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David Gerard Update on the Study of the Economy cf
Rantoul, Illinois
Results from the tenth
Rantoul longitudinal survey
indicate that the private sector is
now optimistic about long-term
prospects for the village economy.
Private sector expectations for earn-
ings and employment have gener-
ally stabilized or improved, and
firms are reporting that the positive
effects of an expanding village
economy are beginning to out-
weigh the negative effects from the
base closure. Even so, data from the
recent past indicate that the upward
trends in earrungs and employment
have not materialized.
The federal government an-
nounced the closure of Rantoul's
Chanute Air Force Base in 1989,
and the base was formally decom-
missioned in September 1993. bi
order to monitor the impact of the
defense conversion process on the
local economy the Bureau of Eco-
nomic and Business Research at the
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign initiated the
Rantoul longitudinal study in the
spring of 1990. The study is based
on biannual surveys of Rantoul-
area businesses, nonprofit organi-
zations, schools, and the
municipality. To account for differ-
ences in the impact of the base clo-
sure among firms, businesses are
divided into six categories: retail,
industrial, financial, artisan/con-
tractor, financial, and professional.
The most recent questionnaires
were returned in the spring of 1994.
Description of Survey and
Results
Each survey includes questions
about recent revenues and employ-
ment developments as well as ex-
pectations regarding future trends.
The first set of questions relates to
current revenue levels and changes
in these levels over the previous
six-month period. However, mea-
sures of central tendency are not
particularly insightful. Although
the arithmetic mean is accurate, it
has little representative value—in
part, because of the wide disper-
sion of values for firm revenues
and employment. In some cases the
mean is taken from an insufficient
number of respondents. Neverthe-
less, monitoring changes across
firms within specific sectors can
still be instructive.
Firms provide information about
employment in the current period
and the change in employment
from the previous period. In addi-
tion, they project employment lev-
els into the near-term future.
Responses from firms that partici-
pated in each of the past two sur-
veys are compared to see how well
their expectations for the fall 1993
matched what actually occurred.
Finally, firms evaluated the
overall village economy with re-
spect to the expected adverse im-
pact of the Chanute AFB closure
and, alternatively, the expected
positive impact of new or expand-
ing businesses in the area for the
latter half of 1993. These evalua-
tions are made on a one-to-four
scale, where one is a powerful im-
pact and four a limited one. Busi-
nesses also evaluated the overall
business climate for the next six
months and for one year from the
survey date. These assessments are
made on a scale of one to 10, where
one is very good and 10 is poor.
The observations that follow are
based on data from eight previous
surveys and the 57 responses re-
ceived from a total of 286 question-
naires mailed in the spring of 1994.
Because the data are taken from a
nonrandom, voluntary-response
survey, the results may provide
insight into the state of the defense
conversion process, but not the
definitive statement.
General Trends
The survey results suggest that
revenues and employment are
roughly stable. While long-run
expectations for the Rantoul
economy are promising, there is no
clear upward trend within the rev-
enue category for the current sur-
vey period. Overall, 46 percent of
responding firms reported de-
creased earnings, 15 percent re-
ported no change, and 39 percent
reported an increase. The only
firms reporting increased earnings
were from the retail and profes-
sional sectors. Similarly, employ-
ment projections for responding
firms are fairly stable, as firms out-
side the industrial sector do not
anticipate substantial changes. A
comparison of the expected delete-
rious effects of the base closure
with the positive impact of new
business expansion, coupled with
an examination of sector-specific
long-run trends provides for the
most useful insight into the Rantoul
economy.
The data comparing the negative
impact of the base closure and the
posihve effects of new or expand-
ing businesses indicate that areas
hardest hit by base closure are re-
tailers and nonprofit organizations.
Each of these sectors has consis-
tently considered the effects of the
AFB closure as more important
than the offsetting positive effects
of expanding business activity
within the community. (Chart 1)
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Chart 1. Expected Negative Impact ofAFB Closure on the Retail Sector Compared with
Expected Positive Effects of Economic Expansion, Fall 1989-Fall 1993
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Moreover, both currently report, on
averagem, that they now expect the
impact of the base closure to be
more pronounced than they did
when the longitudinal study began.
The professional sector followed a
similar trend until the most recent
survey period, at which time re-
porting firms down-
played the negative impact of the
AFB closure. (Chart 2) Industrial
firms, which predominantly sell
their goods outside Rantoul, con-
tinued to report that the effects of
the local economy—whether from
the base closure or new business
—
have had only minimal effects on
employment and earnings within
their sector.
Reporting firms are optimistic
about expectations for the overall
local economy. The average expec-
tations for the Rantoul business
climate over the next 12 months
were the highest they have been in
any survey for the financial, arti-
san/contractor, and professional
sectors. As has been the case for
each of the last three surveys, long-
term expectations relating to the
next year are better than those for
the next six months; in contrast,
three surveys from the fall of 1991
through the fall of 1992 showed
exactly the opposite situation. Ac-
cording to those earlier surveys,
businesses projected that prospects
for the economy were better for the
short run than for the long term.
Not surprisingly, the recent change
in these expectations from short-
term to long-term optimism coin-
cides roughly with the national
economic recovery.
Specific Private Sector
Trends
Retail respondents continue to be
pessimistic about the local business
climate, and survey data indicate
that the local retail economy is soft,
though somewhat more stable than
in previous periods. The percent-
age of retail firms reporting a de-
cline in gross sales increased to 58
percent from 44 percent and the
percentage reporting increases in
employment dropped to 20 percent
from 50 percent between spring
and fall 1993. Further, only 11 per-
cent of firms plan to add full-time
workers. However, the overall
mean change in employees across
the sector was less than one, and 68
percent of firms projected no
change in employment for 1994. the
table shows that retailers and non-
profit organizations consider the
impact of the base closing as more
pronounced than do other sectors.
Each nonprofit respondent re-
ported a decline in contributions.
Chart 2. Expected Negative Impact ofAFB Closure on the Professional Sector
Compared with Expected Positive Effects ofEconomic Expansion, Fall 1989-Fall 1993
1 = important 4= not important
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and none had increased employ-
ment levels, or expected to do so.
The professional sector , in
contrast, placed a smaller empha-
sis on the AFB closure in the re-
cent survey than in earlier ones.
This sector provides a variety of
services, including insurance,
accounting, medical, and dental
operations. One-half of the firms
reported increased billings, and
expectations for the next year are
the best since the study began.
Even so, this sector remains fairly
pessimistic, which may be due to
the decline in billings for one-third
of the respondents and to the fact
that no respondent plarmed to in-
crease staff in the latter half of 1994.
Nevertheless, employment is
stable, as 87 percent of the firms
reported no change in employment
between spring and fall 1993, and
87 percent projected no change for
1994.
Although expectations of the
negahve impact of the base closure
have been fairly stable, respon-
dents from the financial-sector have
become more optimistic about the
positive effects of the expanding
local economy, particularly in the
long-term.
Industrial sector data give mixed
signals, as sales and employment
headed in opposite directions dur-
ing fall 1993. None of the firms
reported an increase in gross sales,
and there was a substantial decline
in some cases. However, each firm
reported an increase in employ-
ment and planned further increases
during 1994. During spring 1992
Projected Economic Performance of Reporting Firms,
Earl L. Grinols Gambling as Economic Policy:
Enumerating Why Losses Exceed Gains
There would he little
concern over how
much gambling there
is—any more than
one cares how much
golf, movie atten-
dance, or opera there
is—if it were notfor
the social problems
and costs that gam-
bling creates.
There are three basic public
policy questions related to
gambling.
How is gambling different
from other forms of entertainment?
Is gambling a good vehicle for
raising taxes? and
Does gambling create economic
development?
Confusion over these questions is
partly due to misinformation by the
gambling industry and partly due
to a faulty framework for evaluat-
ing the issues involved.
This article summarizes the eco-
nomics of gambling, addressing
each of the questions and provid-
ing the reader with a succinct re-
view of current scholarship.
Gambling versus Ordinary
Entertainment
Gambling proponents defend the
industry as providing just another
form of entertainment. In fact, there
would be little concern over how
much gambling there is—any more
than one cares how much golf,
movie attendance, or opera there
is—if it were not for the social
problems and costs that gambling
creates. These costs are quite high,
and quite real.
Though the gambling industry
prefers to refer to itself as "gam-
ing" to emphasize the idea of
leisure games played for entertain-
ment and relaxation, this does not
give the entire story. At least three
things would need to be changed to
convert gambling to ordinary en-
tertainment in its social impact.
First, for a small percentage of
the population, gambling is addic-
tive, with all of the harmful conno-
tations that addiction implies. This
leads to costs imposed on society.
including on those who do not
gamble. One, therefore, would have
to prevent the addiction of the 1.5
to 5 percent of the population who
will become addicted to gambling
when the opportunity to gamble is
available.
Second, although gambling
merely transfers money from one
person's pocket to another, it uses
time and resources. Gambling be-
yond the point of recreation or
entertainment reduces national
income. This type of gambling
would have to be eliminated.
Third, because the nature of
gambling requires government
oversight and restriction (the limi-
tation of competition), it is an in-
dustry that offers artificially high
profits for the few fortimate
enough to be licensed. For example,
in Joliet, Illinois investors put up $7
million to fund a riverboat casino
after being awarded a state license.
News accounts (Chicago Sun-Times,
April 18, 1994) reported that they
nearly tripled their original invest-
ment—within the first six months
of operation. This kind of profit
drives others to seek to expand
gambling for their own benefit.
This usually requires convincing
some governmental body or official
to grant a license and to acquire
that license for oneself. The recent
$20 million influence-buying at-
tempt by a casino using two gov-
ernment insiders to help obtain a
license in Illinois is an example of
what can result (Chicago Tribune,
March 28, 1995). The resulting con-
Editor 's Note: Extensive notes and refer-
ences for this article can be found on page
12.
Illinois Business Review/Spring 1995
centration of money and influence
in the hands of a small group in the
gambling industry creates a climate
of rent-seeking and constant pres-
sure to expand gambling by licens-
ing new operators. In the 1990s the
gambling Lndustr\' has repeatedly
used its money for influence. The
massive concentration of monev
and questionable influence into the
hands of a few in the gambling
LndushA' would need to be elimi-
nated.
One proposal to alleviate the
problem of rent-seeking and
influence-buN-ing—as well as pro-
vide greater benefits for taxpay-
ers—involves states owning the
casinos themselves and then pay-
ing a management fee to the low-
est-bidding company to operate the
boats. This, of course, raises other
problems such as the issue of a
state com.peting with private enter-
tainment businesses while holding
a gambling monopoly. Another
suggestion might be to tax casinos
heavilv enough that their rate of
return is no higher than for ordi-
nary- businesses.
Were each of these changes
made, gambling would become like
other forms of entertainment. In that
e\"ent, the amount of gambling
would not be a social concern.
The Social Costs of
Gambling
Amon? gambling's social costs,
those that are more easily quantifi-
able are associated with addicted
gamblers. These costs derive from
the apprehension, adjudication,
and incarceration of those commit-
ting gambling-related crime, and
from the cost of lost productivity- of
addicted gamblers. To these costs
we must add the direct regulator}'
costs associated with gambling. If
behveen one and five oi even.- 100
of a firm's employees will become
derelict due to gambling addiction,
steal from the company, or worse,
it represents a significant cost of
doing business. The Champaign,
flUnois, banker who stole nearly SI
million by taking out fictitious
loans in other people's names, us-
ing the proceeds for loan paNinents,
and gambling is a good clinical
example. The bank discovered the
fraud when he missed a loan pay-
ment, after which he was tried,
convicted, sentenced, and ser\ed
hme in jail. In addition to the costs
bom bv the bank, social costs in-
cluded costs to the legal system
(the time of accountants, prosecu-
tors, the judge), and incarceration.
Gambling-related crimes are
economically significant. In a pub-
lished report, the American Insur-
ance Institute is cited as estimating
that 40 percent of white collar
crime has its roots in gambling.
The Institute finds that insurance
fraud (such as arson) alone as re-
lated to gambling is SI.3 billion per
vear, or more than SIO annually for
ever\' working American.- The so-
cial costs per addicted gambler
—
just those that can be easily
quanhfied as described here—are
estimated to be bet\\een S14,000
and S30,000 per year.' Assuming, as
is consistent with recent studies,
that the increase in addicted gam-
blers as a percent of the adult
population due to the introduction
of gambling' is between 0.75 and
2.25 percent' implies social costs
between S100-S300 per adult in a
region where gambling becomes
prevalent. Since I first made these
estimates public," I have learned of
recent research that indicates this
range may be too conser\ati\e and
that the costs may be higher.' No-
tice that these costs are averaged
over all adults in the area, not just
those who gamble.
Gambling's social costs are enor-
mous.^ Apphing them to the adult
population of the United States
implies losses equal to the lost out-
put of an additional 1990:111-1991 :U
recession ever}' eight to fifteen
vears, or an additional hurricane
.\ndrew (the most costlv natural
disaster in American histor\') e\"en,-
vear, or t^\o 1993-level Midwest
floods (the largest floods on record
for the area) annually
Information from localiz i expe-
riences highhghts other costs ."> the
public. For example, in October
1994 the front page of the Des
Moines Register described a 19-
vear-old college student who began
gambUng, left college to be nearer
to the Tama Indian Casino, and
started taking out college loans at
different banks, though he was no
longer a student. According to fam-
ilv members, he told them that he
"thought about gambling even,'
second of everv day." He shot him-
self in the head on the day his car
loan pa\Tnent was due, leaving a
note sa^-ing, "I'm out of control."
.Another man killed himself re-
centlv in the parking lot of the
Elgin, Illinois, casino after gam-
bling. He had SI 3 in his possession,
although he had won about S4,0(X)
the dav before at the nearby .Arling-
ton International Racecourse.
Placing a dollar figure on the
cost of a suicide is not easy. The
social costs I discussed here do not
include the harmful effects of many
social problems such as suicide.
.According to leading gambling
researcher, Henn.' Lesieur, compul-
sive gamblers are more than five
times more likelv to commit suicide
than the general population." .Areas
where gambling is prevalent fre-
quentlv stand out in a number of
statistics that reflect the social prob-
lems associated with gambling.
Xevada, for example, has the high-
est suicide rate for residents in the
nation—its rate is more than
double the national average." It has
the highest school dropout rate; is
first for deaths per vehicle-mile
driven; and, according to the Janu-
ary' 1994 issue of the Archives of
Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine, it
led the nation in chUd death by
abuse in 1979-1988 (a period when
casino ganibling was illegal in
other parts of the nation except
.Atlantic CitA). .Although Xevada
does not lead in the statistics for all
problems, it shows up prominently
in statistics for other social prob-
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If between one and five
of every 100 of n firm's
employees will become
derelict due to gam-
bling addiction, . . . it
represents a significant
cost of doing business.
lems including crime. Cities that
have introduced gambling report
that family-related problems such as
child abuse rose after the introduc-
tion of gambling."
Concerning gambling and in-
come reduction, activities that use
time and resources without creat-
ing something of tangible value
reduce national income. Even
though the attraction for many who
gamble is not leisure, those who
speak for the industry often assert
that all gambling is recreational.
That is, regardless of motive or
amount lost, the gambler must
have purchased entertainment
equal in value to what was lost.
Many hold to this position in spite
of evidence such as the survey in
which less thar\ half of the respon-
dents said that they gambled for
enjoyment and fully 27 percent said
that they gambled to get rich.'- This
raises the question of whether
someone who makes $20,000 per
year really experiences $4,000
worth of entertainment in one night
when that $4,000 is lost gambling
on a riverboat." Paul Samuelson,
Nobel prize-winning economist
and internationally known author-
ity and leader in the establishment
of the theory of risk and uncer-
tainty, has linked gambling to in-
come reduction, by writing that
"when pursued beyond the limits
of recreation . . . gambling subtracts
from the national income" (Econom-
ics, 1976, p. 425).
Because of the substantial case to
be made against gambling as the
creator of social problems, the gam-
bling industry has spent a great
deal of money for lobbyists, cam-
paign contributions, marketing
experts, and others to represent its
case and add respectability. These
efforts protect the interests of the
industry in the tremendous profit-
ability of a competition-limited
sector. In Illinois, for example, the
Chicago Sun Times (April 10, 1994)
reported that nearly two-thirds of
the legislature shared in contribu-
tions from the gambling industry
totaling $675,000. The largest re-
cipients were the then Democratic
Speaker of the House and the Re-
publican President of the Senate. In
another state, a former president
pro tem of the state senate has told
me that the gambling interests
"own the legislature." Often, as
reported for example, in the Colum-
bia Journalism Review (January/
February 1994), those who speak
for the industry are found to have
financial ties to it in one form or
another.
Other approaches are also used
by the gambling industry. In Iowa,
a group calling itself "Cihzens for
Riverboat Gambling" and paying
tens of thousands of dollars for
advertisements on television was
discovered by the press to consist
of just two members. "The entire
campaign is being paid for by [the
gambling] company that wants to
bring a floating casino" to Iowa,
according to the account in the
October 20, 1994 Des Moines Regis-
ter. The gambling industry also
maintains contacts with selected
academics and economic consulting
firms to produce studies that give
favorable reports of the effects of
gambling. A number of these stud-
ies have been reviewed by the lead-
ing nahonal gambling expert in this
area, Robert Goodman. He ranked
them in four categories: balanced,
mostly balanced, mostly unbal-
anced, and unbalanced—depend-
ing on whether they were primarily
just promotional pieces for the
gambling industry or discussed the
negative possibilities as well. He
found that only two reports of the
fourteen examined could be consid-
ered balanced and that "most could
not be considered objective descrip-
tions of economic benefits and
costs."'* I have been told by an
economist at a consulting firm that
a gambling company client termi-
nated their contract when the firm
refused to change the economic
benefit numbers in its study to
make them more favorable to the
gambling company's interest.
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It is not uncommon for the gam-
bling industry to outspend its op-
ponents by overwhelming margins
of as much as $100 to $1 in areas
where the industry wants to place
new casinos. The recent poor show-
ing of the industry in the Novem-
ber 8, 1994, elections has even
suggested to some observers that
unless gambling interests outspend
those on the other side of the issue
by $75 to $1 or more, the voters
reject gambling. Gambling expan-
sion initiatives failed in Colorado,
Florida, the Navajo Reservation,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
in New Mexico (the latter due to an
illegality in the way in which the
issue was placed on the ballot). In
Waterloo, Iowa, voters rejected
casino gambling on May 17, 1994,
but the gambling interests were
powerful enough that the issue was
placed on the ballot again only four
months later on September 27.
Spending by the gambling industry
was $40 to $1. The initiative failed.
The gambling industry spent $16.7
million dollars to $1.6 million by
opponents ($10 to $1) in their at-
tempt to convince Florida voters to
open their $32 billion tourist mar-
ket to the casino industry (Florida
Sun, November 9, 1994). Floridians,
who had twice before rejected casi-
nos, voted down gambling by a
margin greater than two to one. On
April 4, 1994, Missouri voters re-
jected an amendment to their state
constitution to allow games of
chance, but the gambling industry
was able to place the issue on the
ballot for another vote in Novem-
ber 1994. The industry more than
doubled its spending the second
time around, bringing the ratio of
spending to $7 million to $90 thou-
sand (a ratio of $78 to $1), winrung
the initiative. Those knowledgeable
about the political situation in Mis-
souri doubt that the issue will be
placed on the ballot again soon,
now that the gambling industry has
won. It is interesting that South
Dakota, for which only 37 percent
opposed video gambling in 1989,
found that opposition had risen to
47 percent by 1994.
The willingness of the gambling
industry to support "cheerleading"
publishing by academics and eco-
nomic consulting firms, make large
political contributions, devote
millions of dollars to public adver-
tising, and create "citizens- for-
gambling groups" testifies to the
amount of money at stake. The
ability of the industry to pursue a
strategy as it has in Florida, Iowa,
Missouri, Michigan, and other ju-
risdictions whereby public votes
are taken repeatedly when the
gambling industry point of view
fails is also quite impressive. Many
question, however, if such activity
leads to good government and
policymaking in every case.
Gambling as Tax Policy
Government bodies often act as if
they believe that gambling taxes
are costless revenues delivered
without the pain of ordinary taxes.
However, gambling taxes are more
costly than taxes raised the ordi-
nary way. An ordinary additional
tax dollar costs the private sector in
the neighborhood of $1.17 to $1.57
in social costs per dollar collected.'^
(For example, a 25 percent tax on
an $80 item raises the cost to the
consumer to $100, which could be
high enough to dissuade the con-
sumer from purchasing the item.
Thus, both the consumer who loses
the item and the seller who loses
the sale bear social costs.) Assum-
ing that fully 40 percent of gam-
bling revenues are taxed, an adult
that loses $200 per year in gam-
bling"' would provide government
with $80 in taxes. Total social costs
imposed are the $80 lost plus the
$100 to $300 in social costs. This
means that gambling taxes cost
between $2.25 and $4.75 per dollar
raised. If gambling taxes are 20
percent of gross revenues (the
usual rate for casino riverboats, for
example), the cost per dollar range
becomes from $3.50 to $8.50. This is
far more costly than raising taxes
The American Insur-
ance Institute esti-
mates that 40 percent
of white collar crime
has its roots in gam-
bling.
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Gambling's social costs
are enormous. Apply-
ing them to the adult
population of the
United States implies
losses equal to the lost
output ofan additional
1990:111-1991:11 reces-
sion every eight to fif-
teen years.
the old fashioned way—by levying
a conventional tax.
Additionally, a public body con-
sidering gambling for its taxes
should know that as gambling con-
tinues to seek new outlets'" existing
gambling tax revenues become
more uncertain. Gambling taxes
should, therefore, be considered
less stable than other forms of tax
for many locations.
Dissociality versus Decent
Debate
Ground swell of public interest has
never been the impetus for expan-
sion of gambling. As indicated,
pressure for gambling has come
primarily from gambling promot-
ers and groups that want to own a
casino.
One way the gambling industry
has responded is to promise eco-
nomic development. As already
explained, many of these studies
are unbalanced in their analysis'" so
that even those close to the indus-
try caution against taking these
claims too seriously.'"
A complementary strategy, remi-
niscent of the tobacco industry's
response to early studies linking
cancer with smoking, is to deny
high social costs by denying that
the spread of gambling will in-
crease gambling addiction, or by
denying the validity of unfavorable
research. This includes questioning
the credibility or motives of re-
searchers,'" even though the money
made from the gambling industry
is the obvious source of conflict of
interest for those who speak for the
industry.-'
Another tactic, exemplified by
plans of the gambling industry to
locate in the narrow part of West
Virginia between Ohio and Penn-
sylvania, is to divide and conquer
based on "beggar-thy-neighbor"
gambling competition. By having
regions vie for each others' dollars,
the industry can enhance its
chances of expanding into both
locations. In West Virgirua, officials
were told that casinos would draw
more than 80 percent of their pa-
trons from nearby areas (notably
Columbus and Cleveland, Ohio,
and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania). If
such a great proportion of the gam-
blers will come from much larger
population centers in neighboring
states, why does the industry not
locate its casinos there directly? In
many cases, the answer is that they
would like to, but have been turned
down. The casinos in Gary, Indiana
(targeting the Chicago market) will
almost surely be cited by the indus-
try in the future as a reason to in-
troduce gambling into Chicago. By
locating first in a neighboring area,
the industry provides itself lever-
age for later expansion. The pattern
can be noted in diverse locations
across the country: Tunica, Missis-
sippi, feeds on the Memphis, Ten-
nessee, market; Las Vegas feeds on
the California market, Atlantic City
feeds on the Philadelphia market,
and so on. In the case of East St.
Louis, the casino objective was to
attract money from St. Louis, Mis-
souri, until casinos would be
opened in St. Louis itself. The clas-
sic "race to the bottom" engendered
by such competition naturally
works in the favor of gambling
expansion. However, when the
bottom is reached—convenience
gambling is offered in each re-
gion—few regions will attract
money from other areas, though all
will experience, to varying degrees,
the associated social costs. Even
though they suffer the social costs
of gambling, tourist gambling cen-
ters like Las Vegas and Atlantic
City avoid much of the costs when
the gamblers take their problems
back home.
Gambling as Economic
Development
In contrast to the impression of
gambling as a powerful engine of
job creation often provided by the
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promotional literature produced by
the gambling industry' and its
spokesmen, gambling operates
under the same laws of economics
as other business. It is different, as
described earlier, only in its nega-
tive externalities. This means that
when convenience gambling lo-
cates in a population center, draw-
ing its clientele from nearby
residents, it does not create jobs
any more than adding a new res-
taurant to a large city would create
jobs. When the casino or restaurant
grows in size, its revenues come at
the expense of the revenues of
other business. One enterprise
shrinks as the other grows, with the
only lasting result being a shift of
resources out of the other sectors
into the expanding firm.
In principle, tourist gambling
can lead to an expansion of the
economic base (Las Vegas would
be a minor tov^Ti in the desert of
Nevada if not for tourist gambling),
but it does so at the expense of
neighboring areas (primarily CaU-
fomia, in the case of Nevada). Ar-
eas that develop successfully
through casinos shrink the econo-
mies of neighboring areas while
sending many of the social costs
home with the problem gamblers
(such as the banker mentioned
earlier whose gambling was con-
ducted elsewhere, but whose costs
were paid in Champaign).
VVTiether any business adds to
the economic base or diminishes it
depends on whether the business
draws more new dollars to the area
that are then spent on goods and
services in that area. To benefit the
local economy these new dollars
must exceed the number of dollars
the business causes to be removed
from the area. Because casinos have
artificially high profit margins, are
often owned by out-of-area inves-
tors, and frequentlv take dollars
from the area's existing tourist base
rather than attracting new tourists,
the effect of gambling in many
cases is to diminish the economic
base and cost jobs. This possibility.
dependent on net export multiplier
theorv and regional input-output
multiplier analysis is not in dispute
among responsible economists.^
However, it is difficult to find any
gambling industry study that
evaluates or even mentions this
possibilitv'. Discussions of how
much money will be taken out of
the economy by promoters in the
form of profits or out-of-area pur-
chases or how much will be used to
fund later expansion into other
areas is never included in industry
proposals.
The claim is frequently heard
that bv introducing gambling a
localit}' can regain revenues that
are currently being drained by a
distant gambling center. However,
such a claim must be evaluated
carefully. It is also possible that
introducing gambling can increase
the total of all gambling while hav-
ing little or no effect on those who
gamble at distant centers. In fact, it
may even worsen the outflow by
introducing more people to gam-
bling. This was precisely the situa-
tion of Chicago between 1990 and
1993. In 1990, before casinos were
introduced in Illinois, there were
760 thousand visits by Chicagoans
to Atlantic City and Las Vegas. Ln
1993, after casino gambling had
been available in Illinois for se\eral
years, there were still 760 thousand
visits to Atlantic Cit\' and Las Ve-
gas, but the total number of gam-
bling visits had risen from 902
thousand to 2.5 million.-'
If gambling is just a shell game
—
attracting dollars from one person's
pocket to another and from one
region to another—whose effects
depend on the same rules of eco-
nomics as other business, why do
other businesses not receive the
same amount of public attention?
The question brings us fuU circle to
the questions we posed at the begin-
ning of this article.
Summary and Conclusions
Apart from the social harm that it
causes, gambling would be just
another inconsequential, lo -
technology business earning 'di-
nary profits and exhibiting easy
entr}' and exit. It is a logical impos-
sibility' for every area to win at the
others' expense when gambling is
present in everv' region. For the
nation as a whole there will be no
net economic development from
the spread of gambling, but there
will be the creation of a new social
problem and the social costs that
entails. The best research available
today indicates that these costs are
very high.
Because the pressure for new
casinos will continue as long as the
profits of gambling promoters are
artificiallv high in consequence of
the need for government oversight,
and because "beggar-thy-neighbor"
competition betw^een localities pro-
vides incentives for an ill-consid-
ered race to the bottom, a national
policy is needed if serisible choices
based on a dispassionate compari-
son of the benefits and costs of
gambling is to replace present
trends. From a national perspec-
tive, the sole benefit of gambling is
that it is an additional form of en-
tertainment for the subset of users
who gamble recreationally and can
do so without harming themselves
or others. The cost-benefit question
is whether we need another form of
entertainment badly enough that
we are willing to pay for another
social problem whose costs are
equal to an additional recession
everv' decade in order to have it.
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•This article is prompted by the continuing
deb.ite over the expansion of gambhng as a
purported tool of economic development.
The article refocuses attention on gambling
as a social cost-benefit issue bv summariz-
ing the economic case against gambling. By
framing the issue appropriately, leaders in
Illinois and other states will be better able to
make judgments about its value as eco-
nomic policy.
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Harvey B. Westbrook, Jr. The Illinois Econometric Forecast
Steady expansion in the Illi-
nois economy is predicted by
the Illinois Econometric Model. The
total economy is projected to ex-
pand at a moderate rate as declin-
ing growth in the goods-producing
sector is offset by an increase in
growth of the substantially larger
services-producing sector.
Employment
Growth in Illinois employment will
be steady over the period fore-
casted by the Illinois Econometric
Model (lEM). According to the
model, developed by and main-
tained in the Bureau of Economic
and Business Research, the rate of
expansion in total nonagricultural
employment will decline from 1.7
percent in 1995 to 1.3 percent
through 1997. The slowdown in
1996 can be explained by declines
in the pace of expansion of specific
goods-producing industries. This
slowdown in expansion is miti-
gated by the steady rate of growth
m services-producing industries
shown in Chart 1.
Employment in the goods-
producing sector of the Illinois
economy will grow at a slightly
slower pace in 1996 and 1997.
Growth in this sector is projected to
decrease from 2.5 percent in 1995 to
1.1 percent and 0.8 percent in 1996
and 1997. Construction employ-
ment is expected to move upward
by 4.7 percent in 1995 and then
increase 5.1 percent and 4.7 percent
in the next two years. Although the
lEM projects a steady rise in em-
ployment in construction, this sec-
tor makes up only about 4 percent
of the non-
agricultural state economy, not
large enough to offset the reduced
growth of other goods-producing
industries.
The reduced rate of expansion in
nonagricultural employment, re-
flects a slowing of the rate of
growth in manufacturing. Manufac-
turing constitutes nearly one-fifth
of the nonagricultural Illinois
economy; thus, changes in employ-
ment developments in this sector
are likely to have pronounced ef-
fects on trends relating to the
whole. The lEM projects total
manufacturing employment growth
of 2.2 percent for 1995 and 0.2 per-
cent in 1996; thereafter, there will be
a slight decline. Durable manufac-
turing is expected to expand 3.2
percent in 1995, then decline
slightly in 1996 and 1997. Nondu-
rable manufacturing employment is
projected to expand roughly 1 per-
cent in 1995 and thereafter remain
approximately unchanged.
The services-producing indus-
tries, nearly four-fifths of the
Editor's Note: The complete forecast statis-
tics upon which this article is based can be
found on pp. 17-18.
Chart 1. Percent Change in Growth in Goods-and Services-Producing Employment in Illinois
nciiagricultural state economy,
dominate the employment markets
in the Illinois economy. The lEM
projects between 1 and 2 percent
employment expansion per annum
in services-producing employment
during the forecast period. Employ-
ment in wholesale trade, approxi-
mately 6.4 percent of the total
statewide employment, is expected
to grow at 3 percent in 1995 and
then remain essentially unchanged
in 1996 and 1997. Retail trade is
anticipated to expand at 1.7 percent
in 1995 then decrease to 0.7 percent
and 1.1 percent in 1996 and 1997.
The finance, insurance, and real
estate subsector is expected to re-
main constant in 1995 but is pro-
jected to enlarge slightly in 1996
and 1997.
The services sector, a catch-all
subsector in the services-producing
industries, includes services related
to business, health, legal, engineer-
ing, and management.
The IBM projects employment
growth in services of 2.5 percent for
1995 and 2.6 percent and 2.7 per-
cent in 1996 and 1997, respectively.
The expansion in this subsector is
the source of the robust rate of
increase in services-producing
industries.
Increases in employment in
the services-producing subsector
will more than offset the slight
decrease in growth in goods-
producing industries. Government
employment is not expected to
expand in 1995, but will increase
slightly in 1996 and 1997. Since
this is a relatively small sector, 14
percent of the nonagricultural
Illinois economy, even large ex-
pansions in this sector would not
affect decreases in the state as a
whole. Concentrated progress in
the services-producing industries
is consistent with forecasts of the
national economy run by the
WEFA Group, a national forecast-
ing service.
Personal Income
Real total personal income, ad-
justed for forecasts of inflation, will
expand 2.4 percent in 1995. An
increased growth of 3.2 percent and
2.8 percent is projected for 1996 and
1997. Although the lEM current
forecast of personal income is
slightly lower, reflecting the less
optimistic forecasts of the national
economy (see Chart 2), the projec-
tions are not significantly different
from the most recent projections
made by the lEM last quarter.
Nonagricultural personal in-
come is expected to increase at a
slightly lower rate than total per-
sonal income, implying stronger
growth in the agricultural sector.
However, the lEM does not forecast
the agricultural sector directly.
Total nonagricultural personal
income is expected to expand 2.8
percent in 1995, then will fluctuate
near this level through the remain-
der of the forecast period. The lEM
forecasts 2.9 and 2.7 percent
growth in nonagricultural personal
income for 1996 and 1997. The in-
crease in personal income is
especially noteworthy as we re-
mind ourselves that the forecasts
are adjusted to take into account
the effects of inflation.
As was the case in employment,
much of the increase in total per-
sonal income is the result of expan-
sion in the services-producing
industries. However, the forecasts
of growth in goods-producing in-
dustries are higher than previous
forecasts of the lEM. Growth in
goods-producing industries is ex-
pected to reach 2.8 percent in 1995,
then moderate to 2.2 percent in
1996 and 2 percent in 1997. The
projected decrease in growth is
smaller than was previously fore-
cast by the lEM. Fourth quarter
projections of the lEM forecast 1.8
percent growth in 1995 and 0.2 and
0.9 percent growth in 1996 and
1997.
Income in manufacturing indus-
tries can be expected to expand 3
percent in 1995, then grow only 2.1
percent in 1996 and 2.2 percent in
1997. Income in durable manufac-
turing will grow more slowly than
in nondurable manufacturing.
Durable manufacturing incomes
are forecast to increase 3.9 percent
Chart 2. Percent Change in US Gross Domestic Product and Growth in
Charts. Real Illinois Retail Sales (thousands of 1987 dollars)
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in 1995 followed by a decline to 1.3
percent in 1996 and 1997. In con-
trast, nondurable manufacturing
income is projected to grow only
1.7 percent in 1995, then quicken
to 3.3 percent in 1996 and 3.5 per-
cent in 1997. Since durable manu-
facturing is a larger portion of total
Illinois manufacturing—approxi-
mately 12 percent versus nondu-
rable at 8.6 percent—the decrease
has a stronger effect on the growth
of manufacturing as a whole.
Personal income in the services-
producing sector is increasing
steadily. Expansion in personal
income is expected to be 2.9 percent
in 1995 accompanied by an increase
to 3.2 percent in 1996 and a de-
crease to 3 percent in 1997. The
iiicrease in growth is consistent
with the forecast of total personal
income for the state. Wholesale
trade shows the most significant
expansion in income with forecasts
of 3.3 percent in 1995 and relatively
large increases of 4.9 percent in
1996 and 4.5 percent in 1997. In-
creases in personal income are also
projected for finance, insurance,
and real estate. Expansions of 2.6
percent and 3.5 percent in 1995 and
1996, with an increase to 3.6 per-
cent in 1997, are projected.
Stability can be expected for the
largest component of the services-
producing sector. Services are ex-
pected to grow 3.2 percent in 1995
with slight increases to 3.6 percent
in 1996 and 3.4 percent in 1997. As
this sector is 27.8 percent of the
nonagricultural personal income in
the state economy, it is not surpris-
ing that its growth displays the
same steady behavior seen in the
aggregate.
Gross State Product
Real gross state product (GSP), the
total iriflation-adjusted value of all
goods and services produced in
Illinois, will expand 2.3 percent in
1995. Somewhat more rapid rates of
expansion are forecast for the re-
mainder of the forecast period.
Goods-producing industries will
expand 2.6 percent in 1995 followed
by projections of 2 percent and 2.2
percent in 1996 and 1997. Durable
manufacturing is expected to grow
2.8 percent in 1995 and then drop to
0.3 percent and 1.2 percent in 1996
and 1997, respectively. A 3.2 per-
cent increase in services-producing
industries is expected in 1995 fol-
lowed by 3.5 percent in 1996 and
3.3 percent in 1997. The behavior of
growth in GSP is similar tn most
major sectors of the economy. The
forecast of GSP has not changed
substantially from previous projec-
tions of the lEM.
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Consumer spe* ling,
as measured by retail
sales, is projected to
expand steadily,
fluctuating around a
2 percent annual rate
of increase. A decline
of nearly 5 percent in
spending on
durables is projected
for 1995, followed by
a smaller contraction,
then a moderate
increase in 1997.
Nondurable goods
are projected to grow
at 6.3 percent in 1995,
followed by some-
what lower growth in 1996 and
1997. Because expenditures on non-
durable goods are substantially
greater than those on durable
goods, the stable growth of the
total retail sales is not surprising.
Declines in consumer spending on
durables will be more than offset
by a continued expansion in spend-
ing on nondurables. Chart 3 illus-
trates the magnitudes of spending
on durable and nondurable goods.
Conclusion
The Illinois economy will experi-
ence only moderate expansion in
employment, personal income, and
GSP. Such a forecast is consistent
with the less optimistic forecasts
we are starting to see for the na-
tional economy. The expansion of
the services-producing sectors ac-
companied by relatively weak
growth in goods-producing indus-
tries may be viewed as a continua-
tion of the long-term shift in the
underlying structure of the
economy.
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Harvey B. Westbrook, Jr. Illinois Revenue Forecast
Continued
growth of General
Fund tax revenue is pro-
jected by the Illinois
Econometric Model (JEM)
of the Bureau for Eco-
nomic and Business Re-
search. An expansion of
5.5 percent is forecast for
the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1995, followed by
a somewhat more moder-
ate increase of 4.8 percent
in 1996 (see Table la). The
moderation in revenue
growth reflects a slow-
down in projected in-
creases in nominal net
personal income, net re-
tail sales, and net miscel-
laneous tax revenue. A
slight decline is forecast
for net corporate income
taxes in 1995, followed by
a rebound in 1996.
Real net General Funds revenue
is expected to expand 1.7 percent
in 1995, then rise 2.0 percent in
1996. Real net General Funds rev-
enue is adjusted to reflect the ef-
fects of projected inflation.
Moderate growth is forecast for net
-.
--
.- •,-
Forecast Statistics
Forecast Statistics
Real llUiiois Retail Sales (in millions of 1987 dollars)
Total Retail Sales
% change
Durable Goods
% change
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Michael V. Maciosek Illinois Exports
Over the last two decades the
combination of actively pro-
trade presidential administrations
and technological advances in com-
munications and transportation
have given US companies improved
access to international markets. In
the last two years, markets have
been opened through the comple-
tion of the Uruguay round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade and the signing of the North
American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). More recently, talks
covering both Pacific and North
and South American trade areas
have been started in order to pro-
vide even larger markets and new
opportunities. On June 2, Secretary
of State Warren Christopher pro-
posed talks on an Atlantic trade
area, to include the United States
and the European Community, that
could set the stage for continuously
expanding markets though the next
quarter century.
These developments are likely to
benefit Illinois companies at least
as much as companies in other
states. Estimates based on state and
national data indicate that manu-
facturing exports in Illinois grew
nearly 90 percent between 1983 and
1993 after adjusting for inflation. In
this article, the available data are
used to outline patterns in Illinois
exports and export-related employ-
ment and to identify the industries,
companies, and employees in the
Illinois economy most affected by
' Industry definitions correspond to Standard
Industrial Classifications. 'Firm' or 'plant' is
a reference to an operation at a single loca-
tion (establisfiment) and not a reference to
the entire operations of a company (which
may have multiple establishments).
the opportunities presented by
opening international markets.
Illinois exporters have been partici-
pating in markets worldwide and
in doing so ha\'e affected employ-
ment and income throughout the
state economy. The data suggest
that in some areas Illinois may not
be taking full advantage of export
opportunities. This fact, combined
with freer world markets in the
near future, provides the potential
for Illinois exports to continue their
rapid growth.
The data used in this article were
taken from various editions of the
Illinois Statistical Abstract (including
the forthcoming 1995 edition).
Section 16, "Exports and Export-
Dependent Employment" provided
the export data that are analyzed
here using employment, gross state
product, and price index data from
other Abstract sections. (See the
data note, p. 6.)
Illinois Exporters
The 1987 Census of Manufactures
indicates that 21 percent of Illinois
manufacturing establishments ex-
port part of their product, com-
pared with 18 percent for the
United States as a whole. More than
one-third of the firms in Electric
and Electronic Equipment, Trans-
portation Equipment, and Instru-
ments and Related Products are
engaged in exporting.' These in-
dustries produce products such as
appliances, audiovisual equipment,
communications equipment, motor
vehicles and parts, railroad equip-
ment, medical instruments, and
photographic equipment. Small
firms play a significant role in ex-
ports—75 percent of the state's
3,651 exporting manufacturers
employ fewer than 100 people.
Exports are spread widely
across these firms. For firms for
which information is available, 76
percent sell less than one-fifth of
their product abroad, and less than
1 percent export more than one-
half of their goods. More than one-
third of exporting establishments
export less than 1 percent of their
total production.
The Growing Importance
of Exports
The recent history of real (inflation-
adjusted) manufacturing and com-
modity exports is shown in Chart 1.
Over this eight-year period, real
manufacturing exports increased
by 70 percent, and from 1989 to
1993 total real commodities exports
Chart I. Real Illinois Exports (thousands of constant dollars, 19S2-84 = W0>
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Chart 2. Manufinturin^ Exports' Share of Economic Aclivity (ficrcciit)
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Chart 3. Illinois Employment Related to Manufacturing Exports (thousands)
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5). However, in view of the fact
that the state's share of US manu-
facturing is somewhat greater than
its share of the overall economy (it
averaged 5.5 percent between 1983
and 1991), it seems possible that
Illinois manufacturing exports are
below their potential level. This
seems to be the case given that 9.5
percent of Illinois manufacturing
was devoted to exports in 1991,
compared with 11.1 percent for the
United States as a whole.
The value of parts and supplies
(not including services) used by
export manufacturers began the
period at more than 5.5 percent but
has fallen consistently since. In
1983 the value of parts and sup-
plies used by exporters was greater
than direct exports, indicating that
Illinois was a net supplier to export
manufacturers in other states.
However, the pattern reversed in
1988, and it appears that Illinois
export manufacturers have become
net purchasers.
The Illinois share of aggregate
US employment has also averaged
about 4.8 percent in recent years. In
1989 the Illinois share of US manu-
facturing employment related to
direct exports reached this same
level and remained there. Again, a
more appropriate comparison may
be the Illinois share of US manufac-
turing employment, which averaged
5.4 percent between 1983 and 1991.
The portion of Illinois employ-
ment related to the parts, supplies,
and services used in export manu-
facturing equals the Illinois share
of US manufacturing as a whole
(Chart 6). In 1991, employment
related to manufacturing exports
(including supplies and services)
was 18.6 percent for both Illinois
and the United States, indicating
that Illinois employment in the
exporter supply network has been
at a reasonable level.
Important Industries
A few industries produce the bulk
of Illinois exports. In 1991, Indus-
trial Machinery and Equipment,
Chart 5. The Illinois Share of US Export Manufacturing (percent)
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Chemicals and Allied Products, and
Electric and Electronic Equipment
accounted for nearly 60 percent of
Illinois direct manufacturing ex-
ports and 62 percent of employ-
ment related to direct exports. The
figures on direct exports do not
give an accurate picture of each
sector's contribution. Establish-
ments in one industry purchase
parts and supplies from establish-
ments in other industries, and the
value of these parts and supplies is
counted in the final export product,
not as exports for the supplying
firm. The Department of Com-
merce estimates that Primary Metal
Industries make the largest contri-
bution of parts and supplies to
export manufacturers, and that
Fabricated Metals Products, ac-
count for the most employment
related to the manufacture of parts
and supplies for exporters.
Within the broad industrial cat-
egories, a large portion of exports
and related employment can be
attributed to a few, more narrowly
defined industries. The largest.
Construction and Related Machin-
ery, accounts for 56 percent of the
direct exports of Industrial Machin-
ery and Equipment and provides
30 percent of the export-related
employment in the sector. Simi-
larly, Communications Equipment
accounts for 47 percent of direct
exports and 26 percent of export
related employment in Electric and
Electronic Equipment. Drugs are
notable for constituting 46 percent
of direct exports and 73 percent of
direct export employment in
Chemicals and Allied Products.
Problems with the data make it
difficult to identify industries with
fast export growth. Yearly esti-
mates within an industry can vary
substantially due to the signing or
termination of major supply con-
tracts, the startup or closing of
large firms within an industry, and
estimation problems. Thus, annual
growth rates can be erratic, and
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compdrisons made over a period of
years can \ ary greatly depentling
on the choice of the period's initial
and final years. Nevertheless, it is
possible to identify some strong
industries such as Apparel and
Other Textile Products, which reg-
istered the largest growth of any
industry. The exports of Chemicals
and Allied Products Industries and
Printing and Publishing also grew
consistently throughout the 1983-
1991 period; and in more recent
years. Rubber and Miscellaneous
Plastic Products and Primary Metal
Industries have been among the
leaders.
Important Trading Partners
Half of the export pie shown in
Chart 7 is composed of exports to
just five of the 224 nations that
import Illinois goods. TTiirty-one
percent of Illinois exports are
shipped to our NAFTA partners,
Canada and Mexico. However, the
rest of Illinois exports are spread
more widely, with only 7 percent
going to the rest of the Americas,
14 percent to western Europe and
Scandinavia, and 22 percent to
eastern Asia.
Chart 7. Illinois Exports /n/ Importing Nation, 299.3
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Canada is the largest importer in
virtually every industry. But there
are exceptions. Japan is the largest
importer of Illinois Agricultural
Crops and Metal Mining products;
Morocco is the largest importer of
Coal; and the United Kingdom is
the largest importer of Lumber and
Wood Products.
We might expect Illinois exports
in some industries to be limited by
the economic structure and re-
sources of our trading partners.
Yet, surprisingly, Canada is the
largest importer of Illinois Forestry
commodities. Fishing, Hunting,
and Trapping commodities, and
Paper, and is the second largest
importer of Illinois Lumber and
Wood Products, despite Canada's
relative strength in these indus-
tries. Mexico is the third largest
importer of both Textile Mill Prod-
ucts and Apparel and Other Fin-
ished Products. Japan, in addition
to being a primary importer of
Illinois agricultural and mineral-
based commodities, is the forth
largest importer of Industrial Ma-
chinery and Computer Equipment,
the third largest importer of Elec-
tric and Electronic Equipment, and
the second largest importer of In-
struments and Related Products.
Surprisingly, the state's smaller
trading partners are relatively large
importers in some industries. Mo-
rocco and Brazil rank first and fifth
in the importation of Illinois coal.
Saudi Arabia is the seventh largest
importer of Textile Mill Products,
and the twelfth
largest importer
of Petroleum
Products. In
Apparel and
Other Finished
Products, Costa
Rica is tenth
and Haiti is
thirteenth; in
Lumber and
Wood Products,
Poland is ninth
and Hungary is
eleventh; and in Leather and
Leather Products, the Dominican
Republic is second and Thailand
is fifth.
Concluding Remarks
In short, while a large portion of
Illinois exports are sent to a few
countries, they do reach virtually
Canada 24.4%
Japan 9.1%
Mexico 6.9%
every nation on the globe. With
perhaps 10 percent of Illinois GSP
and employment tied to exports
(including all commodities and
services, and supplies and services
related to exports), it is likely that
more Illinois residents earn part of
their paycheck in the markets of
other countries than realize it. With
exports becoming an increasingly
important part of GSP and new
US trade agreements on the table,
it is likely that even more Illinois
residents will be employed in ex-
port related jobs over the next
quarter century.
Data Note
The two primary data sources for
this article are the US Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
and the Massachusetts Institute for
Social and Economic Research
(MISER). The Department of Com-
merce estimates are based on a sur-
vey of manufacturing establishments.
These data tend to underestimate
manufacturing exports because
manufacturers only report the por-
tion of their product that they export
directly. Goods that are sold to inter-
mediate parties may also be exported
without the manufacturers' knowl-
edge. The MISER data are based on
Shipper's Export Declaration forms.
Because these forms are incomplete,
the MISER data need to be inter-
preted with caution. For example,
exports that have been manufac-
tured, mined, or grown in Iowa and
temporarily warehoused in Illinois
before being exported are likely to be
counted as Illinois exports. Similarly,
products originating from Illinois
could be tabulated as exports of
another state. On the destination end,
exports from Illinois that are shipped
to one nation according to the
Shipper's Export Declaration form,
may be subsequently shipped to
another country without being noted
on the form.
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Qiumei Yang The Potential Impact of the North
American Free Trade Agreement on the
Illinois Economy
On January 1, 1994, the United
States, Canada, and Mexico
signed the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the
first reciprocal free trade pact be-
tween developing and industrial
countries. NAFTA promotes the
liberalization of trade and invest-
ment in North America—a market
even larger than that of the current
European Union (EU).
By eliminating tariff and most
nontariff barriers NAFTA will gen-
erate higher US exports to the
growing Mexican market and con-
sequently more US jobs. Illinois
residents, however, are concerned
about the potential impact of
NAFTA on the state economy.
These concerns have been height-
ened by the devaluation of the
Mexican peso since December 1994,
which further complicated discus-
sions about how NAFTA will affect
the American and Illinois economies.
NAFTA extends the provisions
of the US and Canada Free Trade
Agreement, signed in 1989, to in-
clude the Mexican economy. As a
way to try to predict the potential
impact of NAFTA on the Illinois
economy, I will examine
how the US-Canada
agreement has affected
our state. Then I will offer
views about how the
introduction of Mexico
into the equation might
influence Illinois exports,
income, and employment.
Chart I. Illinois Exports to Canada: 19S9-1993
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US-Canada Free
Trade and the
Illinois Economy
After the implementation of the
US-Canada agreement in 1989,
Illinois exports to Canada have been
growing steadily (Chart 1). Between
1987 and 1989 the annual average
growth rate of Illinois exports to
Canada was 13 percent. In 1990, the
second year after UCFTA was en-
acted, Illinois exports to Canada
jumped by 52.9 percent. Since then,
exports from Illinois to Canada have
exceeded $5.0 billion every year,
compared with $3.4 billion in 1989.
Export-related businesses that
have benefited most from US-
Canada free trade are transporta-
tion equipment, industrial
machinery and computers, electric
and electronic equip-
ment, fabricated and
primary metals, and
chemicals (Table 1).
These industries create
the highest paying jobs
in Illinois. The Office of
the US Trade Represen-
tative estimates that the
average hourly wage of
Illinois workers in 1991
was $12.79 in chemical
industries, $13.44 in
primary metal indus-
tries, $13.56 in industry
machinery and comput-
ers, and $13.76 in
Table 1. Illinois Top 10 Exports to Canada, 1993
($ thousands)
1. Indust. Machinery & Computer Equip. 1,788,023
2. Electronic and Electrical Equipment 727,323
3. Transportation Equipment 683,371
4. Chemicals and Allied Products 483,255
5. Food and Kindred Products 291,505
6. Fabricated Metal Products 275,293
7. Printing and Publishing 237,398
8. Rubber and Misc. Plastics Products 219,209
9. Primary Metal Industries 191,517
10. Instruments and Related Products 141,987
Source: lllitiois Stutistical Abstract, 1994.
transportation equipment, all
above the $11.68 average manufac-
turing wage.
NAFTA expands the gains that
Canada and the United States have
already received from the earlier
agreement. Nevertheless, NAFTA
did not address the ongoing US-
Canadian argument over Canadian
wheat export subsidies. With the
inclusion of Mexico, American and
Canadian wheat farmers face inten-
sified competition and continuing
rounds of dispute.
NAFTA and the Illinois
Economy
Illinois exports to Mexico have
grown markedly since 1989 (Chart
2). By 1991 Mexico became the third
largest export market for Illinois
behind Canada and Japan. In the
same year, Illinois exports of manu-
factured goods to Mexico generated
almost 24,500 jobs in the state. The
major exports from Illinois to Mexico
are the same ones that benefited the
most from US-Canada free trade
—
industrial machinery and computers,
transportation equipment, electric
and electronic equipment, primary
metals, and chemicals (Table 2).
The US Council of Mexico-US
Business Committee has made
comprehensive projections of the
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Chart!. Illinois Exports to Mexico: 1989-1993
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potential impact of NAFTA on the
Illinois economy (see the side bar,
p. 9). Illinois exports of industrial
goods and corn will benefit most
from the opening up of the Mexi-
can markets by NAFTA, and conse-
quently employment in these
industries is expected to increase.
Illinois industries such as insur-
ance, export/import services, and
trucking will benefit from greater
access to markets, intellectual prop-
erty rights protection, and the re-
laxation of investment restrictions
in Mexico.
While facilitating the increase of
exports from the US to Mexico,
NAFTA also lifts restrictions on
various Mexican imports such as
glassware, ceramic tile, and fruits
and vegetables. This may increase
competition to US producers. More
important, labor interests argue
that the low cost of Mexican labor
will drive down the average wage
the exchange rate of the peso and
the Mexican inflation rate.
The decline in the exchange rate
of the peso could cut US exports to
Mexico and increase US imports as
Mexican goods become less expen-
sive to Americans, and US-
produced goods become relatively
more expensive to the Mexicans.
If Mexican prices and wages
increase at a similar rate in re-
sponse to the drop of value in the
peso, then we need not worry
about the dampening effect that
peso devaluation might create on
US production. However, if the
increase in the Mexican inflation
rate falls behind the speed of the
real devaluation of the peso, then
the negative effect of peso devalua-
tion on the sales of relatively more
expensive US goods in Mexico will
be the dominant force.
Before devaluation the inflation
rate in Mexico was 7 percent. By
mid-March, it had doubled to 14
percent. The rate of devaluation
was relatively smaller. The fast
growth in the Mexican consumer
prices could serve to modestly
strengthen the competitiveness of
US goods in Mexico.
The economic plan put forward
by the Mexican government in
January was designed to improve
the Mexican current account bal-
ance by $14 billion in 1995. Accord-
ing to the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco Weekly Letter (March
17, 1995), the realization of such a
plan would reduce US gross do-
mestic product by about 0.2 percent
in 1995 if the $14 billion improve-
ment in the Mexican current ac-
count is created solely from a lower
trade deficit and if trade with the
US contributes to the bulk of this
improvement.
The effect of the devaluation of
the peso on the Illinois economy
can then be roughly approximated
by multiplying the US GDP by the
portion of the Illinois Gross State
Product that is accounted for by
exports to Mexico. In 1993, Illinois
total exports to Mexico was 0.5
percent of the gross state product.
Thus, given a 0.2 percent overall
US GDP effect, Illinois will expect a
0.1 percent drop in the gross state
product in 1995 due to the devalua-
tion of the Mexican peso.
Conclusion
NAFTA will create jobs with higher
income levels for Americans. With
government action and well-
organized job training programs,
most low-skilled American workers
displaced could expect a relatively
easy job-shift from import-
competitive to export industries.
The further liberalization in
regional trade and investment
brought by NAFTA is expected to
have a positive effect on the Illinois
economy, especially in export
industries.
The recent Mexican peso devalu-
ation, however, proposes a poten-
tial threat to the competitiveness of
US production. A stable economy
in Mexico is needed to assure that
Illinois benefits from NAFTA.
The Potential Impact ofNAFTA on the Illinois Economy
Exports
m $45.7 million in additional exports to Mexico every
year in the next ten years.
Faster growth for top four export industries (non-
electrical machinery, electronic equipment, chemicals,
and transportation equipment), which currently
account for 60 percent of total Illinois exports.
More business for retailers and producers of medical
equipment and supplies and industrial products such as
auto parts, truck fleet, mining and construction equip-
ment, and pollution control equipment and services.
Four million tons of com exports to Mexico every year
once NAFTA is fully implemented (after ten years).
Employment
m 10,300 new jobs over the next ten years.
At the end of the 10-year transition period, increased
employment mining, crude petroleum and natural gas,
paper and allied products, prinhng and publishing,
chemicals and allied products, petroleum and coal,
rubber, leather and leather products, fabricated metal
products, nonelectric machinery, transportahon equip-
ment, and miscellaneous manufacturing.
Market Access
u Expanded market opportunities for Illinois manufac-
turing, transportation, insurance, construction and engi-
neering, telecommunications equipment, and export/
import service industries.
Intellectual Property Rights Protection
m 20-year patent protection from the Mexican government.
This will benefit Illinois pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Investment Restriction
m Elimination of investment restrictions on international
cargo trucking in Mexico. Illinois trucking companies
will be allowed to use their own drivers and equipment
for shipments into Mexico.
Guaranteed nondiscriminatory access to the Mexican
public telephone network in 18 months after
implementation.
Increased Mexican demand for services of Illinois
construction and engineering firms, and financial, legal,
and brokerage services.
Illinois firms operating in Mexico will receive the same
legal treatment as Mexican firms.
Source: The US Council of Mexico-US Business Committee
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Marcia Tjader How DCCA Is Helping Illinois Businesses
Go Global
I
nternational business is vital to
creating jobs and economic
growth in the United States and
IlUnois. The worki market is four
times larger than the US market,
and the slowdown of US economic
growth makes it even more impor-
tant for local firms to investigate
new markets. It can be argued that
exports provide the best way for
the US and Illinois economies to
grow and prosper. Since 1986, ex-
ports alone accounted for over 40
percent of US economic growth.
Between 1989 and 1994 Illinois
exports doubled from $13.2 billion
to $26.4 billion.' From 1993 to 1994
the total dollar value of Illinois
exports in 1994 increased 20.2 per-
cent, nearly double the 10.2 percent
increase in the United States as a
whole. According to the Center for
Economic Competitiveness, SRI
International, and DRI McGraw
Hill, "International markets will
provide the greatest opportunity
for Illinois manufacturing-based
industries in the 1990s." The posi-
tive impact of international trade
on the Illinois economy is illus-
trated by the following statistics:
direct and indirect exports sustain
more than 615,000 Illinois jobs.
Exports and foreign investment
accounted for 854,000 jobs in 1992,
or one in eight. In the manufactur-
ing sector, one in four jobs is de-
pendent on international trade.
Exports to NAFTA countries,
Canada and Mexico, accounted for
nearly one-third of 1994 Illinois
' Because they are based on different
sources, the statistics cited in this article
may differ from those in other articles in
this issue.
exports. Exports to Canada, the
state's top trading partner, were up
17.6 percent over 1993 to a record
$6.3 billion. Trade with Mexico,
which is Illinois' third largest trade
partner, increased 37.7 percent over
1993 to a record $2.1 billion.
In 1994, exports to Japan, Illi-
nois' second-largest trading part-
ner, were up 9.9 percent to $2.2
billion. The state's other leading
trade partners in 1994 include the
United Kingdom (up 21.3 percent
to $1.3 billion), and Germany (up
11.5 percent to $1.3 billion).
By industry, 1994 exports of
industrial machinery and electronic
and electrical equipment, including
computers, accounted for 46.4 per-
cent of all exports. Industrial ma-
chinery and computer equipment
increased 21 percent; other elec-
tronic and electrical equipment
showed a 26.3 percent increase.
Other major exporting industries
include chemicals and allied prod-
ucts ($3.7 billion, up 20.3 percent),
transportation equipment ($1.9
billions, up 15.5 percent), agricul-
tural production-crops ($1.7 billion,
up 33.5 percent), food and kindred
products ($1.4 billion, up 5.9 per-
cent) and instruments ($1.2 billion,
up 22.2 percent).
Clearly, Illinois businesses have
made impressive progress in ex-
porting. Yet, the potential exists for
increasing exports still more. Illi-
nois' share of the total US manufac-
turing output is greater than its
share of manufactured exports. To
help Illinois companies to increase
their share of exports and to com-
pete and succeed in a global
economy, the State of Illinois estab-
lished the Department of Com-
merce and Community Affairs
(DCCA). DCCA views exporting
from the firm's point of view and
has set up programs that address
the demands of every phase of
exporting.
Barriers to Export and Some
Solutions
The greatest barriers preventing
businesses from exporting their
products are cost and the lack of
information about how to go
about it.
The following are some com-
monly expressed barriers to export-
ing, and DCCA's solutions:
Understanding the Foreign
Market.
Lack of market knowledge and
perceived difficulty in exporting
often prevent firms from exporting,
so DCCA has developed a state-
wide network of International
Trade Centers that provide individu-
alized export assistance and coun-
seling to Illinois manufacturers.
Locating Foreign Contacts and
Trade Op^wrtnnities.
Companies are often unaware of
the programs and resources they
can use to identify contacts and
potential distribution channels in
foreign markets. DCCA sponsors
and coordinates international trade
shows and missions; catalog
shows; a trade lead program that
disseminates trade leads through
an automated trade lead matching
computer program; and an exten-
sive network of foreign trade of-
fices to assist Illinois companies in
their overseas marketing efforts.
Understanding Transportation
and Customs Issues.
Many firms, because they are over-
whelmed bv the amount of unfath-
omable paperwork involved in
export transactions, fail to train
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staff adequately to deal with
freight-forwarding, customs, and
related issues. DCCA has formed
the Illinois Export Alliance with
companies whose fields of special-
ization range from management
consulting to freight-forwarding.
These firms provide pro bono in-
formation to new Illinois exporters
on specific export questions and
problems.
Identifying a Firm's
Readiness to Export
DCCA research shows that the
greatest export potential lies with
midsize businesses in industrial
machinery, chemicals and plastics,
electrical equipment, medical and
scientific equipment products, and
food processing. Another factor
that determines a company's capac-
ity to undertake export trade is the
maturity of its export experience.
Levels of a firm's export experience
can be categorized as follows:
STAGE 1: New-to-Concept.
Stage 1 companies are focused
solely on domestic markets and
have no current interest in export-
ing. Such companies need encour-
agement to convince them to get
involved in exporting, as well as
basic market intelligence and infor-
mation on market opportunities.
Support for the firm at Stage 1 is
important to encourage more firms
to participate in export markets.
STAGE I: Export-Willing.
Stage 2 companies show initial
interest in exporting but need train-
ing to provide a basic understand-
ing of the process as well as
identify leads, agents, and
distributors and understanding
international banking procedures.
Realistically, to be exporters, firms
must have sufficient resources to
Direct and indirect
exports sustain
more than 615,000
Illinois jobs.
purchase material, produce the
product, and market the goods
abroad.
STAGE 3: Export-Ready.
Stage 3 companies that have re-
ceived initial training and now
need step-by-step assistance into
the export marketplace.
STAGE 4: New-to-Market.
These companies have some export
experience and seek to find new
export markets for their products.
These firms need specialized
information related to new mar-
kets, sales contacts, or leads.
Doing Business in a Global
Economy: DCCA's Export
Strategy Matching Illinois'
Strengths with Opportunities
An international business strategy
is comprised of several elements.
First, an entity must understand
the basic theory underlying inter-
national trade. Then it needs to
research global market trends, and
finally it must develop and deploy
resources to implement the strat-
egy. In designing an export strat-
egy for Illinois businesses, DCCA
has taken into consideration which
of the global markets are large and
growing and which are most open
to imports. Illinois's global market-
ing areas are divided into three
regions: Europe, Asia, and the
Americas. Target markets are iden-
tified according to market demand
and/or potential receptiveness to
international targeted industries.
DCCA's export strategy, devel-
oped with the assistance of an in-
ternational export strategy task
force, focuses on matching Illinois's
strengths with emerging export
opportunities and working to build
an international infrastructure
rather than assisting individual
companies.
DCCA has created the Illinois
Coordinating Committee for Ex-
ports, which consists of more than
20 federal, state, and local govern-
ment agencies and private organi-
zations that promote exporting by
Illinois firms. The committee coor-
dinates the activities of its members
to promote improved cooperation
and avoid duplication of efforts.
To enhance export-related ser-
vices for its members, DCCA also
works with Illinois industry associa-
Hons, chambers and industrial coun-
cils, along with export networks.
How DCCA's International
Business Division Is
Organized to Help Firms
Export
The State of Illinois has an estab-
lished tradition of offering export
assistance. Illinois was first among
the states to demonstrate an effec-
tive commitment to help its busi-
ness community prosper through
increased exports. In 1965, DCCA
established its International Busi-
ness Division (IBD) to provide
needed export assistance to Illinois
companies. Today, Illinois provides
a three-level export infrastructure
comprised of local, state, and over-
seas export assistance (see sidebar
on p. 12).
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Assistance Available to Illinois Businesses Wanting to Export
Local Export Assistance—Illinois
International Trade Centers
Established in 1989, International Trade Centers are
funded by DCCA, the US Small Business Adminis-
tration, and the host institution to provide one-stop
shopping in international services to potential
Illinois exporters. Centers provide individualized
export assistance and counseling to Illinois manufac-
turers, use international market research to evaluate
key overseas opportunities, maintain an extensive
collection of international trade reference materials,
provide access to DCCA and all federal and state
export resources. They are strategically located
throughout Illinois at:
The North Business and Industrial Council in
Chicago College of DuPage in Glen Ellyn
Bradley University in Peoria Southern Illinois
University at Edwardsville University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign.
The Chicago Office
The Chicago office of the International Business
Division is staffed by trade specialists with specific
regional expertise. They provide assistance to com-
panies with specific questions related to doing busi-
ness in Europe, Asia, Canada, and Latin America.
The Chicago staff also coordinates international
trade shows and missions, catalog shows, trade lead
program, and the Illinois Export Alliance.
International Trade Shows and Missions
A proven way to develop foreign sales is through
participaHon in international trade shows and mis-
sions. The International Business Division, together
with its foreign offices, identifies specific foreign
opportunities and matches these with key Illinois
industries. DCCA's Chicago and foreign offices pro-
vide a full range of support services for both trade
shows and missions, including preshow publicity,
counseling, and coordinating follow-up.
DCCA promotes companies in advance of events
by contachng buyers and distributors in host coun-
tries, planning buyer receptions, researching key
distribution channels, and arranging appointments
with potential customers. DCCA also handles logis-
tics and trouble-shooting for trade shows
Trade missions offer opportunities for new market
contacts. DCCA arranges individual appointments
for groups of Illinois businesses with potential agents,
distributors, and government officials to suit the
needs of the business groups and the marketplace.
Catalog Shows
Catalog shows, in which the products of targeted
Illinois companies are featured via catalog presenta-
tions, are a cost-effective means of gaining market
exposure with foreign agents and distributors Inter-
ested in representing US manufacturers. Each year,
the foreign offices plan a series of catalog shows,
each focusing on a specific geographic region and
featuring products with high market potential in
that area.
Trade Lead Program
Trade leads disseminated through DCCA's Chicago
and foreign offices are made available to Illinois
businesses through the automated trade lead match-
ing computer program. The agency uses databases
provided by the US Department of Commerce and
other sources to help companies identify trade leads.
In addition, DCCA also tracks foreign export and co-
venturing opportuniHes and develops export net-
works to assist Illinois companies in improving their
opportuniHes.
Illinois Export Alliance
DCCA's International Business Division has formed
an alliance with various companies whose fields of
specialization range from management consulting to
freight-forwarding. These companies provide pro
bono information to new Illinois exporters on spe-
cific questions and problems in exporting products.
Overseas Export Assistance - Foreign
Trade Offices
Foreign trade offices provide a competitive edge for
Illinois firms pursuing export markets, and can iden-
Hfy export opportunities, trade leads and business
partners in targeted industries; assist trade associa-
tions/export networks in planning and executing
trade missions and participation in trade shows;
provide information on key markets and applicable
product standards; provide introductions to key
business contacts, potential agents and distributors,
maintain and update databases of agents and dis-
tributors in key markets and industries, serve as a
liaison with appropriate US and foreign commercial
service posts. DCCA's International Business Division
maintains an extensive network of foreign offices to
assist Illinois companies in their overseas marketing
efforts. They are located in, Brussels, Mexico City,
Budapest, Tokyo, Warsaw, and Hong Kong.
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Dixie S. Zietlow Wholesalers in International Franchising
In 1987, franchised business
sales reached $591 billion or
33 percent of all retail sales in the
United States. International fran-
chising by US franchisors is also
experiencing rapid growth. Ac-
cording to a recent report, "almost
50 percent of US franchisors with-
out foreign units plan to grow in-
ternationally, and 93 percent of the
franchise operations that have al-
ready expanded abroad plan to
increase their presence overseas."
[Chain Store Age Executure, 68 (2),
70). In the early 1990s, Illinois-
based McDonald's Corporation
had already derived $6 billion in
sales (or 35 percent of their
systemwide sales) from interna-
tional markets.
The international expansion of
US franchise systems is fascinating
because of the variety of ways
franchisors enter foreign markets.
Occasionally they establish a com-
pany-owned retail unit directly
from the US headquarters (see the
Chart, Case A). Or, more com-
monly, the US franchisor sets up
franchisees directly from US head-
quarters who act as owner-
operators in the foreign market
(Chart, case A). US franchisors also
frequently establish wholesalers or
middlemen with the responsibility
of developing retail units. There
are four ways that US franchisors
expand into foreign markets via a
wholesaler.
Area Development
Agreement
Under an area development agree-
ment, the US-based franchisor
grants an area developer the exclu-
sive rights to develop a foreign
territory and own the retail units
(Chart, case B). Area development
agreements allow the franchisor's
system to grow rapidly while risk
is shared with the area developer.
One drawback of this agreement is
that it is difficult to write a contract
that specifies a sufficient number of
retail units the area developer must
open in a certain period of time. If
the franchisor has modest expecta-
tions about the potential of the
foreign market, the contract will
specify only a moderate number of
outlets. If the territory holds more
potential than anticipated, the
franchisor cannot then force the
area developer to open more units
than the contract specifies. In those
circumstances, the franchisor's
system will not exploit the full
potential of the foreign market.
Master Franchise Agreement
In a master franchise agreement the
US-based franchisor grants a sub-
franchisor the exclusive rights to
develop a foreign territory, owning
some retail units and franchising
others to third parties (Chart, case
C). Such agreements create the
opportunity for rapid develop-
ment. And, the sub-franchisor typi-
cally increases the franchisor's
knowledge of local conditions.
Many franchisors object to these
agreements because the sub-
franchisor gains too much control
Chart 1. International Franchise Distribution Alternatives
US FRANCHISOR WHOLESALER
Home Market Host Market
over the franchise system in the
foreign market. The franchisor
must entrust the enforcement of
quality control provisions in the
unit franchise agreement to the
sub-franchisor. If the sub-
franchisor fails to enforce the
franchisor's standards on the sub-
franchisees, the quality of the fran-
chise system will be reduced.
Joint Venture
In a joint \enture arrangement, the
US headquarters finds a partner to
share an equity investment in the
foreign market. The purpose of the
joint venture is to establish com-
pany-owned and /or franchised
units in the host market and /or
surrounding countries (see Chart,
case D). Joint ventures allow the
franchisor to maintain more control
o\er the franchise system and to
participate in decision-making. In
addition, the joint venture partner
frequently provides local knowl-
edge. However, the franchisor
must have a greater knowledge of
the foreign market than would be
necessary if they did not have own-
ership in the wholesaler. The joint
venture also requires more capital
than an area development or mas-
ter franchise agreement.
Wholly owned Subsidiary
Under this scheme, the US head-
quarters owns a subsidiary in a
host country. The purpose of the
subsidiary is to establish company-
owned and /or franchised units in
the host market and /or surround-
ing countries (Chart, Case E). These
subsidiaries provide the franchisor
with full control and management
discretion. However, the franchisor
Table I. Wholesalers Operated by US Franchisors in Foreign Markets*
Harvey B. Westbrook, Jr., and
Qiumei Yang
Illinois Economic Forecast
Robust expansion of the Illi-
nois economy will continue
through 1995, but the growth will
slow in 1996 and 1997. The Illinois
Econometric Model (lEM) forecasts
indicate moderate growth of total
nonagricultural employment and
steady expansion of total personal
income and total gross state prod-
uct through 1997. Personal income
and the services-producing portion
of gross state product will be in-
strumental in the expansion of the
Illinois economy.
Employment
Illinois employment growth will be
strong through 1995 but modest in
1996 and 1997. Such a pattern fol-
lows the similar trend of national
forecasts of 2.6 percent for 1995 and
1.6 percent and 1.7 percent for 1996
and 1997 (Chart 1), according to the
WEFA Group—one of the leading
forecasting agencies in the United
States. Employment in the goods-
producing industries is projected to
be approximately 3 percent in 1995.
This relatively large rate of expan-
sion will be followed by a smaller
1 percent growth in the following
two years. The lEM forecasts solid
growth in the service-producing
sector for the entire forecasting
period.
Employment in the mining sub-
sector of goods-producing is fore-
cast to decline sharply in 1995
while the other sub-sectors will
expect employment growth. The
lEM projects a 25 percent decrease
in employment in the mining sub-
sector in 1995, followed by a de-
cline of 8.2 percent in 1996 and
stabilizing in 1997. The drop in
mining employment may be the
result of an industry-wide contrac-
tion, which also explains the sharp
decline in the forecasts of personal
income and gross state product for
1995 in the mining sub-sector. After
a few rather lackluster years, em-
ployment in the construction sub-
sector is forecast to increase at a
very strong 6 percent in 1995 and
between 4 percent and 5 percent for
the rest of the forecast period. By
1996 this expansion will increase
employment in construction be-
yond the level attained in 1990.
Chart 1. US and Illinois Employment Growth
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Manufacturing is the single
largest sub-sector of the goods-
producing sector and, thus, plays
a significant role in the strength of
employment in that sector of the
Illinois economy. Durable manu-
facturing employment is projected
to expand 4.1 percent in 1995. After
1995, the lEM projects weaker em-
ployment in manufacturing as ex-
pansion in both the durable and
nondurable goods sectors will be
less than 1 percent for 1996 and 1997
The lEM projects that employ-
ment in service-producing indus-
tries will grow by 2.5 percent in
1995 and by approximately 1 per-
cent for both 1996 and 1997. Be-
cause the service sector accounts
for nearly four-fifths of total
nonagricultural employment,
steady employment in this sector is
the source of the stable employ-
ment of the state's economy.
The lEM projection for employ-
ment in wholesale trade in 1995
reflects the same trend as previ-
ously reported—solid expansion in
1995 at 3.3 percent followed by
slower growth of around 1 percent
over the rest of the forecast period.
Retail employment is anticipated to
expand by 3 percent in 1995, and
then taper off to 0.3 and 0.9 percent
in 1996 and 1997, respectively.
The services sub-sector is a
catch-all category of the service-
producing sector that includes ser-
vices related to health, business,
law, engineering, management,
and such. Employment in this, the
largest sub-sector of the Illinois
economy, is expected to expand
3.9 percent in 1995 and then slow to
growth of over 2 percent in 1996
and 1997. The relative size of this
sub-sector, over one-fourth of the
Illinois nonfarm economy and over
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one-third of the services-producing
sector, means that the expansion of
the sub-sector has a strong positive
influence on the overall level of
employment in Illinois. Employ-
ment in the government sub-sector
is expected to remain approxi-
mately constant over the forecast
period—as it has for the past
several years.
Personal Income
The lEM projects the real total per-
sonal income, adjusted for infla-
tion, will expand 3.5 percent in
1995, 3.7 percent in 1996, and 3.4
percent in 1997. The current projec-
tions are stronger than those re-
ported in previous lEM forecasts.
Both the goods-producing and
services-producing sectors of the
economy will experience stable
growth of personal income. The lEM
projects 4.5 percent increase in per-
sonal income in the goods-producing
sector for 1995 and 2.6 and 3 percent,
respectively, for 1996 and 1997.
Personal income in the mining sub-
sector is expected to decline by 20.9
percent in 1995 and then by 8 per-
cent and 1.2 percent in 1996 and
1997. The decrease in personal in-
come in this sub-sector is consistent
with the projections made for em-
ployment and gross state product.
Personal income in the manufactur-
ing sub-sector is projected to in-
crease by approximately 5 percent
in 1995, and then growth should
moderate to 3 percent in 1996 and
1997. Much of the anticipated gains
in personal income in manufactur-
ing can be traced to the relatively
strong growth in durable manufac-
turing in 1995.
Personal income in the service-
producing sector of the economy is
expected to increase by 4.4 percent
in 1995 and by more than 3.3 percent
in 1996 and 1997. These rates for
1996 and 1997 are slightly higher
than those for goods-producing
industries (Chart 2). The service
sector accounts for over half of the
total personal income in the Illinois
economy. A significant expansion
Chart 2. Illinois Real Personal Income Growth
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is projected for personal income in
the transportation and public utili-
ties sub-sector with an increase of
over 8.5 percent in 1995 and over 5
percent for 1996 and 1997. Whole-
sale trade is expected to grow 4.1
percent in 1995 and then stabilize
at about 3.5 percent in 1996 and
1997. The pattern is similar for
retail trade, with growth projected
at about 4.9 percent in 1995 fol-
lowed by moderation to about 3.6
percent for 1996 and 1997. Strong
growth is expected for personal
income in the services sub-sector.
In 1995, a 4.2 percent expansion in
personal income is projected in
services, followed by 3.7 percent
and 4 percent m 1996 and 1997.
Personal income earned in
government is expected to increase
by approximately 2 percent over
the entire forecast period.
Gross State Product
Real gross state product (GSP), the
total inflation-adjusted value of all
goods and services produced in
Illinois, will expand 3.2 percent in
1995. The previous forecast by the
lEM predicted a lower rate of ex-
pansion. Growth in total GSP will
be 4.7 percent in 1996 and 3.1 per-
cent in 1997. Illinois gross state
product will experience higher
growth rates than will the nation's
gross domestic product as projected
by the WEFA Group (Chart 3). The
pattern of growth in various
(continued on back page)
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Harvey B. Westbrook, Jr. Illinois Tax Revenue Forecast
Steady growth of
General Fund tax
revenue is projected by
the Illinois Econometric
Model (lEM) of the
Bureau for Econontic
and Business Research.
A 4.8 percent increase in
total net General Funds
revenue, measured in
current dollars, is fore-
cast through the fiscal
year ending June 30,
1997 (Table la). Al-
though considerable
expansion is expected
in net personal income,
we project a decrease
in growth of net retail
sales taxes. Slight
increases are expected
in the growth of net
corporate income tax
revenue and miscella-
neous tax revenue.
Real total net General
Funds revenue is expected to
expand approximately 2.0 percent
through fiscal year 1997. Real net
General Funds revenue is mea-
sured in 1987 dollars adjusted to
reflect the effects of projected in-
flation. Retail Sales, corporate
income, and miscellaneous tax
revenues are not expected to
grow more than 1 .5 percent over
the forecast period. The lEM
General Funds revenue projections
are consistently lower than those
made by the governor's Bureau of
the Budget (BOB) and the
legislature's Illinois Economic
and Fiscal Commission (lEFC)
(see Table 2).
Table la: Net Fiscal Year Tax Revenue'
Forecast Statistics
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sub-sectors of GSP is similar to that
seen in employment and personal
income. The goods-producing sec-
tor will expand 4.4 percent in 1995,
followed by 2.1 percent growth in
1996 and 1997. Growth of the ser-
vices-producing sector will be ap-
proximately 4 percent for the
forecast period.
Consumer Spending
Consumer spending, as measured
by retail sales, is projected to expand
moderately. An increase of 3.3 per-
cent is projected for 1995 followed
by approximately 2 percent growth
in 1996 and 1997. The increase is
driven primarily by purchases of
nondurable goods, since spending
for durable goods is expected to
decline. Retail sales in nondurable
goods are expected to increase by
6.1 percent in 1995, followed by 4.9
percent and 3.3 percent in 1996 and
1997. Because nondurable goods
account for two-thirds of total retail
sales, stable growth in total retail
sales is not surprising.
Conclusion
Overall, the expansion of the Illi-
nois economy will moderate
slightly in 1996 and 1997 in terms
of employment and retail sales.
The projections of the lEM indicate
that growth in most major sub-
sectors of the economy will con-
tinue, but at a slower rate. Growth
in personal income and GSP, how-
ever, will remain strong over the
forecast period. The forecasts re-
flect the national trends projected
by DRI/McGraw-Hill and the
WEFA Group whose national data
underlie the lEM.
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Michael V. Maciosek Behind the Growth of Services
The phenomena] growth of the
nation's service industries is
now well recognized. This expansion
has occurred in both absolute terms
and in relation to the rest of the
economy (see Charts 1 and 2). In the
45 years between 1947 and 1992,
services grew from 47 to 63 percent
of gross domestic product (GDP). At
the same time, manufacturing's
share of GDP fell from 28 to 18 per-
cent. During the same postwar pe-
riod, manufacturing employment
grew just 16 percent compared with
236 percent for services; and in the
last 25 years, services employment
doubled while manufacturing em-
ployment dropped 8.5 percent.
In a less frequently cited, but
equally important, trend price levels
for manufactured goods quadrupled
between 1947 and 1992, while ser-
vices prices increased tenfold (see
Chart 3).' Although it appears from
Chart 3 that services prices have
exploded in the past few years, in
fact, the rate of increase in the most
recent ten years was similar to that
of the first ten years shown. The
chart gives the impression of a huge
jump in the rate of increase because
a relatively constant rate of inflation
is being applied to higher service
levels. However, the chart does
clearly show the difference between
' Services have not, however, exploded in
recent years as much as the chart makes it
appear. It gives that impression because a
relatively constant rate of inflation is being
applied to high price levels.
' Analysis similar to what is presented here
can be found in Baumol, Blackman, and
Wolff, Productivity and American Leadership,
The MIT Press, 1989 and in Baumol, "Health
Care, Education, and the Cost Disease: A
Looming Crisis for Public Choice," Public
Choice, Vol. 77, 1993.
1947 and 1992 price levels for each of
the sectors.
While in recent years the magni-
tude of these trends has become better
recognized by policymakers and
their constituents, the reasons behind
the trends have not. Examining these
reasons provides new perspectives
on international trade issues, rising
tuition costs, the expanding health
sector, and the size of government.
-
Most notably, a review of the trends
behind the growth of the service
sector wiU yield a better understand-
ing of what can
and cannotbe
are necessarily being produced,
rather services that were previously
produced at home or inside manu-
facturing establishments are now
contracted out and are only now
being included in service sector sta-
tistics. Unfortunately, it is nearly
impossible to measure these trends.
There are at least three other ex-
planations that are believed to be
farther reaching than the effects of
specialization and that can be com-
pared with readily available data.
The most common has become
changed through
government
initiatives.
Reasons for
the Growth
of Services
There are nu-
merous explana-
tions for the
expanding scope
of service indus-
tries. One possi-
bility is that
urbanization has
led more house-
holds to purchase
services outside
the home. Simi-
larly, it is thought
that greater spe-
cialization of
manufacturers
has led firms to
handle less of
their own ac-
counting, mar-
keting, janitorial,
and other ser-
vices. In both of
these cases, no
more services
Chart la. Major Sectors as a Percent ofGDP
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known as the de-industrialization
thesis, made popular in newsprint
and political debates. According to
frequent reports, the United States is
falling behind the rest of the world in
manufacturing. We are becoming
uncompetitive in world markets and
losing jobs to foreign competitors,
especially to low-wage countries in
the developing world. While this is the
most commonly recognized explana-
tion for the expansion of services, it
was not the first to be developed.
As early as 1690 it was recognized
that richer countries tend to produce
more services and less agricultural
and manufacturing goods than do
poorer countries. Serious study of
these patterns began in the 1930s and
led to other explanations. According
to the first of these, as people become
richer they simply choose to spend a
larger portion of their income on
services than on manufactured
Chart 2. Employment hy Major Economic Sector
goods. A second alternative is that as
the economy has advanced, services
productivity has grown more slowly
than agricultural and manufacturing
productivity, and, therefore, services
have experienced illusory growth.
While most explanations of ser-
vices expansion focus on demand-
side factors, the evidence indicates
that the supply-side forces behind
the productivity-based argument are
the most consistent with GDP, em-
ployment, and inflation data. The
other explanations are examined
first in order to illustrate their con-
sistency with the data. ' They can
explain the trends illustrated in
Charts 1, 2, and 3, but are incor\sis-
tent with other facts.
De-Industrialization
Foreign compefifion is frequently
blamed for the plant closings re-
ported periodically in the press. The
lower para-
graphs of the
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Senices include transportation, communications, public utilities,
wholesale trade, retail trade, finance, insurance, real estate, and other
ser\ices. and do not include government.
Chart 3. CPI Corresponding to Major Economic Sectors
has grown more m the United States
than in any other OECD country as
more women have sought employ-
ment outside the home. Much of this
expanding labor force has been ab-
sorbed by the service sector.
Income Growth
The long-standing growth of services
in the US economy and OECD coun-
tries has led to another postulate: the
richer a country becomes, the larger
the portion of its total income its
citizens spend on services, and the
smaller the portion they spend on
manufactured goods. In fact, this
scenario could describe modem
economic history. Consider an
economy initially dominated by an
agricultural sector that provides
enough food to maintain the society
at some basic level. Then, increasing
productivity in agriculture allows
labor and savings to be transferred to
industry without disrupting supplies
of the basic nutritional needs of the
population. At the same time, in-
creased productivity results in larger
incomes, less and less of which is
needed to obtain the requisite agri-
cultural produce. Resources are freed
for use in industry, while extra in-
come is generated and spent on in-
creased consumption of manu-
factured goods. Even though agricul-
ture does not shrink in absolute size,
it begins to account for a smaller
portion of economic activity.
The same process may transform
the industrial economy to a service
economy. Increases in industrial
productivity free labor and capital
for use in the service sector, and also
provide extra income, an increasing
portion of which is spent on services.
Essentially, as productivity growth
translates into extra income, con-
sumers purchase goods and ser-
vices that they denied themselves at
lower incomes.
We see anecdotal evidence in
people who now purchase services
that were previously produced at
home. It is believed that as people
grow richer they wiU purchase more
lawn care, haircuts, restaurant
Chart 4a. Major Sectors as a Percent ofGDP, Adjusted by
Individual CPIs
Productivity Growth
A possible explanation of employ-
ment patterns can be found in a
theory of "unbalanced growth" that
is based on differing rates of pro-
ductivity growth in manufacturing
and services.
The basis of the unbalanced
growth view is the belief that, com-
pared with manufacturing, some
ser\'ices can achieve only slow pro-
ductivity gains because they are
inherently labor intensive. It may be
easy to introduce new machinery
that reduces the labor necessary to
produce an automobile, but nearly
impossible to speed up the time
necessary to perform a piece of clas-
sical music, teach a math lesson,
administer medical care, or resolve a
court case.
It is argued that productivity in-
creases in manufacturing cause
manufacturing wages to grow with-
out increasing costs because less
labor is needed to produce the same
amount of goods. However, services,
which must compete with manufac-
turing plants for workers, must also
offer higher salaries, without the
ability to offset these higher costs
with increased productivity. There-
fore, service sector production costs,
and subsequently prices, rise faster
than those of manufacturing.
Unbalanced growth also incorpo-
rates an explanation for services'
increasing share of employment. It is
said that manufacturing employ-
ment can be expected to grow more
slowly than does employment as a
whole because new machinery and
productivity gains allow the manu-
facturing sector to meet consumers'
desires with less labor. As the econ-
omy expands, purchases of manufac-
tured goods and services may grow
equally in real terms, and manufac-
ttiring employment may grow abso-
lutely, but manufacturing employ-
ment will always grow more slowly
than does services employment.
The productivity-growth explana-
tion is probably the most consistent
with the facts, yet it cannot com-
pletely rule out some role of growing
incomes. The real share of services
has remained relatively stable as per
capita income has growm (Chart 4a).
However, we normally expect that as
the price of an item rises people will
buy less of it. Given the faster in-
crease in services prices, we would
expect the quantity of services to fall
relative to goods, not remain the
same. A possible explanation for this
discrepancy is that consumers have
decided to buy more services with
their greater income and that this
tendency has been offset by rising
service prices.
Conclusions
Without more detailed analysis, a
definitive explanation of the rise of
services is not possible. In particular,
it is not obvious that services must
offer higher wages in response to
manufacturing productivity in-
creases, or that services productivity
grows at a significantly slower pace
than manufacturing productivity.
However, the reasoning behind rela-
tive productivity growth is the most
consistent with the data examined
here, though income growth or some
other balancing force must be main-
taining service production levels
despite higher prices. Errors in mea-
surement, most notably the difficulty
of measuring services output and
quality changes, may also contribute
to the puzzle.
In any case, it is clear that issues
involving a specific service should
not be analyzed outside the context
of overall services growth. Growing
tuifion costs and medical care prices
and the expansion of the legal sys-
tem are not necessarily the fault of
inefficiencies as we often hear;
rather, they might be due to strong
producfivity growth of manufactur-
ing and the resulfing pressure on
labor costs. Similarly, the expansion
of government budgets is partially
due to the rising cost of providing
services and not necessarily to
spendthrift polificians throwing
money at pork-barrel projects. Even
the porfion of the federal budget
that is spent on a large amount
manufactured goods, the defense
budget, might be weighted down by
growing costs of research and devel-
opment services. It is possible that
federal deficits are the result of pro-
viding the same level of services to
voters who have not been willing to
pay higher taxes because, as with
most things, they demand less gov-
ernment services when prices rise.
In one sense, these conjectures are
disheartening because they imply
that policy-based reforms have a
limited ability to change these
trends. All the same, we need to
recognize that nothing here implies
that services are becoming less af-
fordable. The root cause of the higher
relative prices of some services may
be due to higher productivity in
manufacturing, which brings about
higher real incomes. If anything, as a
nation we have the ability to pur-
chase a larger quantity of services—
we simply do not like the price tags.
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Noreen M. Sugrue Issues in Welfare Reform: Part I, Medicaid
Some Medicaid Facts
m Approximately 70 percent
of Medicaid recipients
are families with depen-
dent children and they
use about 31 percent of
the resources.
Approximately 8 percent
of Medicaid recipients
are elderly and they use
about 19 percent of the
resources.
Approximately 18 percent
of Medicaid recipients
are disabled and they use
about 48 percent of Med-
icaid resources.
This article is the first in a two-
part series focusing on welfare
reform. The first article focxises on
Medicaid; the second on cash assis-
tance/cash grants and housing al-
lowances. The articles are not
intended to offer a solution for wel-
fare reform in Illinois. They provide
information about who is on welfare
and the benefits they receive, as well
as examine some of the policy impli-
cations associated with welfare re-
form initiatives.
Throughout the United States
there is a clamor for welfare reform.
The demands include getting people
off welfare and into jobs, controlling
the costs of cash grants and Medic-
aid, and ensuring that only the de-
serving poor get benefits. Nobody
denies that there are many problems
with the current welfare system and
that changes are needed. Rather,
disagreements arise when discus-
sions focus on the assumptions of
what types of people are on welfare
and why; what benefits welfare re-
cipients ought to receive; and what
can be done to curtail the "epidemic"
of welfare dependency. Which policy
options for welfare reform that one
champions depends upon these
assumptions as well as beliefs about
how long recipients are on welfare,
why they are on welfare, and what
incentives are needed to remove
them from the rolls.
' Most of the elderly receiving Medicaid are in
long-term care facilities. Many of the disabled
who receive Medicaid do so while they are
waiting to become eligible for Medicare. In
the case of certain disabilities, people may be
enrolled in the Medicare program within a few
years of their disability being diagnosed, but
unHl then, they are dependent on Medicaid.
Welfare has three components
that require attention: Medicaid;
cash assistance /cash grants (almost
exclusively to aid families with de-
pendent children); and housing al-
lowances (assistance given to people
so that they can live in public hous-
ing or other subsidized housing).
Medicaid
Authorized under Title XIX of the
Social Security Act, Medicaid is an
entitlement program paid for by the
states and the federal government
and administered by the states to
finance the costs associated with
providing health care to low income
(poor) persons. Although the pro-
gram was designed for the poor,
being poor is not an automatic quali-
fication to receive Medicaid. Accord-
ing to the Congressional Research
Office (1993), less than 50 percent of
the naHon's population with family
incomes below the poverty line are
covered by Medicaid. Only people
who are poor and can be fit into
other categories (for example, preg-
nant, blind, disabled, children under
a certain age, elderly) are eligible for
Medicaid. According to the more
recent (1994) report of the Kaiser
Commission, because of the dual
qualification only 62 percent of
Americans who are poor are covered
by Medicaid. Of those covered, more
than two-thirds are women of child-
bearing age and children under the
age of 18. The other major categories
of Medicaid recipients are the elderly
and the disabled.'
In Illinois, Medicaid costs are a
major contributor to the state's bud-
getary woes. Medicaid costs con-
tinue to rise, and there appears to be
little relief in sight. Medicaid was
designed as a health care program
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Table J. Illinois Medicaid Expenditures (% distributions) by Category ofAssistance,
Selected Fiscal Years, 1983-1994
the elderly is for long-term care.
While about 17 percent of resources
expended on the elderly is for physi-
cians, hospital care, and prescription
drugs. When the expenditures for
the disabled are examined, one finds
41 percent of those resources going
to long-term care and 40 percent
allocated to hospital care. Only
about 11 percent of resources spent
on the disabled are for prescription
drugs and physicians.
A question that often arises is,
"Is the money spent on long-term
care being used to care for the poor
or as long-term care insurance?"
That question is difficult to answer
with certainty because individual
financial data are not accessible.
However, one proxy for gauging if
the elderly on Medicaid are truly
poor is the percent of elderly Med-
icaid recipients who receive other
welfare benefits. In Illinois, about
6 percent of the elderly on Medicaid
receive other welfare benefits.
Therefore, 94 percent of the elderly
on Medicaid are not poor enough to
be eligible for additional welfare
benefits. From this, it follows that
many of the elderly enrolled in
Medicaid are enrolled so that their
long-term care costs will be paid,
and not because they are truly
poor. For families on Medicaid,
about 50 percent, also receive cash
grants (welfare)' indicating they are
truly poor. Most of the families with
dependent children enrolled in
Medicaid but who receive no cash
'Receiving cash grants indicates that family
income is below povertv level. Not recei\-ing
cash grants indicates that household income
is at or above poverty level, but there is no
health insurance for family members.
* The federal government has mandated such
care and allows states some flexibility in
determining how much above po\'erty level
thev are willing to go. Tlie states are not
allowed to cover pregnant women and chil-
dren who live more than 200 percent above
poverty; howe\'er, the states do have flexibil-
ity is setting the limit up to that level.
grants are pregnant women and /or
families with young children. The
federal government has mandated
states to provide Medicaid for
pregnant women and children who
are living slightly above the pov-
erty level.
^
Families receiving Medicaid and
cash grants are 50 percent of total
Medicaid enrollees, accounting for
only 22 percent of total Medicaid
expenditures (see the chart). At the
same time, families receiving Medic-
aid and no cash assistance are 22
percent of total Medicaid enrollees,
using about 9 percent of Medicaid
resources. Tine elderly and disabled
account for 8 and 18 percent, respec-
tively, of Medicaid enrollment, while
using 66 percent of Medicaid re-
sources. Data presented in Table 4
underscores the disproportionate
relationship between a percentage of
enrollees and the amount of re-
sources each enrollee uses. The
groups with the largest enrollment
use the least.
Discussions
Medicaid was designed as a stop-
gap program to provide social
assurance to poor people. It was
assurance that they would be able
to get the medical care they needed.
It was to be short term and not a
substitute for health insurance.
Today that is no longer the case.
The program designed to help the
poor provides help to less than two-
thirds of our nation's poor. In Illinois
the data tell us that the program has
shifted from providing funds for the
medical care of poor people to pro-
viding funds for the health care
needs of families who are working
poor, the elderly in long-term care
facilities, and the disabled. It ap-
pears, given the distribution of
Medicaid expenditures, that Medic-
aid no longer primarily provides
fimds for families who are in need,
rather, it is more long-term care in-
surance for the elderly and the dis-
abled, as well as health msurance for
the disabled.
Any serious consideration of
Medicaid reform would have to
consider reform initiatives for all
recipient groups, not just families
with dependent children. Unfortu-
nately, this does not often occur. For
example, in Illinois there have been
sweeping Medicaid revisions or
reforms enacted and proposed, al-
most all of which are aimed only at
families with dependent children.
The primary suggested Medicaid
reforms have focused on stricter
eligibility requirements for families
with dependent children, decreasing
services available to families with
dependent children, and placing
families with dependent children
Medicaid Enrollment and Expenditures by Category of Assistance, FY1994
ENROLLMENT
Families-
MAG* 50% Families-
MANG»* 20%
Elderly
Other 5%
EXPENDITURES
Families-
MAG
22%
Families-
MANG»* 9% Elderly
19%
Disabled 47%
* Medicaid plus cash grant; ** Medicaid no cash grant
Data Source: Center tor Urban Research and Policy Studies, University ot Chicago, 19<J5
Illinois Business Review/Fall 1995
into managed care settings."^ Reform
efforts aimed at the elderly or dis-
abled are almost nonexistent.
The economic problems associated
with Medicaid are more a fimction of
expenditures for the disabled and the
elderly rather than the costs of caring
for poor women and children or able-
bodied adults capable of working.
Yet Medicaid reforms focus on poor
women and children and the dis-
abled and the elderly are specifically
omitted from these reform efforts.
Attempting to fix the economic
problems associated with Medicaid
by "reforming" what is provided to
those on whom the least is spent is
going produce minimal savings. Poor
women and children use a small
percent of the Medicaid dollars, and
there are ways that the money could
be better spent (for example, for
more preventive services rather than
using the emergency room for pri-
mary and routine health care).
Many proposed solutions assume
that capitated contracts for women
and children on Medicaid will save
money, and this will help the overall
economic problems associated with
the Medicaid program. While putting
poor families in managed care set-
tings may save some money, it will
not save a great deal. Tighter eligibil-
ity requirements will mean that
many poor people now receiving
care will still need it , but Medicaid
will no longer pay. Support for the
care of poor people will still need to
generated from somewhere. Decreas-
ing the level of services provided to
families with dependent children
will provide some economic relief,
but again it will not be much relief.
In fiscal year 1993 Illinois spent
$7,900 per elderly Medicaid enroUee,
$9,000 per disabled enroUee, and
$1,300 per family with dependent
children. Decreasing the amount
expended on the group for whom
the least is spent cannot produce the
economic savings needed. Currently
there are no serious reform efforts
aimed at cutting the cost of long-term
care for the elderly or the care pro-
vided to the disabled, who require
intensive and expensive care. More-
over, unlike services to poor families,
it is care that is, gerierally, not short-
term help until people can "get it
together to take care of themselves."
Without serious reform initiatives
aimed at the elderly and the dis-
abled, the fiscal crisis in Medicaid
will only worsen.
^A study by D. A. Freund and E. M. Lewit
("Managed Care for Children and Pregnant
Women: Promises and Pitfalls," The Future of
Chihiren, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1993): 92-122) indicates
that there is not as much money saved as pre-
dicted and that there is not as much harm to
patients as predicated. In other words, there is
no evidence that such a move saves a signifi-
cant amount of money and there is no evi-
dence that patients are ill-served by such
contracts.
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David Gerard The Economics ofPollution Reduction
and Sulfur Dioxide Emmissions Permits
Ironically, the net
, result of a trade
between a New York
firm that over-
complies and sells
its excess permits to
an Ohio firm may be
poorer air quality in
New York.
Economists have put forward
several market-based ap-
proaches for reducing the costs of
improving environmental quality.
The rationale for these approaches is
the use of a price mechanism to pro-
vide firms with incentives to reduce
their pollution levels. One example is
an effluent fee, which is a tax on each
unit of pollutant that a firm dis-
charges. Another is a transferable
discharge permit scheme that estab-
lishes a market and allows for trad-
ing in rights to pollute. This article
discusses the recent implementation
of an Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) program that utilizes
transferable discharge permits to
control sulfur dioxide emissions.
Many environmental problems
arise because some property rights to
amenities such as air and water are
not clearly specified. For instance,
particulate matter emitted from the
factory smokestack may reduce vis-
ibility, compromise public health, or
contribute to add rain. Unless the
firm emitting the smoke compen-
sates each individual affected by the
smoke, it does not pay the full costs
of its actions and other interests also
bear some of the costs. In such cases,
it is difficult to negotiate a contrac-
tual arrangement with each affected
party for proper compensation.
Therefore, governments often inter-
vene on behalf of the community.
Instead of the traditional govern-
ment mandates, many levels of gov-
ernment are beginning to implement
market-based programs to address
environmental problems. For in-
stance, such a plan facilitated the US
transition from leaded to unleaded
gasoline. The government estab-
lished lead-reduction targets for
each refinery. Refineries that over-
complied with lead-reduction targets
deposited their savings into a "lead
bank." Firms that could not meet
compliance targets could withdraw
these savings in order to meet overall
reduction targets. There are also
numerous tradable discharge permit
programs for reducing water pollu-
tion, and several states have imple-
mented these programs for wetlands
protection. Recent Congressional
amendments to the Clean Air Act
established a program for trading
rights to emit sulfur dioxide. Public
utilities that generate electricity with
coal-fired power plants are a princi-
pal source of these emissions, which
are a known cause of acid rain.
The 1990 Amendments to the
Clean Air Act
The 1990 Amendments to the Clean
Air Act established a market for the
right to emit sulfur dioxide. The EPA
administers the system and monitors
firms to ensure compliance. The
program uses on-site monitoring
equipment to ensure that utilities
comply with emissions standards
and mandates stiff penalties for vio-
lators. Phase I of the program covers
a limited number of firms and began
in 1995. Phase II, which begins in the
year 2000, incorporates stricter emis-
sions standards and covers a larger
number of firms.
The initial allocation of permits is
an important aspect of the program.
Most permits are based on past emis-
sion levels. Phase I affects plants that
emit more that 2.5 pounds of sulfur
dioxide per million Btus (MBtus) of
heat that the firm used from 1985-
1987. The government determines a
firm's allocation of permits by multi-
plying 2.5 times the number of
MBtus and converts the result to tons
by dividing by 2,000. Firms can use
the permits to emit, sell them, or
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carry them forward to subsequent
years. The system also affects new
firms. For instance, if a mining com-
pany wanted to develop a smelting
operation— a sulfur dioxide-
generating activity— it would have
to buy permits for the right to do so.
Phase II will increase the number of
firms covered and further limit emis-
sions. An additional 700 firms will
enter the program, and the units of
sulfur per MBtu will be scaled back
from 2.5 to 1.2.
In addition, the EPA auctions 3
percent of the total number of per-
mits each year on the Chicago Board
of Trade. As with any other com-
modity, anyone can buy and sell
permits—including firms, specula-
tors, and environmentalists. By the
year 2010, aggregate sulfur dioxide
emissions in the United States will be
10 million tons per year less than
1980 levels.
The rationale for the system is
based on principles of cost-
minimization. It grants flexibility
to firms that would otherwise ex-
ceed their allotments. Management
can decide the least-cost way to com-
ply with the law, whether by alter-
ing its current production process, or
by acquiring permits. Suppose that
there are two firms that are located
in the same area so their emissions
have the same environmental im-
pact. Firm 1 owns a permit, and its
costs of reducing its emissions level
by one ton is $400. Firm 2 does not
have a permit, and its abatement cost
per ton is $500. Firm 1 should be
willing to sell its permit for any price
greater than $400. Similarly, firm 2
should buy at any price below $500.
The price of the permit should be
between $400 and $500. A trade in
this price range would reduce costs
for both firms with no resulting dif-
ference in environmental quality.
However, analysts expected more
robust trading and higher permit
prices than have materialized. When
Congress authorized the amend-
ments to the Clean Air Act in 1990
many analysts believed that permits
would trade for more than $1,000
each. Before the first auction in 1993
the price estimate had fallen to $300-
$750. In fact, the average price from
the first auction was slightly more
than $150—less than one-tenth of the
initial estimates. The average price of
Phase II permits was even lower at
$136. Publicly announced trading
prices have been slightly higher, but
still lower than anticipated. In addi-
tion, there have been far fewer trades
than analysts anticipated, fewer than
40 trades in the first two years.
As with any other
commodity, any-
one can buy and
sell permits
—
includingfirms,
speculators, and
environmentalists.
The situation presents some inter-
esting scenarios for other industry
participants, and Illinois utilities are
pursuing a number of strategies.
Illinois Power has purchased close to
half a million permits, which it be-
lieves are cheaper than alternative
abatement strategies. Common-
wealth Edison will not use all of its
allotted permits, but it is waiting for
prices to increase before it will sell
the surplus. CIPS has already sold a
number of permits in order to fi-
nance pollution-control equipment,
which tends to be expensive.
Environmental groups are also
monitoring the situation. These
groups should be indifferent to the
low trading price; the attainment
of a certain emissions target is
independent of the permit price.
Low prices, however, may present
opportunities for environmental
groups to purchase and retire some
permits, which would reduce emis-
sions below aggregate target levels.
Some permits have already been
retired for health's sake. One
Connecticut-based uHlity made a
highly publicized (and tax-deductible)
donation of 10,000 allowances to the
American Lung Association.
Environmentalists, however, are
concerned about the trading scheme
for other reasons. First, they may
believe that the government is allo-
cating too many permits. Second, the
air quality in any particular area is
not solely a function of total US
emissions. Therefore, even though
the system reduces total sulfur diox-
ide emissions, the air quality in every
region will not necessarily improve.
The difference between sulfur
dioxide and carbon dioxide illus-
trates the point. Carbon dioxide is a -
suspected cause of global warming.
The carbon dioxide buOdup in the
atmosphere, however, is indepen-
dent of the site of the source
—
whether that source is the United
States or China, or anywhere. The
environmental impact of sulfur
dioxide, however, varies by location,
even though permits are valued
equally. For instance, a power gen-
erator in New York state may cause
little damage from add rain, as the
weather patterns may take the emis-
sions out to sea. Emissions from a
coal-fired plant in Ohio, however,
may produce serious environmental
impact on northeastern locales. Ironi-
cally, the net result of a trade be-
tween a New York firm that over-
complies and sells its excess permits
to an Ohio firm may be poorer air
quality in New York. Despite the
differential impacts, permits trade
one-for-one. The system's use of this
ratio may cause environmental
groups to lobby for a trading system
based on damage ratios, or for scrap-
ping the system altogether.
While industry officials and en-
vironmental groups evaluate their
options, economists are contem-
plating the sluggish trading and
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surprising divergence between ex-
pected and actual trading prices. As
usual there is no shortage of explana-
tions for why predictions were wrong.
Transferable Discharge Permits
The EPA market in sulfur dioxide
permits is a transferable discharge
permit scheme in which the govern-
ment establishes a market to pollute
by issuing permits that firms need in
order to discharge emissions. If the
firm requires additional credits, it
can choose to purchase more; or if
the firm has extra credits, it can sell
them, retire them, or carry them over
for future years.
The government decides the num-
ber of permits to issue, and, there-
fore, it knows aggregate emissions
in advance. Because monitoring is
fairly precise and penalties for non-
compliance are quite stiff, cheating
seems unlikely. The system is resis-
tant to inflation. Firms will buy and
sell based on the real value of the
permits, and the government will not
have to link fees to an inflation index.
The system provides the least-cost
solution because firms know their
own cost of abatement and, there-
fore, know whether it is beneficial to
buy or sell permits. Another advan-
tage of the system is that if a firm
can reduce emissions for less than
the price of the permits it is holding,
it has clear incentives to abate and
sell the permits. In fact, the firm has
the incentive to continue abating as
long as its cost of abatement is less
than the price. If the market is well-
defined firms will alter their choice
of raw materials and production
processes, and will trade permits
until the cost of abatement is the
same for each firm—and equals the
permit price.
Low Prices, Light Trading
The Electric Power Research Insti-
tute, which uses a large computer
model to estimate utility abatement
costs, projected that some midwest
plants would exceed $300 for some
plants in the midwest during Phase
I, and estimates for Phase n are close
to $500. So why are permits selling at
less than one-third of that amount?
When firms do not respond to incen-
tives, economists want to know
why. The first step is to examine the
plausibility of the underlying as-
sumptions. The tradable discharge
permits scheme rests on three princi-
pal assumptions:
Firms comply with the system.
The market is well-defined and
reasonably competitive
Firms minimize costs.
The first assumption is supported by
the on-site monitoring devices and
penalties for violators should reduce
incentives to evade regulations.
Therefore, the latter two assump-
tions may provide insights for the
lack of demand and low prices.
Sufficiently Large, Reasonably
Competitive Markets
The benefits of competitive markets
may be contingent on the number of
buyers and sellers involved. Thin
trading implies that most firms do
not consider buying permits as a
viable option for reducing costs.
There have been several conjectures
as to how large a market must be in
order to work. Some analysts assert
that the current market is too small
to be effective.
Another reason for the unexpect-
edly low number of trades may have
more to do with the emergence of a
new market than its size. Several
components of this particular market
may have induced a supply glut. The
principal factor is price uncertainty.
When Congress authorized the
amendments to the Clean Air Act in
1990, firms began to devise compli-
ance strategies. If the expected per-
mit prices were significantly higher
than probable abatement costs, firms
had incentives to over-comply and
sell the remaining permits for a
handsome profit.
Also, the Phase I cutbacks in
emissions are not so severe as those
slated for Phase U. Many firms in the
program have not made previous
investments to reduce sulfur emis-
sions and, therefore, currently have
lower abatement costs than they
will face later. Given the high prices
they expected for the permits, they
made arrangements to reduce emis-
sions consistent with current, rela-
tively low costs. As a result, demand
for permits is low. Another factor is
state regulations that force many
firms to abate further than their fed-
eral allotment. These firms auto-
matically over-comply. Each of these
factors should contribute to an ex-
cess of permits.
The excess-supply argument may
overstate the case. Many firms have
chosen to switch to low-sulfur coal
rather than to install scrubbers to
meet their obligations. These firms
should be able to buy up large num-
bers of permits, switch back to high-
sulfur coal, and still come out ahead.
Although so far observed trades
have been for low prices, firms do
not know with a much probability
that the price will remain low,
whether they can actually procure
permits at the current price, or
whether the current system will
continue indefinitely. Firms with
permits may be reluctant to sell
them at current prices—so that
permits are not really available at
these prices.
Cost Minimization
Another potential stumbling block
for the tradable discharge permits
market may have to do with the fact
that the principal market partici-
pants are public utilities. Many deci-
sions of public utilities are subject to
the approval of state regulators. In
many states it is unclear who would
benefit from savings generated
through savvy dealings in tradable
discharge permits—shareholders or
rate payers. If a utility pursues a
strategy of complete compliance
with the law, it is likely that it can
pass the additional costs on to cus-
tomers; whereas, if it loses a lot of
money speculating with tradable
discharge permits, it is not clear
whether the state public utility board
would allow them to pass their
losses on the consumer.
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The implication of this line of
argument is that electric utilities may
not pursue cost-minimizing strate-
gies if there is any ambiguity with
respect to their profit margins. As
regulated monopolies, they can pur-
sue more certain strategies, pass the
additional costs on to rate payers,
and offer security to shareholders.
Furthermore, firms can carry per-
mits forward to hedge against future
uncertainty. For instance, if there
were to be a sudden increase in the
price of low-sulfur coal, firms that
held permits would not have to pur-
chase permits on the open market,
where prices would also likely in-
crease. This may be another factor in
the low number of trades, but re-
stricting supply does not explain the
low prices.
Another likely reason why firms
are reluctant to use the purchase of
permits as a tool to reduce costs are
the possible public relations ramifi-
cations of such a strategy. A firm
may save money by emitting more
than its allotment, but it might face
backlash from the public. For instance.
the former governor of New York
was especially unhappy about the
potential environmental impact of
some proposed trades in the
Adirondacks—and even spoke of
revoking the state charters of some
firms. Other cases, such as Illinois
Power's declaration that it plans to
purchase and use permits as a cost-
reducing tool, have elicited rather
tame public response. Nevertheless,
these considerations certainly reduce
the incentive for firms to pursue
permits as a means to lower costs.
Conclusions
Despite economists' aversion to
uniform government-mandated
emissions levels for addressing envi-
ronmental problems, their favorite
solution—a transferable discharge
permit scheme—is essentially acting
as just such a system. For the most
part, firms are not trading, and,
therefore, their emissions are at or
below their initial allotments.
As Phase 11 approaches, more
firms will enter the market for trad-
able discharge permits for sulfur
dioxide and the more stringent re-
strictions will force firms to make
further reductions in emissions. It is,
therefore, likely that there will be
more action at the Chicago Board of
Trade. It is questionable whether the
Phase n addition of more firms to the
program will make purchasing per-
mits more attractive. Will new firms
base plarming decisions on current
prices for tradable discharge permits
or will they expect the market to firm
up and prices to rise? Given that
utilities firms in the market are not
traditional cost-minimizers and that
they face potential public relations
problems or political pressures to
adopt certain strategies, it seems
unlikely that the market for sulfur
dioxide permits will ever operate
like a textbook case.
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Harvey B. Westbrook, Jr. Economic Forecasting and The Illinois
Econometric Model
The services-
producing sector, and
the services indus-
tries in particular,
will experience very
strong growth of5.6
percent in 1996 and
5.2 percent in 1997.
At least once a week the gen-
eral public is offered some
economic forecast. Whether it is the
newest prediction generated by a
government agency or debates of the
effects of legislattve policy, economic
forecasting gets a lot of media play.
Generally, only the results relevant
to the issue discussed are reported,
often without reference to the under-
lying assumptions. When confronted
with several contradictory forecasts,
the observer has to wonder who is
right, who is wrong, and, most im-
portant, why. In the simplest terms,
an economic forecast is the product
of the raw material, data, as pro-
cessed by a computer-driven set of
mathematical formulae and rela-
tionships determined according to
economic theory. The analysis of
economic forecasts relies heavily
upon the understanding of the rela-
tionships among the variables
within any given model. Announc-
ing results without providing the
fundamental assumptions of the
analysis usually does not provide
information required to evaluate the
level of reliability of the predictions.
Thus, one should be cautious about
making decisions based upon fore-
cast results.
We use the Illinois Econometric
Model (lEM) to generate the fore-
casts presented in each issue of the
Illinois Business Review. The lEM
generates forecast statistics for Illi-
nois employment, real personal
income, gross state product, and
retail sales.
The Data
In the table that presents the forecast
results at the end of each issue, the
Illinois economy is divided into
several sectors, subsectors, and
component industries. Much of the
data used to run the model is en-
tered by industry. This will become
very important as we establish the
links that actually drive the results of
the forecast.
We get the Illinois data from a
variety of sources. Data for employ-
ment are produced by the US Bureau
of Labor Statistics, personal income
and gross state product come from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
retail sales come from the US Depart-
ment of Commerce. Industry-level
data for such economic variables as
employment, personal income, and
retail sales are also entered for the
national economy. The national
forecasts are generated by the WEFA
Group and DRI/ McGraw-Hill, two
large, private economic forecasting
services that publish national fore-
casts for the major industries, ex-
tending out two years (which
explains why the lEM forecasts for
the same period).
The Model
The forecasts for Illinois industries
are based on the forecasts of these
industries across the country. We
chose national forecasts rather than
some other basis, say a midwest
region, because good industrial level
data exists for the national economy
and may not exist for regions of the
country. With the availability of
inexpensive computing power, com-
plex analysis is available to practi-
cally everyone; however, it is
irrelevant if good data does not exist.
By good data, 1 mean data that is con-
sistently measured and maintained
over a long period of time. If data are
not measured, maintained, and orga-
nized consistently, the results of the
analysis may not be reliable.
In the case of forecasting we are
trying to establish relationships
Illinois Business Review/ Fall 1995 15
Grturth in Goods- and Services-Producing Sectors
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Total Nonfarm Employment
Goods-Producing Industries
Service-Producing
Industries
among variables for the purpose of
predicting their behavior in the fu-
ture. We establish a framework
based upon our theoretical beliefs
about the relationship between the
Illinois economy and the national
economy and our knowledge that
certain economic variables have been
strong predictors in the past. The
forecaster looks for mathematical
relationships that improve the fore-
casting power even though there
may not be a strong theoretical rela-
tionship. Part of the job of maintain-
ing such a model is to verify that the
relahonships have as much predic-
tive power as possible. Having
mathematically defined these rela-
tionships, we can now use forecasts
of the performance of the national
economy to generate forecasts of the
performance of the Illinois economy.
The Current Forecast
The forecast results for the third
quarter of 1995 are printed at the end
of this issue. Modest growth is fore-
cast for employment, personal in-
come, and gross state product. The
forecasts reflect the underpinnings
of less optimstic forecasts of the
national economy. The Chart illus-
trates the growth patterns of em-
ployment in the two main sectors of
the Illinois economy, goods produc-
tion and services production. The
Illinois economy is forecast to ex-
pand at a slower rate through 1996.
The ser\'ices-producing sector is
about three-fourths of the state
economy. An increased expansion
in the economy after 1996 will be, in
large part, driven by robust growth
in the services-producing sector. This
shift in the composition of the Illinois
economy is reflected further in the
the expansion of real personal in-
come. Tlie 3.8 percent growth rate of
total nonfarm personal income fore-
cast for 1996 is largely the result of
the 3.4 percent expansion in the ser-
vices-producing sector.
Within the services-produciiig
sector, personal income in the ser-
vices industries is predicted to
expand 5.0 percent in 1996 and 4.5
percent in 1997. This is the largest
sustained expansion in personal in-
come forecast for the economy. Thus,
even though a contraction is forecast
for total personal income, much of
the contraction is concentrated in the
goods-producing sectors.
Gross state product wQl remain
robust through 1996, then decrease
to 2.5 percent in 1997. Again, much
of the economic contraction will be
concentrated in the goods-producing
sector. Tlie services-producing sector,
and the services industries in par-
ticular, will experience very strong
growth of 5.6 percent in 1996 and 5.2
percent in 1997.
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Harvey B. Westbrook, Jr. Illinois Tax Revenues Remain Steady
The Illinois Econo-
metric Model has
forecast steady growth
of tax revenues. Al-
though total net general
funds revenue is antici-
pated to contract in the
1996 fiscal year (see
Table la), the antici-
pated effects of inflation
will moderate the con-
traction. The model
projects growth of ap-
proximately 2 percent in
the 1996 and 1997 fiscal
years for real total net
general funds revenue
as (see Table lb). Real
tax revenue is adjusted
to reflect the effects of
inflation. Total net gen-
eral funds revenue in
current dollars is pro-
jected to grow at 4.8
percent for the 1996 and
1997 fiscal years.
Real net retail sales, real net corpo-
rate income, and real miscellaneous
tax revenues are expected to remain
steady with growth of approximately
1 percent. Real net personal income
tax revenues are expected to grow at
5.3 percent and 4.3 percent in the
1996 and 1997 fiscal years.
The Illinois Econometric Model
projects lower tax revenues than are
projected by the state legislature's
lUinois Economic and Fiscal Com-
mission (lEFC) and the governor's
Bureau of the Budget (BOB). Table 2
shows a comparison of the results of
the three forecasts.
Table la: Net Fiscal Year Tax Revenues by Maji
Forecast Statistics
1i
Real Personal Income (in millions of 1987 dollars)
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A Message from the Dean
The College of Commerce and
Business Administration at the
Urbana-Champaign campus of the
Uni\ersiU- of Illinois is pleased to
present once again this annual out-
look issue of the lUiiioif Biifinc>> Re-
znra\ which examines prospects for
the economic performance of the
state of Illinois for the coming year.
This publication comes to you
from our Office of Research under
Director Ricliard I. Amould and
reflects tlie breadth of our definition
of education. As the major research
uni\ersit\- of the state, we recognize
as one of our areas of responsibility'
the collection and dissemination of
these data and the interpretations
that accompany them.
The forecast for this new year is
for the econom\' to remain steady
with moderate growth continuing.
Our authors discuss prospects for
growth in emplo\Tnent, personal
income, private investnient, con-
sumption, retail sales, and state
revenues—including the current
improved revenue picture and Weun-
ings for future challenges to meet
state expenditures. The continuing
changes in the agricultural sector are
also re\iewed.
We are indebted to Ameritech for
its support of our ongoing efforts to
improve and expand the Illinois
Econometric Model. Our aim is to
make it increasinglv useful to busi-
ness and commurut\- leaders, aca-
demic researchers, government
policxinakers, and interested citi-
zens. Quarterlv forecast data gener-
ated bv the model are published in
e\"er\- issue of the Illinois Busitiess
Rrcieic.
We are grateful to all of those
whose efforts contributed to the
preparation of this special issue of
the Revieic. Your comments and
sussestions for future issues are
most welcome. Please send them to
Janet FitcK editor, niinois Business
Rti-iru: Office of Research, 42S Com-
merce West, 120t) South SKth Street
Champaign, IL 61820.
Howard Thomas. Dean and
James F. Towey F^^fessor of
Strateinc Management
College of Commerce and Business
Administration, University- of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign
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1996 Illinois Economic Forecast
The Illinois Econometric
Model
The Illinois Econometric Model
(lEM) is a forecasting model devel-
oped by the Bureau of Economic and
Business Research at the Uni\'ersity
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
The lEM projects the behavior of
several economic variables of the
major sectors of the Illinois economy,
such as employment, personal in-
come, gross state product, and con-
sumer spending as measured by
retail sales. The lEM forecasts the
behavior of these economic variables
by using national variables as the
imderlylng "drivers" of the state
economy. Forecasts generated by the
WEFA Group and DRI/McGraw-
Hill, two national economic forecast-
ing organizations are used as the
basis for the forecasts of the Illinois
economy. These use large economet-
ric models to generate forecasts for
major sectors of tlie national
economy.
Because this article was prepared
near the end of 1995, final data were
not available for the year as a whole.
Consequently, figures quoted for
1995 will be based partly on the his-
torical record and partly on our end-
of-year forecasts of the final data for
the year.
The National Economy
Is the US economy facing boom or
bust? The answer is that neither is
going to happen. Real gross domes-
tic product (GDP), the value of all
goods and services produced in a
given period and adjusted for the
effects of inflation, grew at a surpris-
ing 4.2 percent annual rate in the
third quarter of 1995 after very mod-
est growth of 1.3 percent in the sec-
ond quarter. Tlie overall growth for
1995 is expected to be 3.3 percent.
There are, however, some negative
signs for the prospects of future
growth. Total consumer debt as a
percent of disposable income is now
at a record level of 19 percent, sur-
passing its 1989 peak level. The sav-
ings rate remains very low
—
^just
around 4 percent. The index of lead-
ing economic indicators fell 1 percent
in September. These mixed signals
are characteristics of moderate
growth. The WEFA Group projects
modest growth of 2.5 percent and 2.4
percent in 1996 and 1997 (see Chart
1). DRl/McGraw Hill forecast a
somewhat larger expansion, 2.6 per-
cent, for 1997.
Employment grew moderately at
3.0 percent and 2.3 percent during
1994 and 1995. The WEFA Group
projects more modest growth at the
rates of 1.5 percent and 1.4 percent
for the next two years. DRI/McGraw
Hill forecasts slightly higher rates.
Growth in employment will be pri-
marily due to increases in serx'ices
employment in which transporta-
tion, wholesale and retail trade,
health care, utilities, business and
social services are included. Low
mortgage rates will again induce
increased residential construction.
The relatively rapid growth during
the last few years has absorbed much
of the excess office space, and non-
residential construction can be ex-
pected to increase.
However, employment levels will
contract in the mining and manufac-
tiiring sectors. The civilian unem-
ployment rate was 6.1 percent and
5.6 percent during 1994 and 1995,
and it is expected to remain low for
the next few years. DRl/McGraw
Hill forecasts unemployment rates
of 5.6 percent in 1996 and 5.8 percent
in 1997. The WEFA Group forecasts
for imemployment are 5.8 percent
and 6.0 percent for 1996 and 1997,
respectively.
Generally, an unemployment rate
below 6 percent leads to wage infla-
tion. However, the recent low unem-
ployment rate has not led to wage
and salary growth. Rapid productiv-
ity growth during 1995 also kept
inflation very stable despite the un-
employment rate of 5.6 percent. One
Chnrt 1. US Gross Domestic Product ami Illinois Personal Income Croii'th
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important factor in determining; tiie
direction of inflation is the iinem-
plo\ ment rate at vviiich inflation is
stable (NAIRU). Both this rate and
the Linempli>\ment rate jointly influ-
ence the direction of inflation. Since
the current unemployment rate aver-
ages of around 5.6 percent, the DRI/
McGraw Hill Rroiczr of the US
Ecoiionn/, argues that the NAIRU
should be about 5.5 percent. As pro-
ductivity growth slows down, the
NAIRU is expected to rise, and, con-
sequently, the unemployment rate is
expected to be close to or slightly
below the NAIRU over the next few
years. As a result, the rate of inflation
should remain stable. The consumer
price index (CPI) was 2.7 percent and
2.6 percent in 1993 and 1994, respec-
ti\'ely, and it is expected to be 2.9
percent through 1995. This is the first
time in o\er 30 years we have had
three back-to-back years below 3.0
percent inflation. Predictions also
look optimistic for the next few
years. DRI/McGraw HiD forecasts
CPI to continue at 2.9 percent during
1996 and 1997, while the WEFA
Group forecasts of CPI are even
lower at 2.5 percent and 2.6 percent
for the next two years.
The producers price index (PPI),
which measures the changes in
prices that businesses pay for their
inputs, provides an early indication
of future inflation. The PPI will be
fairly flat. For finished goods, the
PPI is expected to grow 2.0 percent
in 1995, after growing only 0.6 per-
cent in 1994. DRI /McGraw Hill
predicts PPI to be 2.1 percent and
1.8 percent for 1996 and 1997. The
WEFA Group forecasts are even
lower—1.7 percent for the next
two years.
Real personal consumer expendi-
tures, the total value of spending on
retail goods and xarious services
adjusted for inflation, rose 3.5 per-
cent in 1994 and 3.0 percent in 1995.
The DRI/McGraw Hill forecasts for
real personal consumption expendi-
tures are 3.3 percent for 1996 and 2.5
percent for 1997. The WEFA Group
also projects a decline in growth but
Chart 2. US Real Personal Consumption Expenditures by Kind, Percent of Total
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with more pessimistic rates of 2.2
percent and 1 .9 percent for the next
two years. Much of this growth will
come from the expend itvires on ser-
vices and durable goods (such as
automobiles, personal computers,
and television sets), although expen-
ditures on nondurable goods are also
expected to register positive growth.
Prospects of sluggish growth in in-
come and employment could be part
of the reason for this constrained
consumption growth. High con-
sumer debt may also be a factor.
Chart 2 shows the breakdown of real
personal consumption expenditures
into two components, spending on
retail goods and spending on ser-
vices. As the chart shows, the share
of spending for services will increase
over the forecast period, while the
share spendiiig for retail purchases
will drop. This is due to very slow
growth in expenditures on nondu-
rable goods.
On the international scene, the
weakness of the Japanese economy
continues to depress foreign GDP
growth. However, the Chinese and
some of the far eastern economies
are booming, Europe is on course for
a modest recovery, and the Mexican
economy is now more stable. Oxer-
all, foreign GDP growth, according
to WEFA forecasts, is expected to be
2.1 percent in 1995, 2.5 percent in
1996, and 2.6 percent m 1997. This
modest growth, accompanied by a
weaker dollar and a slower increase
in the US imit labor cost, will lead to
robust growth in US real exports.
WEFA projects real growth to be 9.2
percent and 8.8 percent, respectively,
hi 1996 and 1997, after very strong
growth of 10.8 percent in 1995. The
corresponding DRI/McGraw Hill
forecasts are 8.8 percent for 1996 and
9.9 percent for 1997. During 1995
imports grew rapidly at 11.1 per-
cent—mainly due to large imports of
capital goods. However, as equip-
ment investment slows down, so will
import growth, which, according to
WEFA projections, is expected to be
6.9 percent in 1996 and 6.1 percent in
1997. DRI/McGraw Hill projects
slightly higher rates, 8.3 percent and
6.8 percent in 1996 and 1997. One
measure of the intemahonalizahon
of the US economy is that exports
and imports, both in absolute terms
and as shares of real GDP, have been
steadily increasing over time. Chart 3
plots the exports and imports as a
share of real GDP. Exports have risen
from 6.4 percent of GDP and imports
from 7.5 percent in the early 1970s to
about 13.2 percent and 15.4 percent,
respectively, during 1995. There is a
misconception that most of the re-
cent increases in exports are due to
service exports. Many observers
overlook the growth in merchandise
exports, which have grown very
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Chart 3. US Exports and Imports as a Percent of Gross Domestic Product
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rapidly, triggered by exports of capi-
tal goods such as computer hard-
ware. As a share of GDP,
merchandise exports grew 10.0 per-
cent in 1995, and they are expected to
grow at 11.0 percent and 12.0 percent
during the next two years. On the
other hand, growth of the share of
service exports have remained at 3.0
percent since 1990 and are projected
to stay around that rate for the next
few vears.
The Illinois Economy
Employment
Employment in Illinois will grow at
a slightly slower rate over the fore-
cast period (see Chart 4). Total non-
agricultural employment growth
will increase from 1.8 percent in
1994 to 2.4 percent in 1995 and de-
crease to 0.6 percent in 1996 and
increase to 1.0 percent in 1997. Tlie
decrease in the forecast of total non-
agricultural employment growth in
1996 can be explained by decreases
in the growth of goods-producing
industries. This slower growth is
mitigated by steady growth in
service-producing industries.
Employment growth in the
goods-producing sector of the Illi-
nois economy will decline in 1996
and 1997. Growth in this sector is
projected to decrease from 2.6 per-
cent in 1995 to 0.6 percent and 0.4
percent in 1996 and 1997, respec-
tively. Construction employment is
expected to grow by 5.4 percent in
1995, and then growth will slow
down to 2.4 and 1.4 percent in 1996
and 1997.
The slower growth expected in
employment is likely the result of
decreased growth in manufacturing.
Manufacturing consists of approxi-
mately 17.0 percent of the Illinois
economy, so changes in the employ-
ment growth in this sector are likely
to have significant effects on the
growth of total nonagricultural em-
ployment. The lEM projects total
manufacturing employment growth
of only 0.1 and 0.3 percent in 1996
and 1997, respectively, after stronger
growth of 2.1 percent in 1995. Du-
rable manufacturing employment is
expected to expand 3.5 percent in
1995, but it will contract 0.3 percent
in both 1996 and 1997. Nondurable
manufacturing employment growth
of 0.2 percent in 1995, and 0.8 and 1.2
percent are anticipated in 1996 and
1997. It should be noted that goods-
producing industries make up ap-
proximately 21 .0 percent of the total
employment in the Illinois economy.
Thus, even though grt)wth in em-
ployment in manufacturing-related
industries is expected to decline, a
substantial portion of the economy
—
the service producing sector—will
experience robust growth.
Tlie services-producing sector
accounts for nearly 80 percent of
state employment. Growth in this
sector has a significant impact on the
employment growth in the Illinois
economy. Tlie lEM projects employ-
ment growth in ser\'ices-producing
industries of 2.3 percent in 1995 and
0.6 percent and 1.1 percent for 1996
and 1997. Employment growth in
wholesale trade (approximately 6
percent of the total statewide em-
ployment) is expected to grow at 2.3
percent in 1995 and 0.2 percent both
in 1996 and 1997. Retail h-ade is ex-
pected to grow at 1 .0 percent in both
Chart 4. Illinois Goods- and Sen<ices-Producing Employment Groirth
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1995 and 1996, and then grow 1.1
percent in 1997. Finance, insurance
and real estate is expected tci grow
2.8 percent in 1995 but is expected to
grow only 0.2 percent in 1996 and
then decrease 0.2 percent in 1997.
The largest sector in the services-
producing industries is the service
sector. This category is a catch-all
subsector that includes industries
such as ser\'ices related to business,
health, legal, engineering, manage-
ment, and others. This subsector
constitutes approximately 28 percent
of the Illinois employment. The
lEM projects robust growth in ser-
vices of 3.7 percent for 1995, and
then 1.9 percent and 2.4 percent in
1996 and 1997, respectively. This
steady expansion is the source of the
robust growth in services-producing
industries. Growth in this sector
appears to compensate for the
slight decrease in growth in goods-
producing industries. Government
employment is expected to grow 0.5
percent in 1995, contract 0.9 percent
in 1996, and then its level is ex-
pected to remain unchanged in
1997. As this sector is relatively
small (just over 14 percent of the
Illinois economy) such meager
growth will not contribute much to
the decrease in growth in the overall
employment level.
State employment growth in ser-
vices is consistent with forecasts of
the national economy run by the
WEFA group. Robust employment
growth is projected with most new
jobs created in the service sector.
These employment growth patterns
are consistent with the shift in the
Illinois economy towards the service
industries.
Personal Income
Real total personal income (income
adjusted for inflation) will grow 4.2
percent in 1995. A slight decrease in
growth can be expected as the lEM
projects 3.8 percent and 3.0 percent
growth for 1996 and 1997. Growth in
Illinois personal income follows
closely the growth pattern of US
GNP (see Chart 1). Nonagricultural
personal income is expected to grow
at a slightly lower rate than personal
income as a whole. This implies
positive growth in the agricultural
sector. However, since the lEM does
not forecast the agricultural sector
directly, one must exercise caution in
drawing such inferences from the
aggregate series.
Growth in total nonagricultural
personal income is expected to be 4.2
percent in 1995. The lEM forecasts
3.0 and 2.8 percent growth in
nonagricultural personal income for
1996 and 1997. The increased growth
in personal income is especially sig-
nificant as the forecasts are adjusted
to take into account the effects of
inflation. The relatively high rate of
growth shown in personal income in
1995 may be due to the fact that in-
flation has been lower than expected.
Income growth in goods-producing
industries is expected to reach 4.9
percent in 1995. This will be followed
by growth of only 2.0 percent in 1996
and 1997. Income in manufacturing
industries will expand 5.1 percent in
1995 but growth will decline to 2.6
percent in 1996 and then will in-
crease slightly to 2.9 percent in 1997.
Income growth in durable manufac-
turing is forecast to be 7.2 percent in
1995 followed by a decline in growth
to 2.5 and 2.2 percent in 1996 and
1997. On the other hand, income in
nondurable manufacturing is pro-
jected to grow at a slow rate of 1.9
percent in 1995, but the growth wiU
steadily increase to 2.7 percent in
1996 and 4.0 percent in 1997. Since
durable manufacturing is a larger
portion of the statewide economy
—
approximately 9 percent versus non-
durable at 6 percent—the decrease in
growth has a slightly stronger effect
on the growth of manufacturing
income as a whole.
As was the case for employment,
much of the growth in total personal
income is the result of increases in
growth in the services-producing
industries. Real personal income in
the services-producing sector has
been growing steadily after a drop in
growth in 1993. Personal income is
expected to expand 4.7 percent in
1995. The growth, however, will
decrease to 3.4 percent in 1996 and
will further taper off to 3.1 percent in
1997. Wholesale trade shows the
strongest growth with forecasts of
6.8 percent in 1995, but the growth
will slow dov^m gradually—to 4.0
percent in 1996 and 2.7 percent in
1997.
Incomes in finance, insurance, and
real estate are expected to expand
steadily over the forecast period.
Growth is projected to be 3.7 percent
in 1995 and then 3.5 percent in both
1996 and 1997. Steady growth is
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expected for the largest component
of the ser\'ices-producing sector.
Serx'ices are expected to expand at
4.8 percent in 1995, then slightly
increase to 5.0 percent in 1996 and
decrease to 4.5 percent in 1997. As
this sector contributes one-fifth of
the total personal income in the
state economy, it is not surprising
tliat its growth will ha\'e a positive
influence on the growth of the ag-
gregate income.
Gross State Product
Real gross state product (GSP), the
total inflation-adjusted value of all
goods and services produced in the
state, will grow at 4.2 percent in 1995
and 1996. The growth rate will de-
crease to 2.5 percent in 1997. The
decrease in growth seems to be the
result of declines in the growth of
both goods-producing and services-
producing industries.
Goods-producing industries will
experience growth of 4.9 percent in
1995, followed by an expected in-
crease of 1.9 percent in 1996 and
1997. Growth in services-producing
industries will decline, but more
slowly. It will grow 4.9 percent in
1995 followed by 3.7 percent and 3.4
percent in 1996 and 1997, respec-
tively. Durable manufacti.iring is
expected to expaiid 5.9 percent m
1995 and then drop to 1.4 percent
and 2.1 percent in the next two years.
The behavior of growth in GSP is
similar in most major sectors of the
economy, except in services, which
will grow steadily throughout the
forecast period.
Consumer Spending
Consumer spending, as measured by
retail sales, is projected to grow mod-
erately. Growth of 2.9 percent is
forecast for 1995 followed by 3.2
percent and 2.6 percent for 1996 and
1997. The slight increase in spending
is explained bv the increase in
spending on nondurable goods.
Growth of 4.1 percent is projected for
1995, followed by a growth of 5.6
percent in 1996 and 3.2 percent in
1997. Sales of durable goods are
projected to grow at only 1.1 percent
in 1995. This increase is followed by
a 0.5 percent contraction and 1.6
percent expansion in 1996 and 1997,
respecti\'ely. This sales pattern of
durable goods may indicate that
consumers are now cautious about
buying big-ticket items after a spend-
ing spree during 1992-1994. How-
ever, expenditures on nondurable
goods are projected to be 50 percent
higher than those on durable goods;
a somewhat robust growth of the
total retail sales is still expected
(Chart 5).
Conclusion
In summary, as in the case of the
national economy, the Illinois
economy will follow the no-b(H>m-
no-bust scenario. In terms of employ-
ment growth, Illinois lags behind the
US economy in 1995, and the Illinois
forecasts are for lower grovs'th for
1996 and 1997 compared with the US
figures. However, when it comes to
real gross product, the Illinois
economy will grow at a slightly
higher rate than the national
economy. Once again, it is the ser-
vices industry that proxicies the im-
petus for growth for both the
national and state lexels in terms of
producing income and generating
employment.
Chart 5. Real Illinois Retail Sales (billions of dollars)
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J. Fred Giertz The Illinois Fiscal Outlook
The sustained growth of the
Illinois economy in recent
years, including 1995, has produced
an improved state budget picture,
one that is expected to continue into
1996. While the short-term fiscal
prospects for the state remain good,
Illinois faces longer-term fiscal prob-
lems over the next decade. Pressures
for increasing expenditures that will
come from the needs of a variety of
state programs in areas such as
health care, corrections, and aid for
children at risk will likely outpace
the expected growth in state rev-
enues. This means that Illinois will
continue to face a number of difficult
choices concerning budget priorities
as well as questions about the need
to increase state tax revenues. These
questions will be complicated by a
major restructuring of federal-state
relations that will involve a substan-
tial reduction in the growth of fed-
eral aid to state and local
governments.
1995 in Review
The strength of the Illinois economy
generated an increase in total state
source general funds revenues of
over 4 percent in real (inflation-
adjusted) terms in fiscal 1995 (July
1994 through June 1995) over 1994
without any major new taxes or tax
rate increases. This followed a simi-
lar increase in fiscal 1994. These rev-
enue gains led to a substantial
improvement in the state's budget
for the last three years as compared
with the lean period of the early
1990s. The state has reversed the
recession-induced deficits for 1990
through 1992 with three years of
surpluses (see Chart 1 ).
The state's two most important
revenue sources, the individual in-
come tax and the sales tax, both
posted strong performances the last
two years (Chart 2). After growing at
adjusted annual rates of between 1
and 2 percent from 1990 through
1993, individual income tax receipts.
Chart 1. Recent Surpluses and Deficits (current dollars in millions)
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The economic
expansion of recent
years has led
to a substantial
improvement in
the state's fiscal
health.
adjusted for inflation, increased at
4.8 percent in 1994 and 6.3 percent in
1995. Adjusted sales tax receipts,
which actually declined from 1990
through 1993, grew at over 3.5 per-
cent in the last two years.
The resurgence of corporate tax
receipts has been even more im-
pressive. After a major decline in
1990 and 1991, collections of corpo-
rate taxes increased by around 16
percent in real terms in both fiscal
1994 and 1995. Surprisingly, inflation-
adjusted federal revenue to the state
has also increased substantially dur-
ing the 1990s.
The economic expansion of recent
years has led to a substantial im-
provement in the state's fiscal health.
In addition to the deficits of the early
1990s, the state had also built up a
substantial backlog of unpaid Medic-
aid bills to health care providers not
reflected in the deficit figures. Medic-
aid, a program that provides health
care for low-income cifizens includ-
ing welfare recipients, the disabled,
and the elderly in long-term care, is
administered by the state and fi-
nanced jointly by the federal and
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Chart!. General Fund Revenues by Major Source (billions of constant 1995 dollars)
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State governments. At its peak, the
backlog in Medicaid payments
amounted to over $1.5 billion by
some estimates. Fortunately, the
state has made substantial headway
in reducing outstanding bills without
the need to raise any major taxes.
There is hope that the problem of
overdue Medicaid bills can be effec-
tively eliminated by the end of fiscal
1996 (June 1996). This is the result of
several factors. First, the state has
made efforts to control Medicaid cost
increases by encouraging more re-
cipients to enter managed care ar-
rangements where costs can be better
controlled. The state has also been
able to hold down increases in reim-
bursement rates to providers during
a period in which inflation in medi-
cal care costs has been reduced sub-
stantially nationwide. The rate of
increase in medical care prices for
the last year (1994) was 4.9 percent,
the lowest in the last 20 years. Fi-
nally, it must be remembered that
state funds are matched on a roughly
one-to-one basis with federal aid,
which provides substantial leverage
for additional state dollars directed
to reduce the payment backlog.
f
As noted earlier, there were no
major changes in tax policy in the
last year. After over two years of
debate, casino gambling has not been
approved for Chicago and Cook
County. Similarly, reformers hoping
to change the state's system of edu-
cational finance by reducing the
reliance on local property tax rev-
enues for schools with a substan-
tial infusion of state aid generated
by a state-level tax increase
have made no headway. A
commission, ap-
pointed by Governor
Jim Edgar, is now
addressing educa-
tional funding and is
expected to produce a
set of recommenda-
tions in the spring of
1996. However, it is
unlikely that any
substantial changes
will actually be
implemented until at
least the 1997 legisla-
tive session.
Illinois remains, in
comparison with
other states, a low to
moderate tax state. Meaningful com-
parisons of taxes among states must
be based on combined state and local
taxes rather than state taxes alone,
since states vary greatly in which
level of government provides differ-
ent services. For 1993 (the most re-
cent year for which data is available
for comparison), Illinois ranked six-
teenth highest among the states in
per capita state and local tax rev-
enues at 101 percent of the national
average. However, tax revenues in
Illinois as a percentage of state in-
come was only thirty-third highest
among the states, at 83 percent of the
national average. Note that Illinois
has a relatively high income, ranking
tenth nationally—which accounts for
differences between the measures
based on per capita taxes and taxes
as a percentage of income.
The Prospects for 1996
Most observers expect continued,
although possibly moderating,
growth for Illinois and the nation in
calendar year 1996. For the first five
months of fiscal 1996, state revenues
are slightly ahead of projections
made at the beginning of the period,
in July. The state should experience
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a>ntinuod roal revenue growth
through fiscal 1996 nnd into 1997.
With growth in expenditures, includ-
ing Medicaid, at least temporarily
under control, the short-term state
fiscal picture is relatively bright. In
addition, the major changes at the
federal level that will eventually
have an impact on state aid are not
likely to be telt in Illinois for another
year.
On the negative side, it must be
noted that it has taken tliree years of
strong revenue growth for the state
to work itself out of the problems
encountered in the early 1990s.
Illinois is only now on a relatively
sound fiscal footing. Unfortunately,
the state has not accumulated a mar-
gin of resources to meet any future
problems such as a recession or sub-
stantial reductions in expected fed-
eral aid.
On the legislative front, 1996 is
likely to be a quiet year. Since it is an
election year, major tax increases are
not expected. As noted earlier, re-
forms in education and property
taxes are unlikely until 1997 at the
earliest. With Republican control of
both houses of the General Assem-
bly, an early resolution of the state
budget can be expected as in 1995.
Longer-Term Issues
While the short-term prospects for
the state remain good, the longer-
term outlook is less sanguine. A
recent study conducted by several
members (including the author) of
the Institute of Government and
Public Affairs at the University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign found
that the State of Illinois faces a struc-
tural deficit over the next 10 years.
A structural deficit is defined as a
situation in which if the current
structure of spending programs and
revenue sources remain constant,
long-run projected expenditures will
exceed long-run projected revenues.
To put it differently, a structural
deficit will eventually occur when
the expected, long-run annual
growth rate of expenditures exceeds
The forecast
projects expenditures
to grow at a rate of
2 percent above
inflation each year
while revenues are
expected to grow at
only 1 percent above
inflation annually.
the long-run annual growth rate of
revenues under existing policies.
The results of this study suggest
that state government will face a $1.8
billion structural deficit (in 1995
dollars) in 2005, which would equal
9.5 percent of projected revenues a
decade from now (Chart 3). This
conclusion is based on a set of rea-
sonable assumptions about economic
and demographic changes in Illinois
over the next ten years. These as-
sumptions include a 1.9 percent
growth in real personal income
growth in Illinois, with the projected
growth rate of each state revenue
source based on its historic relation-
ship to growth in personal income.
Projections of expenditures are
based on recent growth rates for
particular programs as well as ex-
pected changes in the target popula-
tions served by state government.
For example, the growth rates for
corrections and education include
projections for changes in school-age
and prison populations while assum-
ing constant inflation-adjusted levels
of support per person served.
The forecast projects expendi-
tures to grow at a rate of 2 percent
above inflation each year (from
$16.9 billion in 1995 to $20.6 billion
in 2005) while revenues are expected
to grow at only 1 percent above
inflation annually (from $17 billion
in 1995 to $18.8 billion in 2005). Both
existing revenue and expenditure
policies contribute to the Illinois
dilemma. Expenditures for several
current state programs are expected
to increase rapidly because the
populations being served are in-
creasing. For example, the number
of prison inmates, abandoned and
abused children, and the elderly
and disabled are all expected to in-
crease significantly.
While the state's revenues are
expected to grow Ln real terms, natu-
ral revenue growth is unlikely to
keep pace with expected expendi-
tures. This creates the persistent gap
between expenditure demands and
state revenues. For example, while
the state Income tax keeps pace with
economic growth and the sales taxes
grows in real terms, other taxes such
as the utility taxes, cigarette and
liquor taxes are expected to decline
in real terms.
The projected deficit is not likely
to actually occur in future years be-
cause the state will be forced to take
action to close the gap. Unlike the
federal government, the state cannot
run continuing large deficits. In gen-
eral, the deficit can be made up by
Chart 3. Projected Rez>enues and
Expenditures (billions of constant
FY95 dollars)
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increasing the growth rate of
revenues, reducing the growth
of expenditures, or some combi-
nation of the two.
Revenues can be increased by
occasional periodic tax rate
increases or other piecemeal
responses or by making chcinges
in the tax structure to make it
more responsive to growth.
Illinois has coped with past such
deficits by increased Income tax
rates, underfunding the state's
pension systems, and delaying
payments to health-care provid-
ers. In other words, the state has
been using short-term strategies
to deal with a long-term, persis-
tent problem. The other option,
reducing the rate of growth of
expenditures, is also problem-
atic. Spending cuts are likely to
entail real pain to many of the
populations served by state
government.
In response to past deficits, the
state has responded by cutting
the share of state resources go-
ing to existing programs (most nota-
bly education) to fund areas where
demands for ser\'ices have increased
rapidly. Chart 4 shows the realloca-
tion of state spending over the past
several decades in response to these
pressures. Note the reduction in the
share going for education, in part at
least, in response to increases in
Medicaid and corrections.
Tlie conclusions of the study on
the coming structural deficit is not
that the state is heading toward
bankruptcy, bistead, it suggests that
Chart 4. Illinois State General Funds Spending
(percentage of total spending by function)
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Illinois will face some difficult
^ choices in the upcoming years
and that it is preferable to ad-
dress these challenges with
long-run planning and strat-
egy rather than the purely reac-
tive stance that has often been
relied on in the past.
On a somewhat more opti-
mistic note, the changes at the
federal level that will be imple-
mented to eliminate the federal
deficit over the next seven
years may not have as dramatic
\. a negative impact on the state
of Illinois as many observers
predict. These changes in fed-
eral budget policy do promise
a major realignment of federal
interactions with the states that
will reduce the rate of growth
of federal aid. Federal restric-
tions on the use of this aid will
be lessened through the ex-
pansion of block grants that
will allow states more discre-
tion in the use of these funds.
However, the increased flex-
ibility is unlikely to compensate fully
for the reduced funding. States such
as Illinois will be forced either to
raise their own taxes substantially
to maintain programs or to make
painful cuts.
Tliis appraisal, howexer, is un-
duly negative with regard to Illinois
because it concentrates only on the
fiscal position of the state govern-
ment and not on the relative posi-
tion Illinois citizens. To eliminate the
federal deficits in the future, the
federal goveniment must either
reduce the rate of growth of expen-
ditures or enact a major increase in
federal taxes. For the people of Illi-
nois, who pay a disproportionate
share of federal taxes and receive a
relatively small share of federal
expenditures, cutting federal
expenditures is ver)' likely to be
more beneficial than an increase in
federal taxes.
The Illinois per capita federal tax
burden is 15 percent higher than the
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average for the country as a whole,
while it receives approximately 16
percent less than the US average in
federal spending. Neither the tax
burden nor the expenditure return is
necessarily unreasonable or unfair.
As a high-income state, it is to be
expected that Illinois will pay more
per capita than the national average.
Similarly, wealthier states expect to
receive less per capita for redistribu-
tive programs than poorer ones. The
fact that Illinois is not a major pro-
vider of military equipment or home
to a large number of military bases
further reduces its share of federal
spending.
Preliminary estimates of the im-
pact of federal changes in aid to
states indicates that by 2002 Illinois
federal aid would fall $3.8 billion (or
29 percent) below the levels pro-
jected under current law. Such a loss
of federal aid to the state would re-
sult in a drop of about 7 percent of
the state's total revenues (including
all funds) by 2002.
On the positive side, the reduced
federal aid (and other federal cut-
backs) would forestall the need to
increase federal taxes substantially to
balance the budget. This is a signifi-
cant point to consider for the citizens
of Illinois. If federal taxes were in-
creased to maintain the current fed-
eral aid programs in 2002 to all state
and local governments in the coun-
try, the Illinois share of the increased
federal taxes would amount to ap-
proximately $5.0 billion, compared
with federal aid reductions to the
state and local governments in Illi-
nois of $3.8 billion. The net impact on
the state of increased federal taxes
would be a net outflow of taxes over
aid returned from Washington of
$1.2 billion compared with federal
aid cuts. From a narrow perspective,
Illinois would be better off to accept
the federal aid cuts and to increase
state and local taxes to deal with the
lost federal revenue.
Federal changes will not be with-
out pain for the state, however. The
State of Illinois may not choose to
continue all existing programs cur-
rently paid for with federal funds by
raising state and local taxes. In such a
case, the poor in Illinois would suffer
disproportionally while higher in-
come residents would benefit from
lower taxes. The fact remains, how-
ever, that this problem is best ad-
dressed directly within the state,
where a dollar of taxes collected
provides a dollar of benefits to the
citizens of the state, as opposed to
sending the money to Washington
where a dollar of Illinois taxes pro-
duces 75 cents in extra revenue for
governments in the state. In sum-
mary, state efforts to maintain ad-
equate services in response to federal
cutbacks are likely to be more pro-
ductive than futile attempts to stop
the changes at the federal level.
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Stephen P. D'Arcy and
Pyungsuk Oh
State Pension Systems: Will They Be Able
to Pay?
By 1995, the un-
funded liability had
increased to over
$19 billion as a
result of continued
underfunding and
generous early
retirement programs.
Financial debacles hold a fasci-
nation for many of us, as we
watch enthralled as incomprehen-
sible sums of money disappear due
to greed, larceny, or simply stupid-
ity. The savings and loan industry,
the Barings Bank failure. Orange
County, Mutual Benefit, Lloyd's of
London, these are a few major finan-
cial shocks we have observed re-
cently. People lose money, or lose
access to their money. One's sense of
financial security is shaken, espe-
cially for those directly involved in
the crisis.
More shocks surely lie ahead, but
for some there may be advance
warning. Knowledgeable observers
have long warned of the coming
bankruptcy of the Social Security
System. There is a committee
charged with the annual task of pin-
pointing the date this system will
become insolvent unless changes are
made. Perhaps these warnings will
be heeded and the necessary changes
made to forestall these problems. If
not, at least no one will be surprised.
But other crises are looming that are
not so widely publicized. One poten-
tial problem area is state pension
systems.
State pension
plans are not subject
to any federal guide-
lines regarding h.md-
ing adequacy. Unlike
private pension
plans, they are ex-
empt from the fund-
ing regulations, and
insurance provisions,
of the Employee
Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974
(ERISA). Instead,
they are subject only
to their own state's
laws and regulations regarding
funding. In many states, there are no
guidelines. In others, including Illi-
nois, violations of the applicable
regulations have gone unpenalized.
As a result, the funding levels of
different states range dramatically,
from almost no funding to funding
at a level that covers not only all
benefits currently owed, but also
some benefits that will be earned in
the future.
In addition to the lack of indepen-
dent oversight in setting and main-
taining funding adequacy, another
major problem is that there is no
widely accepted method of deter-
mining the appropriate level of fund-
ing. Some argue that since states
have the power to tax, any pension
shortfall can be covered by future
taxation. Proponents of this view
also argue that no state has ever
defaulted on pension promises. This
default-free history, although reas-
suring, must be placed in some per-
spective. The first state-administered
pension plan covering general state
workers was enacted only in 1911,
and it generally takes 50 or more
years for any pension system to ma-
ture and approach its full cost level.
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Thus, tlioro roallv lias not been an
extensi\ e record ot state pension
systems attaining their full cost level
and then meeting the pensii>n obliga-
tions under a wide range ot eco-
nomic conditions.
On the other hand, the argimient
is raised that a state should pay tor
the pension benefits earned in the
year thev are earned, so that the
citizens (taxpayers) that benefit from
the ser\'ices provided also bear the
cost, rather than shifting that cost to
a future generation. Shifting costs to
future generations of taxpayers can
only be done for so long before the
recipients of such a burden decide
that they either cannot or will not
pay for ser\'ices they ne\'er received.
State workers, knowing that a de-
fault is possible and that the likeli-
hood of a default is related to the size
of the pension deficit, naturally are
concerned about the reliability of
unfunded pension promises. The
economic effects of this concern,
such as demands for higher wages to
compensate for pension risk, the
inability to attract and retain quality
workers, lower morale and produc-
tivity, are hard to quantify, but likely
exist. In addition, the effect of un-
funded pension liabiliHes on the
financial ratings of state debt can
increase the cost of borrowing across
the board for a state with a serious
underfunding problem.
Despite the research behind the
divergent viewpoints, the issue of a
proper funding level for state pen-
sion plans is not settled. The costs
and benefits from underfunding are
difficult to calculate reliably. Defer-
ring costs may save money in the
short run, but the future liability
created may eventually generate
expenses that exceed the immediate
gains.
We propose a different approach
to state pension funding. Pension
expenses represent a cost that the
state taxpayers must bear at some
time. The least painful method of
paying for these benefits would be to
pay a constant proportion of taxable
Public /V;/s/i)H Pliiiis: Ciirrcnl/Oi'tiiniil I unilin^ Levels
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income each year. This presumes
that the economic gain of reducing
the tax rate by, for example, 1 per-
cent is more than offset by the pain
of raising it by 1 percent later, even
though the later taxpayers may be
different people. In economic
terms, adjustment factors between
generations etjual the per capita
income growth rate. Making this
assumption, the optimal level of
pension funding can be determined
for any range of demographic and
economic variables.
This model does not produce a
universal adequate funding level.
Instead, the appropriate ft.inding
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Public Pension Plans: CiirrcntlOptimal Funding Levels (continued)
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level is determined by the interrela-
tionship of the rate of growth of a
state's pension benefits, the popula-
tion growth rate, and the per capita
mcome growth rate. As long as a
state's tax base is growing more
rapidly than its pension expenses,
then underfunding is the optimal
pension funding strategy. However,
if pension expenses are growing
more rapidly than the tax base, then
the pension plan should be over
funded, hi the case in which pension
costs and the growth of the tax base
are equal, the optimal funding
would be full fmiding.
Although the sources of state tax
revenue are quite varied, with per-
sonal and business income taxation,
sales and use taxes, licenses, and fees
on particular products among other
sources of tax revenue, the effect of
the taxes is borne, in general, by the
residents of the state. Thus, the
population of a state at a particular
time indicates the number of people
affected by a state tax, any tax, at that
time. Based on the underlying as-
sumption about the impact of taxa-
tion, per capita income is the
appropriate index to use to measure
the base income available for taxa-
hon. Combining the population
growth rate with the growth in per
capita income yields the tax base
upon which any tax will be levied.
The objective of this procedure is to
cover all pension expenses by paving
a constant percentage of the tax base.
The tax base is calculated to grow as
follows:
Tax Base (1 + Population Growth
Growth = Rate) (1 + Per Capita
Rate Income Growth) -
1
Pension expenses are the total
benefits paid to retired state employ-
ees. Under a new pension system, no
benefits are paid until the co\'ered
employees begin to retire. This may
take ten or more years if benefits are
earned only for service after the pen-
sion plan has been established.
However, if the plan pro\'ides for
retroactive service credits, gi\'ing
current employees credit for the
years they worked before the plan
was set up, then the first payments
will begin almost immediately.
Whenexer the benefit pavments
begin, the level of payouts ijicreases
each year as more employees retire
and begin to collect benefits. If there
were no inflation, no increase in the
number of covered employees, and
no change in the pension plan to
provide more generous benefits,
then eventuallv tlie pension payouts
would reach a steadv state. Again,
depending on the retirement age
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Funding Level
plan, the growth rate for the tax base
must be compared with the growth
rate for pension expenses. Assuming
.that pension benefits have not been
enhanced, then the growth rate in
pension costs will, in the long run,
approximate the growth rates in
number of employees and average
salary. Across the nation, state em-
ployment grew at a 1.539 percent
rate over the period 1980-1992. The
lowest rate was in West Virginia,
where the number of state employ-
ees fell 1.755 percent annually. The
highest rate was in Nevada, where
employment increased 3.643 percent
per year. In Illinois, the growth rate
was 0.592 percent. Nationally, the
average salary of state employees
grew 5.536 percent per year. The
lowest growth was in Wyoming,
only 2.831 percent growth per year.
The highest rate was in Connecticut,
where it increased 8.652 percent per
year. The Illinois rate was 5.121 per-
cent. Thus, the long-run pension
growth rates would be 7.16 percent
- For details on the method of calculating the
optimal funding level, see Pyungsuk Oh,
"Optimal Funding of State Public Employee
Pension Systems," unpublished dissertation.
University of Illinois, 1995.
nationally ((1.01539)(1.05536) - 1) and
5.74 percent in Illinois ((1.00592)
(1.05121)
-1).
Based on the national growth
rates of 7.10 percent for tax base
growth and 7.16 percent for pension
plan growth, the optimal funding
ratio for a public pension plan would
be slightly over full funding. For
Illinois, with tax base growth of 6.10
percent and pension growth of 5.74
percent, underfunding, to some de-
gree, would be optimal. However,
these pension plan growth rates
assume no benefit enhancements or
other changes that would increase
pension costs faster than the public
employees' wage base.
Unfortunately, from a funding
perspective, beneficieries are fre-
quently offered enhancements that
end up increasing future pension
costs. Over the period 1988 through
1992, based on the annual reports of
state public employee pension sys-
tems, the pension benefit obligation
grew more rapidly than the public
employees' wage base in 38 of the 44
states for which information is avail-
able. For Illinois, the annual growth
rate for the pension benefit obliga-
tion was 11.56 percent, well above
the growth rates for the tax base (6.10
percent) and public employees' wage
base (5.64 percent).
Forecasting the future of pension
costs is difficult when legistative
action can change those costs at any
point. Using the recent past as a
guide, however, suggests that many
states tend to raise public pension
costs faster than the tax base is grow-
ing. Based on this behavior, the opti-
mal funding of public pension plans
is more than full funding. Instead,
public pension plans are now under-
funded by approximately 14 percent.
The current funding levels will force
future taxpayers' to pay a higher
proportion of their taxable income to
cover public pension costs. This
higher tax burden can be resisted by
future taxpayers, who are likely to be
unwilling to pay for services ren-
dered to prior generations of citizens.
The higher tax burdens could prove
recessionary, which would slow the
growth rate in the tax base and exac-
erbate the funding problem. Also,
the higher tax rates, given that they
will vary by state, could induce relo-
cation to states whose public pension
plan funding strategy has not led to
significant tax increases. These popu-
lation shifts will adversely affect
those states with the most serious
underfunding problems while
benefitting states that adequately
funded public pensions.
The chart shows the current and
optimal funding conditions for each
state's public pension funds based
on two different assumptions about
the growth rate of pension expenses.
The first assumes that pension ex-
penses increase in line with the
growth in the number of employees
and salary increases over the period
1980 through 1992. The second as-
sumes that the growth rate in the
state's pension benefit obligafion
over the period 1988 through 1992
conHnues into the future.
-
While it is difficult to forecast
long-range pension costs accurately,
the two esfimates represent a range
of possible outcomes. The states with
current funding levels above both
the indicated opfimal levels are most
likely to be able to avoid future
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problems. California, Georgia, Mary-
land, North Carolina, Oregon, and
Pennsylvania are in this position. On
the other hand, states with current
Rinding levels below both the indi-
cated optimal levels, including Ar-
kansas, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michi-
gan, Mississippi, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, Wis-
consin, and Wyoming, are very
likely to experience funding crises in
the future. The future of other states,
including Illinois, depends on which
of the estimates proves to be more
accurate, the long-term wage base or
recent growth in pension benefit
obligations. Illinois will be in serious
trouble if pension expenses grow at
the pension-benefit-obligation
growth rate, but will be fine if ex-
penses grow in line with state wage
growth.
What will happen when a public
pension plan goes bankrupt? Al-
though we have no examples in this
country on which to base observa-
tions, parallels with other financial
fiascos provide some indications. If
money is not available to pay pen-
sions, then payments will be de-
layed. Periodic budget deadlocks, in
Illinois as well as other states, pro-
vide ample evidence that this can
occur. If the delays are extensive,
then the state may issue checks that
cannot be cashed. In this case a sec-
ondary market is likely to develop in
which pension beneficiaries can
exchange their checks for a payment
of less than the full face value. The
lower payment would reflect the
time value of money and the risk
involved in holding the currently
uncollectible checks. This represents
a de facto pension reduction.
In order to replenish the pension
plan, the state will have to provide
additional resources. This may be
from new revenues (tax increases) or
from a redistribution of spending
(a.irtailing other services). A tax
increase could affect pension benefi-
ciaries along with all other taxpayers,
or could be focused directly on pen-
sion beneficiaries. In Illinois, for
example, Illinois state pension ben-
efits are exempt from state taxafion.
This exemption could be eliminated,
which would be, in effect, a reduc-
tion in benefits. Or the income tax on
public pensions could be at a higher
rate than the general state income tax
rate, in recognition of the fact that
paying public pensions created the
need for the tax increase. This strat-
egy is especially likely for recipients
of public pension benefits who live
out of state. On the other hand, cur-
tailing other public services could
adversely affect the quality of life for
in-state pension beneficiaries, as well
as other state citizens. Another possi-
bility would be for the state to retro-
actively reduce pension benefits, for
example, reducing or eliminating
periodic benefit increases or with-
holding a portion of the pension to
be paid at a later date. Although in
Illinois any reduction in pension
benefits for active or retired employ-
ees would require a constitutional
amendment, if the funding crisis is
severe enough, then this option can-
not be ruled out. Whatever approach
is taken (delayed payment, reduced
benefits, increased taxes) the likely
effect will be to decrease the value of
the pension benefit for retirees.
What can be done to avoid these
potential financial debacles? The
logic behind our model is that pen-
sion costs should be kept a level
portion of taxable income for the
state. Since in pension plans ex-
penses are paid many decades after
the employee performs the work,
small differences in the growth rates
of the tax base and pension costs
have a very large impact. Thus, re-
straining the growth of public pen-
sion costs by holding the growth rate
of number of public employees at or
below state population growth, hold-
ing salary levels at or below the
growth in per capita income, and
avoiding pension enhancements can
prevent problems. For a state with a
tax base growing faster than public
employee pension costs,
underfunding is the optimal strat-
egy, and one that can continue in-
definitely. A little fiscal discipline
can go a long way to preventing
financial disaster. Given that the
legislators and other public officials
setting these policies will also be
victims of any public pension crisis,
there should be an incentive to avoid
problems. Unfortunately, no such
discipline has been demonstrated to
date in most states.
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Robert G. F. Spitze The Search for a 1995 Agricultural and
Food Policy
^
d
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) in January IWS, both of
which set US policy on a gradual
course toward less government inter-
ference in domestic markets and
agricultural trade.
Tlte Current Economic and Social
Situation
In the setting of new policies, the
conditions existing just prior to
polic)' decisions are much more in-
fluential than historic trends. Al-
though this year's weather has had
very different effects on various
areas of the country, agricultural
production, prices, and producer
incomes have been relatively stable,
providing no special impetus for
policy change. In particular, com-
modity supplies have tightened,
exports have been strong, and pro-
ducer incomes have remained
steady. However, the need for food
assistance by US residents has con-
tinued to grow, even wath relatively
stable levels of overall personal in-
come, because of the definite eco-
nomic erosion experienced by
lower-income families.
Tfte Knoxvledge of Participants
Reliable information about the con-
sequences of past policies and the
expected results of various alterna-
tives increases the effectiveness of all
participants in the ag and food policy
debate in achieving their objectives.
Never before have so many facts, so
much analysis, and knowledge of
group preferences been available so
early or been so widely disseminated
as in the case of the 1995 agricultural
and food policy.
Tfte Values ofParticipants
The values—economic, social, psy-
chological or political—of the partici-
pants in the decision process directly
affect public policy choices. Since the
1990 program, two national elections
have demonstrated increased inter-
est in curtailing national budget
deficits and lessening government
intervention in markets. The 1995
policy is expected to feature reduced
A Budget Vinv ofUS Farm and Food Policy, FYl 995 " ^^^^^|
farms (Senator Daschle, Dem., and
others)
to replace the present program and
reduce the budget through declining
fixed payments over seven years,
with no conditions set for production
(Representative Roberts , Rep.)
to retain most present farm pro-
grams but allow more planting flex-
ibility and reduce the budget by
excluding payments to farmland
owners with over $100,000 of off-
farm income (Representatives de la
Garza and Stenholm, Dems.)
Driven by the apparent momen-
tum for budget reduction, these pro-
posals would reduce government
farm outlays by 5-18 percent from
the about $10 billion in the 1990 pro-
gram. There is similar budget contro-
versy over the extensive food
assistance programs of some $40
billion for low-income families, chil-
dren, and the elderly. Some propos-
als would return programming
decisions and administration to the
discretion of the states. The Table
gives some budgetary perspective.
The 1995 Process
Congressional hearings on
specific issues began in 1994
and carried into 1995 at numer-
ous locations around the coun-
try. Throughout the summer
and early fall, the attention of
policymakers mainly focused
on budget deficit reduction,
first for FY1996 and then for the
next seven to ten years. Contro-
versy confinues over both the
extent of budget reductions and
the content of farm commodity,
food assistance, conservation,
and export programs.
Although both the House
and Senate leadership set a late
September deadline for resolu-
tion of differences over the
budget for the new October 1
fiscal year and the new 1995 policy
for agriculture and food, lack of con-
sensus has delayed both issues and,
as of this wrifing (December 1), only
a FY1996 budget for the USDA had
been approved. With the passage of
the Republican-backed seven-year
Congressional budget reconciliafion
bill and its veto by President Clinton,
the new agricultural and food policy
has been postponed longer than in
any recent period. However, delays
are hardly unique. In past years they
have extended for months. The 1990
Act was not finally signed by the
president unfil November 28, 1990,
while the 1985 Act came even later.
It is conceivable that the parties will
be unable to find a compromise and
will only be able to agree on a year-
to-year extension of the 1990 Act,
with changes mandating budgets
through the appropriations process.
Whatever the outcome, it will likely
involve lower outlays for both pro-
ducers and low-income consumers
as well as less public surveillance
over both production and food
quality.
Conclusion
Decisions about important public
issues are always made eventually,
and some agricultural and food
policy will be enacted. Prime public
issues continue to be the efficiency
and security of the food and fiber
supply, the safety of the delivery
system to consumers, and the even-
tual welfare—including but not
limited to economic values—of
producers and consumers. Policy-
makers will be frustratingly delib-
erative about the programs as well as
their budgetary impact because the
consequences of their eventual deci-
sions will affect every citizen as pro-
ducer, consumer, or taxpayer for
years to come. Only when the final
compromise is struck at some yet
unknown date will we know
whether the 1995 agricultural policy
will be more evolution or revolution.
niinois Business Review/Winter 1995 25
Richard j. Amould The 1996 Outlook
Since this is my first venture into
the world of economic forecast-
ing after taking over the position of
Director of the Commerce Research
Office, I would like to begin with a
bit of philosophy. Some might call
this a way of explaining future fail-
ures to forecast accurately.
I would like to discriminate be-
tween econometric forecasting and
predicting. While this is a slight play
on words, the distinction is useful.
Econometric forecasting generally
involves the development of a sys-
tem of mathematical equations, the
purpose of which is to use historical
data to explain the interrelationships
and trends among economic vari-
ables. These relationships are then
used to forecast the future. In a tech-
nical sense, the forecaster is con-
strained by the extent to which past
relationships can be identified and
also by the extent to which structural
conditions that explain the past con-
tinue to be important.
Predicting, as I am using the
term, is more of an art. It involves
combining information from the
econometric model with information
not in the model, such as political
and social factors that could influ-
ence the economy, followed by the
application of a good dose of com-
mon sense. It is much like looking
outside to see whether or not it is
raining before forecasting that it will
be a great day for a golf ouHng. Simi-
larly, if the economy has been grow-
ing at a snail's pace for a number of
quarters, one might want to recon-
sider a forecast of a very high rate of
growth derived from the economet-
ric model.
Thus, it is my purpose to bridge
the technical econometric forecasts
with reality where it appears the
model might be signaling a signifi-
cant change in the direction or level
of some area of the economy. Fortu-
nately, perhaps, for me the forecasts
for the US and Illinois economies
seem to be both realistic and defen-
sible. We expect neither boom nor
bust. The forecasts for the US
economy are for continued solid but
slow growth, probably slower than
in the past two or three years. Like-
wise, employment will continue to
grow at a very slow rate, and infla-
tion should not be a major concern.
The Illinois economy should grow
at an even slower pace than the na-
tional economy, with the possibility
of declines in employment in some
sectors in the next two years. The
major influence on the Illinois
economy seems to be the continuing
restructuring of the economy across
the nation. Illinois has traditionally
been a dominant goods producer,
and like many other midwestem
states, it has been strongly affected
by the decline in manufacturing and
expansion in service industries.
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Growth in the Illinois economy is
highly dependent upon growth in
service sectors. The econometric
model forecasts continued rapid
growth in those components of the
service sector that include financial
services, business services, health,
and legal services. However, there
are forces looming that will make it
difficult to achieve such rates of
growth in the future.
First, the consolidation among
firms continues in services, espe-
cially in banking and health care.
With consolidation comes restructur-
ing of the labor force and the contin-
ued lay-off of mid- to high-level
officers. In many cases, those being
displaced are relatively senior em-
ployees whose alternatives are at
lower levels of compensation. It is to
be hoped that the gains in productiv-
ity wiU offset the negative effects of
this transition.
Second, the February 14, 1995
edition of the Neiv York Times noted
that a widely followed survey of
2,097 employers by Foster Higgins, a
benefits consulting firm, reported
that the employers had witnessed a
decline in medical costs of 1.1 per-
cent. Medical costs in the private and
public sector are being brought un-
der control, something that seemed
impossible just a few years ago.
Therefore, the health care sector
cannot be relied upon to generate
the levels of growth in employment
and spending experienced in the late
1980s and early 1990s.
Third, there are two additional
and disturbing economic trends re-
ported in this issue. Consumer debt
as a percent of disposable income is
at a record high level, and growth in
personal disposable income at a very
low level. Clearly, consumer debt
The transfer of respon-
sibility for problems
now covered by
federal government
entitlement programs
to states through
block grants will have
profound, ifsomewhat
unpredictable, effects
on the state economy.
cannot continue to increase at past
levels without significant increases
in earnings. This was borne out by
the disappointing sales reported by
retail firms for Christmas 1995.
Finally, let me comment on a few
factors that could be considered
"gotchas" to forecasters and arm-
chair predictors alike. First, the entire
world is focused on whether or not
Congress and the president can agree
on a balanced budget. If an agree-
ment is not reached, we can expect
world confidence in the US economy
to decline. If an agreement is
reached, concern will turn to analysis
of its impact on various elements of
the economy. Assuming that the
agreement results in a reduction in tlic
rate of increase in federal government
spending, there will be widespread
effects on various sectors of the
economy—not to mention the need
for the private sector to expand ad-
equately to make up for the decline.
A related "gotcha" is one men-
tioned by J. Fred Giertz in this issue.
The transfer of responsibility for
problems now covered by federal
government entitlement programs to
states through block grants will have
profound, if somewhat unpredict-
able, effects on the state economy.
Most current forecasts and predic-
tions expect a decline in federal
support for these programs with
increasing burdens on the states. Be
prepared for surprises as there are
many complicated (good, bad, and
indifferent) unknowns as the pro-
posed programs come to fruition.
The US entry into Bosnia is an-
other event that could affect the
economy in the next year. Should
the involvement deepen beyond
what is currently contemplated, in-
creased costs could create inflation-
ary pressures.
Let us not forget that next year is
a major election year. One might
predict that campaign spending
would be enough to provide a sub-
stantial boost to the economy! How-
ever, campaigns seem to be unending.
Therefore, one year may not be that
different from another. It is unclear
that elections have much predictable
impact on the economy, but they
generate substantial discussion.
All this said, barring significant
unforeseen events, we seem to be
looking toward a year or two of
slow but posiHve growth in the US
and Illinois economies. As an
economy, we u'ill be better off tv\'o
years from now. However, due to
the continued restructuring from
goods to services, and even within
the service industries, there will be
both winners and losers.
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From the Editor
am very pleased to have been
apointed Director ot the C"om-
merce Research Office at the
University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign and editor ot i\\e Illinois
Business Review.
The Illinois Business Review has
been around over 50 years. Over such
a period, the mission and focus of a
publication have to change occasion-
ally. As you can see, we are again
making changes.
Currently, we consider the mis-
sion of the Illinois Business Review to
include bringing our readers the following:
critical analyses of changes and developments in
major industries in Illinois, such as the article by
Carole Amidon on structural changes in employ-
ment and earnings from manufacturing to service
industries,
critical analyses ofhow issues (such as gambling)
affect Illinois and various communities in the state,
topics about management and leadership,
articles that bring to the business community
research findings of faculty members at the Univer-
sity of Illinois College of Commerce and Business
Administration,
economic forecasts of the Illinois economy with
emphasis on different sectors of the economy and
different regions within the state.
Richard J. Arnould
news items about research activi-
ties ot the faculty and programs and
symposia conducted by the College.
The economic forecasts will be pro-
vided as a joint effort between econo-
mists at the Commerce Research
Office and the Institute of Govern-
ment and Public Affairs. We are happy
to have Professor Robert Resek again
involved in our forecasts. Professor
Resek began the Illinois state economic
and revenue forecasts when he held
the directorship and was editor of the
Illinois Business Review. He rejoins us
after retiring as Vice President for Aca-
demic Affairs of the University of Illinois.
The changes we are making are intended to achieve
two very important goals. First, we hope to make the
presentation more appealing and reader-friendly..
Second, we hope to bring to you topics of interest
and provide you with information of value.
We cannot succeed in our mission or know how
to alter that mission without your input. Therefore,
we have included in this issue a short reader survey
along with a return envelope. Would you please take
a few minutes to respond to the questionnaire? We
value your opinions.
Thank you.
Richard J. Arnould
Commerce News
UIUC Professors Find Academics Not Always the Reason
Student Athletes Leave School
The common assumption that most athletes who
drop out are forced to do so by failing grades may
not be true.
UI economics professors Wallace Hendricks,
Larry DeBrock, and Roger Koenker have found that
the graduation rates of college athletes may not
reflect their academic abilities or the academic sup-
port provided by their schools. Graduation rates for
nonathletes also vary dramatically across campuses.
Students drop out for a variety of reasons. More
than 85 percent of athletes drop out voluntarily, and
fewer than 1 5 percent leave because of academic
troubles.
All drop outs make an economic choice about
the value of their degree. An athlete is more likely to
drop out of a school whose degree confers little value
in the labor market. Male football and basketball
players have the added incentive to leave school to
accept lucrative contracts with professional teams.
Female basketball players have few such opportuni-
ties and graduate at a significantly higher rate.
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Why Some Communities' Earnings
Can't Keep Up
By Carole M. Amidon
A higher percentage of manufacturing jobs
may account for why some communities have
higher per capita earnings than others.
Over the last five years, Illinois workers
have brought home a higher average wage
and a larger percentage of earnings fi'om
manufacturing than the average U.S. worker. In
Illinois as in the country as a whole, a greater per-
centage of earnings is now due to services and less to
manufacturing, but Illinois still derives a larger per-
centage of its earnings from manufacturing than the
U.S. as a whole (Chart
1). This may explain why
per capita income in Illi-
nois has been consistently
higher than the rest of
the United States. One
reason that manufactur-
ing wages are higher than
service wages is the effect
of productivity.When
workers can produce
more revenue for their
company, their wages can
be higher. However, pro-
ductivity in service indus-
tries increases at a slower
rate than in manufactur- ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
ing because these enter-
prises can increase productivity by replacing workers
with machines. On the other hand, it is difficult to
increase the number of operations that a surgeon
performs or the speed of a piano concerto.
Chart 1. Manufacturing and Services as
a Percent of Total Earnings
7o 1 1 %
United States Services
Illinois Services
United States Manufacturing
Illinois Manufacturing
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Percentage earnings from manufacturing have been
higher in Illinois than in the U.S.
Wage Differences in Illinois
Some Illinois communities derive relatively more
of their employment from manufacturing than oth-
ers (Chart 2), and in these communities earnings
have grown faster over the past 25 years. In the
ranking, Springfield has the lowest percentage and
Rockford the highest. If you look at growth in
earnings for 1992-1993, 1989-1993, and
1983-1993 Champaign-
Urbana had percent,
18 percent, and 71 per-
cent, respectively, in the
periods examined, while
Chicago had growth of4
percent, 22 percent, and
88 percent for the respec-
tive periods. Thus, the
Champaign-Urbana area
has consistently lagged
behind the Chicago area
in earnings growth.
Chart 3 shows the av-
erage per capita wages in
eight Illinois metropoli-
tan statistical areas (the
wage per job in an area
rather than the wage per person). The ranking of the
statistical areas by the average wage has not changed
much over the past 25 years, but the gaps between
areas have become more pronounced, especially af-
ter the 1980s.
- 40
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Carole M. Amidon is a graduate student in the Department of Economics and a research assistant in the
Commerce Research Office at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Carole M. Amidon
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Taking a closer look at Chart 3, the Champaign-
Urbana area has the second lowest percentage of
earnings derived from manufacturing after Spring-
field (Springfield is expected to have a lower per-
centage of earnings related to manufacturing due to
the large government and related services sector).
Champaign-Urbana also has the second highest per-
centage of earnings from service industries. Much of
the lower average wages in Champaign-Urbana can
be explained by this higher concentration of low-
wage service jobs. The higher dependance on service
industries, leading to lower growth in wages, par-
tially explains the increasing gap between average
per capita wages in Champaign-Urbana and the
other metropolitan statistical areas over the past 25
years. The remainder of the metropolitan areas also
follow the trend of widening differences in average
per capita wage due to differing concentrations of
manufacturing earnings, though to a lesser degree.
The two exceptions to this theon' are Rockford
and Springfield. Although Springfield would be ex-
pected to have the lowest average wage in the state
because of its high concentration of ser\uce indus-
tries, instead, it ranks in the middle of the distribu-
tion. A possible explanation is that the ser^dce jobs in
Springfield are higher-paying ones, such as in the
legal profession and government support sen'ices,
and this increases the average wage. By contrast,
Rockford woidd be expected to have the highest
average wage because it has the most income derived
from manufacturing enterprises. However, while
earnings from manufacturing are a higher percent-
age of total earnings, the actual manufacturing em-
ployment dropped by 15 percent from 1989 to
1993. Thus, the manufacturing earnings are being
concentrated in the hands of fewer workers, consis-
tent with the productivity gains experienced in manu-
facturing enterprises.
Lower-wage areas in Illinois have lower per capita
earnings for manufacturing as well as for services
(Chan 4). Therefore, it is not the case that the
average per capita wage figures are hiding high-wage
manufacturing jobs in low-wage areas, but both
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing enterprises
are paying lower wages in these areas.
Manufacturing wages are growing, but firms are
emploving fewer workers. From 1989 to 1993, the
manufacturing earnings as a percent of total earn-
ings either remained fairly steady or increased in the
metropolitan statistical areas, except for Rockford
where it fell from 46 to 39 percent (Chart 3), al-
though the average per capita earnings from manu-
facturing have risen over the same period (Chart 4).
Only the Champaign-Urbana, Kankakee, and
Springfield statistical areas have gained manufactur-
ing employment from 1989 through 1993. while
the rest lost manufactur-
ing employment. Thus,
while manufacturing
earnings as a percentage
of total earnings has held
steady, in most statistical
areas the increased aver-
age per capita manufac-
turing earnings are being
accrued by fewer people.
Lower-wage areas have
lower earnings for
manufacturing as well
as for services.
Can It Be Good to Be Low
Wage?
Lower average wages can be good for a commu-
nirs'. It may be easier for the Champaign-Urbana
area to attract new businesses, both manufacturing
and otherwise, than Bloomington-Normal, where
the average wage is higher. Not only could a pro-
spective new business expect to pay lower wages in
Champaign-Urbana now, but the slower growth in
wages implies that the wages will remain compara-
tively lower. Firms that locate or relocate to low-
wage areas can, thus, expect a competitive ad\'antage
in \\'ages now and in the fiiture.
From the worker's point of view, the attraction
of higher wages in otherwise similar areas of Illinois
may entice potential employees to move from low-
wage communities to high-wage areas, creating a
shortage ofworkers in the low-wage places. Then, as
Chart 2. Manufacturing Employment as
a Percent of Total Employment
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Manufacturing enterprises such as Mitsubishi help give
Bloomington-Normal a higher per capita income than
some neighboring communities.
f firms compete for fewer
I workers, wages could be
S driven upward and
S eventually catch up.
•? Currently, there are no
^ data to show whether
^ workers are actually
J moving to higher wage
areas because of the
wage differences, but
the increasing gap be-
tween the high-wage
and low-wage areas sug-
gest that little migration
is actually occuring.
Thus, firms need not
worry yet that the
workforce is going to
desert wholesale and
take away the competi-
tive edge provided by
low-wage workers.
Overall, Illinois has
followed the well-
documented trend in the United States toward fewer
earnings deriving from manufacturing and more
from service industries. At the same time, earnings
from manufacturing are still a larger percentage of
earnings in Illinois than for the United States as a
whole, and the percentage of service earnings is
Lower average wages
can be good for a
community,
smaller. The metropolitan statistical areas are fol-
lowing the national and state income trends. Not
only have they maintained their average per capita
wage rankings over the 25 years period, but the
difference between the highest wage areas and the
lowest wage areas has consistently grown. Low wage
communities are characterized by higher percent-
ages of earnings derived from services and lower
percentages ofincome from manufacturing. A larger
percentage of income from service industries not
only decreases the average per capita wage in an area
but also decreases the rate of growth of earnings.
Even though labor market theory supposes that
potential workers will move from low-wage areas to
high-wage areas, the data do not seem to show that
this is happening in Illinois—since the difference in
average per capita wages has increased, not decreased.
Low-wage areas, such as Champaign-Urbana, may
be at a disadvantage for attracting new workers to
the area but may have a competitive advantage when
enterprises are considering start-up, expansion, or
relocation.
Chart 3. PerJob Wage ($ thousands)
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Chart 4. Manufacturing Earnings as a
Percent of Total Earnings
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The ranking of areas in per capita wage hasn't changed
much over the past 25 years, but the gaps have
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lower-wage areas of Illinois also have lower wages for
manufacturing jobs.
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Who Loses When Casinos Win?
By E. L. Grinols and J. D. Omorov
Although riverboat casinos are highly
profitable businesses^ their impact on area
economic development has not been great
in Illinois.
ibii lialCasino gambl ng remains controversial in
Illinois and other states that have intro-
duced it or are considering it. This is mainly
because the associated increase in problem and patho-
logical gamblers creates social costs ofbetween $110
and $340 per adult per year when averaged over the
entire population. In other words, using a figure
midway in the range, for a representative group of
100 adults to have gambling would require the
group to pay $22,500 annually. Were these social
costs absent, few would object to casino gambling or
care how much there was. Other objections to gam-
bling relate to the need for constant government
oversight and regulation, questionable political in-
fluence-buying by the gambling industry, and the
fact that gambling involves directly unproductive
activity that reduces national income. On the ben-
efit side of the ledger is the fact that for many adults
who can gamble without problems, it is an addi-
tional form of recreation.
Why Who Loses Matters
Although social costs are the main economic
objection to casino gambling, the source of casino
revenues matters to understanding gambling and to
making decisions about it. For example, the evi-
dence suggests that a large portion of the revenues of
expanded casino gambling will come from problem
and pathological gamblers. From surveys of states
with casinos, we find that a number in the range of 3
or 4 percent of the population eventually will be active
problem or pathological gamblers. For example, a
July 1 995 Iowa study found the rate there to be 3.3
percent. Problem and pathological gamblers report
losing $3,600 annually to gambling, half of which
can be ascribed to casinos (in Illinois more than half
of the combined revenues from horse racing, the
lottery, and casinos is from casinos). According to
gambling industry data, an average 100 adults living
within 35 miles of Atlantic City and Las Vegas lost,
as a group, a total of $14,200 annually to casinos in
recent years. Assuming that these numbers are repre-
sentative and allowing for some variation, from three-
eighths to one-half of casino revenues will come
from problem and pathological gamblers.
Such gamblers frequently exhaust their family's
savings, run up credit card debts, embezzle, and in
other ways acquire money for gambling from
nonsustainable sources. Such "mining" of the sav-
ings and credit card balances of a portion of the
population has long-term consequences for the
economy that we do not go into here. Losses to the
casinos by problem and pathological gamblers from
these sources do not necessarily require the gambler
to reduce expenditures on items of daily consump-
tion. Other casino revenues, however, come from
reduced revenues to other businesses. Whether these
other businesses are geographically near or far away
from the casino determines the effect that the casino
has on the nearby economy.
Three analogies help to conceptualize how casinos
function. First, a casino can act as a factory by export-
ing its products to buyers outside the immediate area
and bringing in new money that is spent locally in
the form of payroll, the purchase of inputs, and local
E. L. Grinols is a professor of economics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
J. D. Omorov earned a Master of Science in Policy Economics at the University and now works in private
industry in his native Kyrghizstan.
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Illinois casinos do not seem to have brought economic
boom to their communities.
spending of the own-
ers' profits.
Second, a casino can
act like a restaurant,
selling its services to
local residents and ex-
isting tourists. Since no
new dollars are at-
tracted fi-om outside
the area, the effect is
to redistribute money
in the local economy.
This restructuring or
cannibalization of the
market benefits casino
owners at the expense
of preexisting firms.
Third, casinos can
act as toll houses, col-
lecting money from both local residents and persons
outside the region. The activity of the toll house has
no positive effect on the local economy because the
money collected leaves the area. In effect, the casino
is just a collection booth operating to benefit owners
from outside the area. The local economy may even
be damaged by the toll house to the extent that
gambling takes more out of the local economy than
it brings in.
Government officials often confuse casino prof-
itability with economic development. In each of the
three cases described, casinos may be hugely profit-
able, yet only the first results in economic develop-
ment in the sense of moving jobs to the area.
In Illinois, as in other states where a casino li-
cense gives the holder exclusive rights to market
gambling as a regional monopoly, casinos frequently
earn much higher than normal profits on their in-
vestment. The bulk of their revenues, 80 percent, 90
percent and more in some cases, come from resi-
dents. Illinois casino companies have also been ac-
tive over the years in promoting casino ventures in
other states. Money earned in Illinois to finance
gambling in other states represents a drain on the
economy, showing up in reduced revenues to exist-
ing businesses.
What We Expect
If a small enough neighborhood of the casino is
considered, the introduction of any casino or other
business firm will lead to an increase in jobs in the
neighborhood. If the area considered is expanded,
however, we expect to see the revenues and jobs of
some sectors harmed (tho.se for whom gamblers
reduce their expenditures when their gambling losses
grow) and the revenues and jobs of complementary
sectors helped (those upon which gamblers spend
more when they gamble more). Since it is not clear
that all gamblers reduce spending on the same goods
when they increase their gambling expenditures, it is
difficult to predict which goods could be harmed.
Restaurants in many states, including Illinois, have
reported that their revenues dropped as much as 50
percent in response to the opening of a nearby
casino, and many restaurants have closed. On the
other hand, casinos themselves often provide restau-
rant services and other restaurants may have opened.
For areas farthest from the casino that serves
them, we would expect revenue losses because of
money diverted to the casino with little or no poten-
tial for gains to the area due to the casino.
What We Found
It is a matter for study to determine what type of
expenditures casinos affect, how far away these ef-
fects can be identified, and the extent to which the
effects are similar in different casino locations. The.se
questions matter ultimately because we would like
to know if casinos lead to employment gains. As
explained earlier, this last question is equivalent to
asking whether casinos act as true tourist attractions
(factories) or, instead, serve only as convenience
gambling centers for nearby residents (restaurants
and toll houses).
Sectors Affected
To see which sectors are most affected by the
opening of a casino, we obtained Kind-of-Business
Tax receipts data collected by the State of Illinois.
These data divide sales tax collections into 1 cat-
egories of expenditure: general merchandise; food;
drinking and eating; apparel; furniture, household,
and radio; lumber, building, and hardware; auto-
motive and filling stations; miscellaneous retail and
wholesale; other miscellaneous; and manufacturers.
By knowing the tax rate, we can calculate total
market expenditures in each category. We collected
21 quarters of data, much of it by laborious hand
transcription, going back to the beginning of 1989.
We separated collections into taxes reported by es-
tablishments situated within 0-5 miles of the casino
and 5 to 10 miles of the casino. In some areas, data
were collected for distances 10 to 30 miles away.
Quarterly tax collections, state tax collections for the
same category of expenditure, and casino revenues
were adjusted for price level changes. The sample of
casino locations included Alton, Aurora, Galena,
Joliet, Metropolis, Peoria, and Rock Island.
In Chart 1 we see the average effect of an addi-
tional $1,000 of casino revenue on the sales of the
ten categories of merchandise. (The contribution to
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the average by difFerent locations is shown by the
keyed bar segments. Segments to the right of zero
show gains and segments to the left losses.)'
Three spending categories show large effects. Gen-
era] merchandise, and miscellaneous retail and whole-
sale trade stand out as the two showing the greatest
losses. Miscellaneous retail and wholesale revenues,
showing an average loss of $247, are also notable in
that all seven locations reported losses. General mer-
chandise, showing a larger drop among four loca-
tions, had three locations reporting positive effects.
However, only the smallest (Galena) was statistically
significant, and it was smaller than the statistically
significant negative effect reported by Alton. Net
losses for the two sectors were $367.
Losses in general merchandise and miscellaneous
retail and wholesale expenditures suggest that casino
revenues tend to come from a broad range of alter-
native expenditures rather than from one particular
type of spending. This differs from the situation for
the only sector showing gains in all communities.
Automotive and filling station sales showed an
average gain of$295. Most of this effect is due to the
two largest cases of Peoria ($104) and Joliet ($137),
suggesting that casinos enhance the sales of nearby
gas stations in these locations. The impact for Peoria
for this category ofspending within 0-5 miles of the
casino was statistically significant, and for Joliet it
was nearly so. The other locations reported smaller,
statistically insignificant effects, but all were positive.
There does not seem to be an obvious pattern in
the remaining seven sectors. In the furniture, house-
hold, and radio category there was one positive and
one negative statistically significant area, but the
effects were relatively small, and the other areas were
statistically insignificant. More study will probably
be needed before anything further can be said about
these other seven sectors.
The Distance Effect
Chart 2 shows the losses in general merchandise
and miscellaneous retail and wholesale trade in more
detail by separating them by distance from the ca-
sino. The effect of an additional $1,000 in casino
revenue is to reduce sales in these categories by $142
within 0-5 miles of the casino, and an additional
$217 for businesses 5-10 miles away. The chart also
shows the effect on these categories for distances
10-30 miles away based on a sample of Alton,
Galena, Metropolis, Peoria, and Rock Island. The
effect is small enough to be viewed as negligible. In
all, the average loss for an additional $1,000 of
casino revenue was $381 in these categories.
Chart 3 shows average gains and losses across all
goods by distance from the casino. Distances further
from the casino generally show losses, while areas
Apparel
Aulo & Filling
Stations
Drinking &
Eating Places
Food
Furniture,
Household,
& Radio
General
Merchandise
Lumber, Building,
& Hardware
Manufacturers
Misc. Retail &
Wholesale Trade
Miscellaneous
T 1 r
closer are mixed. The av-
erage lost revenue was
$ 1 95 for all sales between
5 and 10 miles of the
casino. Gains occurring
for sales within 0-5 miles
of the casino averaged
$170 dollars. Peoria ac-
counts for $145 of the
$ 1 70 average. OfPeoria's
$145, $112 is due to in-
creased automotive and
filling station sales. The
average loss for all goods
0-10 miles from the ca-
sino is $25.
A cautious conclusion
would be that sales in
general near the casino
tend to rise (or are mixed)
at the expense of sales
5—10 miles away. It is
possible in areas where
eating and drinking at the
casino form a part of the
increase in revenues near
the casino, that eating
and drinking establishments nearby suffer since our
data do not distinguish between casino and noncasino
sales.
Chart 4 shows the contribution in each of five
areas to the average long-run effect of the casino on
revenues for businesses between 10 and 30 miles
away. As expected, the measurable effects are rela-
tively small compared with closer distances, except
for Peoria. For each location, there are two esti-
mates. One derives from the sum of effects from
individual sectors, as de- ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^_
scribed earlier.
Chart 7. Sectoral Winners and Losers Zero
to Ten Miles from Casino (Sales Change
per $7,000 in Casino Revenues)
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Peoriaj loliet
Alton Aurora
Peoria _]
j^ii^g;];!]]^!
.
.P.
other
Locations with
Losses
Other
Locations with
Gains
-300 -200 -100 100 200 300
Casinos are, in general, associated with losses in
miscellaneous retail and wholesale expenditures and
with reductions in general merchandise sales within 10
miles of the casino.
Note: The individual segments represent each city's share of the gam
or loss resulting from a total $1,000 increase in revenues averaged
across all casino locations.
The two procedures
yield comparable figures
with the notable excep-
tion of Peoria. Further
investigation reveals that
the large summed figure
for Peoria is more than
two-thirds explained by
a single, statistically in-
significant, large estimate
tor food sales (not eating
and drinking establish-
ments) 1 0-30 miles from
the casino. This suggests
the need for fiirther inves-
tigation to rule out pos-
sible spurious correlation.
Chart 2. Average Losses by Distance from
Casino for General Merchandise and
Miscellaneous Retail and Wholesale Trade
-100
-200
-100
200
5-10
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10-30
Miles
The losses in miscellaneous retail and wholesale
expenditures and general merchandise sales per $1 ,000
increase in casino revenues are larger 5-10 miles from
the casino than for 0-5 miles away.
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Charts. Revenue Gains and Losses of All Goods per $1,000
Increase in Casino Revenues by Distance from Casino
nonpayroU expenditures were removed from the
area in question. Large inflows matched by nearly as
large outflows means that the casino will have a
smaller impact on the economy.
The efi^ect in Galena is several times larger than
that in Metropolis. According to statistical estimates,
an additional $100,000 of casino revenue is associ-
ated with 4.7 and 1 .3 additional jobs in Jo Davies
and Massac counties, respectively. This is 41.2 and
15.2 percent of the long-run potential impact in
each market.'
The lack of impact on employment in most
markets and the small effect in Metropolis can be
explained by the analogies to restaurants and toll
houses already discussed. In the case of Joliet, for
example, 39 percent of the employees reside outside
the city, and one-third live outside the county
—
hence their spending is lost to the local economy. A
study of Wisconsin found that over half of casino
patrons lived within 50 miles, and 73 percent within
100 miles (William Thompson, Ricardo Gazel, and
Dan Rickman, "The Economic Impact of Native
American Gaming in Wisconsin," Wisconsin Policy
Research Report. Vol. 8, No. 3 (1995), p. 21) This is
consistent with the pattern that expenditures close
to the casino rise at the expense of those further
away. In Minnesota, 93.2 percent of gamblers in a
recent year were from in-state (Robert Whereatt,
The Minneapolis Tribune, March 7, 1993). In the
case of Wisconsin, 79.8 percent of gamblers came
from in-state, and 15.1 percent came from the nearby
states of Minnesota, Illinois, Iowa, and Michigan.""
Since each of these states have casinos, the revenues
from out-of-state gamblers would have to be bal-
anced against one another to determine the true size
of net flows.
Conclusions
Economists have long known that casinos should
not be viewed as tools for economic development
except in special situations such as Las Vegas where
they have become national and international tourist
attractions, often offering major entertainment and
amusement components geared toward marketing
convention and other services to those outside the
area. In contrast, local convenience casinos prima-
rily serve nearby residents, operating more like res-
taurants or toll houses in their effect on local
employment and the economy.
Even when casinos do not expand the local
economy, they, nevertheless, take in large sums of
money. We have found that casinos are associated
with a drop in general merchandise and miscella-
neous retail and wholesale trade within 10 miles of
the casino averaging $367 per $1,000 increase in
Chart 5. Employment Relative to State
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casino revenues and that
automotive and filling
station sales were in-
creased significantly in
some areas. The average
was $295. The effects on
other kinds of business
receipts are unclear, be-
ing smaller and both
positive and negative.
Total expenditures
within 10 miles of the
casino drop $25. Com-
bined sales 5-10 miles
away were uniformly
harmed by casinos (with
the exception of Galena)
indicating that gains 0-5
miles away come at the
expense of sales further
away. More data is
needed to resolve the un- ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
certain results for sales
10-30 miles from casinos, although theory would
lead us to expect harmful effects, but smaller ones.
Considering the evidence presented here, regional
economic development does not appear to be an
important reason to turn to casino gambling in
general, even though the study shows that the theo-
retically possible contribution under ideal condi-
tions could be large. Of the eight areas examined to
see the effects of casinos on employment, six showed
no relationship between the introduction of casinos
and increased employment, one showed an employ-
ment increase equal to 15 percent of possible, and
another 40 percent. This suggests that the majority
of the revenues earned by casinos came from nearby
residents, much of the casino revenues were re-
moved from the county by casino owners, or some
combination of both.
The lack of net job gain in most of the counties
with casinos must be attributed to taking jobs from
elsewhere in the county or the failure to create jobs
that would have occurred in the absence of casinos.
This conclusion should not be viewed as unusual,
since casinos operate under the same laws of eco-
nomics as other businesses. For the same reasons, we
would not be surprised to find that the opening of a
large Walmart failed to increase total jobs. Employ-
ment gains are possible, but this should not be
presumed, as it has usually been represented by the
gambling industry. Studies such as ours merely con-
firm the more reasonable expectation that there
should be little or no economic development in the
usual case except possibly in the area close to the
casino itself Uilil Footnotes onpage 19.
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Although the potential impact of casinos is large, in
most cases the actual effect is almost nil.
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Hedging and Interest Rate Swaps
Can Reduce Risk
By Stanley B. Block,, Timothy J. Gallagher, and Sibnath Mitra
Hedging and interest rate swaps can help
today's businesses and financial institutions
avoid losses due to fluctuations in interest
or currency valuations.
Stanley B. Block
Unusual volatility in financial markets has
marked the last decade. The most striking
example was the stock market crash of Oc-
tober 19, 1987, in which the Dow Jones Industrial
Average declined 22.6 percent in one day. By con-
trast, the largest one-day loss during the fabled crash
of 1 929 was slightly over 1 2 percent. On that dismal
day in October 1987, IBM stock dropped 37'/2
points; Eastman Kodak, 26 points; Westinghouse
Electric, lOVi points; and DuPont, 18'/2 points.
Volatility in financial markets has not been lim-
ited to the United States. In Japan, the Nikkei 225
Average is down almost 60 percent since its peak in
the early 1990s. In Mexico, securities declined 52
percent from the end of third quarter 1994 as com-
pared with the same period in 1995.
Nor is volatility confined to stocks. In 1994,
long-term Treasury bonds provided a scant return of
1.52 percent (based on interest received less decline
in value). Only one year earlier the same securities
provided a robust total return of 16.93 percent.
There has been similar volatility in the foreign
exchange market. The Japanese yen and German
deutsch mark increased by double-digit increments
against the U.S. dollar in the first half of 1995 and
reversing the pattern in the third quarter of the year.
Coping with Volatility
The stock portfolio manager at times appears to
be on a roller coaster on which one quarter or year he
is praised for providing large returns for clients and
the next he is held responsible for depleting the
capital of an individual investor, pension hand, or
university endowment.
Interest rate volatility can also be a problem to
the chief financial officer of an industrial corpora-
tion: an increase in interest rates may turn an other-
wise profitable venture into a losing proposition.
Everything can go right on the development of a
new product except the cost to finance it. Operating
profits are translated into losses because of unantici-
pated increases in interest rates.
The banker faces the same challenges. A loan that
on the surface appears to be profitable may, in fact,
generate losses if the cost of funding the loan sud-
denly goes up. This was the case for many mortgage
bankers a decade ago.
The opposite can also happen. When a banker
agrees to accept long-term deposits at a fixed rate
and interest rates suddenly drop, he/she may well be
paying more for funds than the proceeds generate in
a declining interest rate environment.
In the case of foreign exchange, a contract to be
closed out in yen, marks, or francs in the future may
eventually turn out to be unprofitable if the cur-
rency in question declines in value against the dollar.
There is, however, virtually no risk in the finan-
cial markets that cannot be hedged away. This is an
important message to the business executive. Whereas
five or ten years ago unexpected changes in interest
rates or foreign exchange rates could have a crippling
Timothy J. Gallagher
Stanley B. Block is a professor of finance at Texas Christian University, Fort Worth.
Timothy J. Gallagher is a professor at Colorado State University, Fort Collins.
Sibnath Mitra is a Ph.D. candidate in finance at Colorado State University, Fort Collins.
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effect on financial plans, this is no longer acceptable.
The option to hedge is available, and one must
decide to accept the risk or remove all or part of it
through hedging. This does not mean that hedging
is always the right answer or should always be used.
It has its disadvantages as well as advantages. What
can be said is that hedging should always be consid-
ered vA^^k there is risk involved. More and more in
the future, boards of directors will be asking their
chiefexecutive officers and financial officers whether
they have considered their hedging option, and an
answer will be expected.
A Closer Look at Hedging
Specifically, hedging means entering into a trans-
action that partially or fully reduces a prior exposure
to risk. In the case of the chief financial officer of an
industrial corporation who saw a profit turn to loss
due to increasing interest rates, a hedge may have
avoided the loss.
Let us assume that interest rates were 8 percent
when the firm borrowed for its new project, but by
the end of the period rates had risen to 10 percent.
On a $10 million loan, the 2 percent rise in interest
rates means an increase in interest costs of $200,000
before taxes. Few projects can absorb that kind of
shock and remain profitable.
A properly executed hedge could have elimi-
nated the interest rate risk in advance. There are a
number of ways to eliminate the risk. Our chief
financial officer could have engaged in an interest
rate swap. The swap itself has nothing to do with the
original 8 percent loan, but has the effect of elimi-
nating the interest rate risk associated with it. This
principle is true of most hedging transactions: Al-
though separate from the initial exposure, they have
the effect of protecting against its risk.
How Interest Rate Swaps Work
In an interest rate swap, one party agrees to pay
the second a fixed interest rate in exchange for a
variable interest rate payment. Our chief financial
officer might agree to pay a bank a fixed rate of 8
percent. The rate will not vary over the life of the
agreement. The bank, in turn, will agree to pay the
firm a rate that starts at 8 percent but will vary with
market conditions over the life of the agreement. Let
us assume the agreements are based on $ 1 million.
If interest rates go up during the term of the
agreement, the firm will make money. It is obligated
to pay a fixed rate of 8 percent, but the bank will
have to pay the going rate because its obligation is
variable. For example, if rates go up to 10 percent,
the bank will pay the firm 10 percent. What the two
parties actually do is net out the difference. The
There is virtually no risk in the
financial markets that cannot be
hedged away,
bank ends up owing 2 percent (10 percent minus 8
percent) on $10 million, or $200,000.
The firm has effectively eliminated its risk of loss
due to higher interest rates. The extra $200,000 it
would have had to pay as a result of a 2 percent
increase in interest rates on the $ 1 million loan was
hedged away by the $200,000 on the interest rate
swap agreement.'
A hedge does not only take away the risk of
losses; it also eliminates the potential for benefits if
interest rates go down instead of up. In our example,
if interest rates drop by 2 percent, payments on the
$ 1 million bank loan will be $200,000 less. That is
the good news. The bad news is that on the interest
rate swap the firm will lose $200,000 to the bank.
Why? Because the firm is paying the bank a fixed
rate of 8 percent on $ 1 million and now will receive
only 6 percent from the bank whose interest obliga-
tion has gone down.^
The lower interest of $200,000 on the bank loan
is wiped out by the $200,000 loss on the interest rate
swap contract. While the outcome may not appear
to be desirable, it is part of the consequence of
hedging. One of the cardinal rules of hedging is that
when you eliminate the potential for loss, you do so
at the cost of the potential for gain. For many
companies that is a fair trade-off
The Proper Focus
In our example, the industrial corporation is
undertaking a new project that it expects to have a
positive impact on its business. Therefore, they do
not want to have to worry about making or losing
money on interest rate changes.
The vice president of finance will not have to go
before the board of directors and explain why he
showed a loss because interest rates went up. Like-
wise, he will not be able to brag that he made a
higher profit than initially intended because interest
rates went down. Of course, not every CFO would
choose to eliminate interest rate exposure. Some
may believe they can predict the next movement in
interest rates or that the exposure is not large enough
to be meaningful. Nevertheless, the interest rate
swap market (and other similar markets) provide the
opportunity to concentrate on operational perfor-
mance and eliminate financial exposure.
'Intcrcsl rates on lojns and swap
agreemcncs do not always move in
perfect tandem; we have assumed that
they do in order to simphty the example.
Althugh not explicitly stated, the bank
also had a motivation for the interest
rate swap. It may be receiving a variable
rcrurn on an investment. It feats that
interest rates will go down and wants to
hedge against that occurrence. With the
swap the bank makes money if the fates
go down and that covers the other
exposure.
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There are over five trillion dollars of
swaps contracts currently out-
standing, a volume that exceeds the
national debt
The Swap Market
4i .^i^ .^ /
The interest rate swaps market began in 1981
when the World Bank issued $290 milUon in Euro-
bonds and swapped the interest and principle on the
bonds with IBM for German marks and French
francs. Since then, the swaps market has grown
faster than any other financial market in history,
with the primary participants being financial insti-
tutions and industrial firms. There are over five
trillion dollars of swaps contracts currently out-
standing, a volume that exceeds the national debt of
the Unites States.
The $10 million interest rate swap contract that
we used in our example is termed a plain, vanilla
swap. For those being exposed to the swaps market
for the first time, it may not have seemed all that
plain. However, the active trader in interest rate
swaps is used to engage in multi-party swaps with
provisions and contingencies that boggle the mind.
Such exotic terms as synthetic swaps, roller coasters,
reversible swaps, and others are frequently used.
This level of sophistication goes beyond the basic
intent of this article. However, it is important to
point out that both
simple and highly sophis-
ticated swaps are depen-
dent upon the existence
ofknowledgeable, highly
capitalized financial in-
stitutions that are able to
meet the needs ofthe par-
ticipating parties. These
so-called swap dealers
and facilitators include
such well-known institu-
tions as Bankers Trust,
Chase Manhattan, Credit
Swiss LCS, First Chi-
cago, Goldman Sachs,
J. P. Morgan, Morgan
Stanley, Soloman Broth-
ers, Societe GeneraJe, and
Swiss Bank Corp.
Unlike the highly struc-
tured options and futures
markets (which are also
effective vehicles for
V
Banks prefer swaps over futures and options for
hedging.
hedging), an interest rate swap agreement starts out
as a blank sheet of paper in which the participating
parties specify all the terms and features that meet
their particular needs. Every swap agreement is dif-
ferent in terms of the amount involved, the maturity
date, the settlement procedures, and so on. It is
through the swap dealers and facilitators that agree-
ments are tailor-made to meet the needs of partici-
pating parties throughout the world.
How Swaps Are Used in the
Real World
As banks achieved strong profitability and un-
usually large net interest margins in the last three
years, analysts were asking, "How long can this last?"
Would the spread between lending rates and bor-
rowing rates remain in the 4.5-5 percent range
indefinitely or return to more normal levels? The
likelihood is that a more normal profit picture will
return, but, in actuality, the large spreads can be
locked in for the future, using the interest rate swaps
market. Basically, the banks can use hedging tech-
niques similar to the one discussed earlier to offset
volatility in interest rates. A lender at fixed rates can
hedge through interest rate swaps to lock in the cost
of funds and maintain the spread. A lender with
variable rates can also use interest rate swaps to
establish and hold the initial spread between lending
rates and borrowing costs. The question is, are bank-
ers actually doing this?
To answer this question, we conducted a survey
of the 300 largest commercial banks in the United
States. Of the respondents to the survey, 70.2 per-
cent currently use interest rate swaps, and all but one
of the remaining banks indicated that they intend to
at least consider implementation ofa swaps program
in the future. Thus, the use of interest rate swaps is
quickly becoming common in the banking industry.
The respondents indicated that they prefer swaps
over options and futures because of the potential for
longer maturity as well as greater flexibiliry.
What about the remaining 29.8 percent who are
not currendy participating in the interest rates swap
market? The top three reasons given for not partici-
pating were lack of expertise, no apparent need, and
top management resistance.
When asked what specific type of" exposure was
hedged, 36.5 percent hedged their commercial loan
exposure, 13.5 percent, their real estate loan expo-
sure, and the balance hedged against 25 other possi-
bilities (including, for example, liability pricing, loans
and deposits, long-term debt, the asset liability gap).
The specific items are not nearly as important as the
potential for the wide utilization of interest-rate
spreads. Article continues onpage 19.
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Modest Growth Expected in Illinois
By Harvey B. Westbrook, Jr.
Services are expected to lead the Illinois
economy to steady growth through 1998.
On the whole, the IlUnois economy isexpected to grow at a modest but steady
pace over the next two years. The growth
of total nonagricultural employment in Illinois is
expected to remain steady at around 1 percent
through 1998. Employment in goods-producing in-
dustries will increase by less than 1 percent through
1998. The strongest growth in the sector will occur
in construction. Construction employment will ex-
pand about 4 percent in 1996 and 2.8 percent in
1997. Employment in goods-producing industries
is expected to grow at less than 1 percent through
1998. Employment in services-producing industries
is expected to increase by 1 .2 percent in 1 996 and by
less than 1 percent in 1997 (see Chart 1, pg. 16).
The strongest employment growth in the sector will
occur in the services subsector. Services employment
will expand at rates in excess of 2 percent through
1998.
Personal income will expand by 2.1 percent in
1996, increasing to 3.5 percent in 1997 and 5.8
percent in 1998. Income in goods-producing indus-
tries is expected to grow by 2.4 percent in 1997 and
4.7 percent in 1998. Within the sector, personal
income in nondurable manufacturing is expected to
increase at relatively robust rates. Income growth in
the services-producing industries will be over 3 per-
cent through 1998. As can be seen in Chart 2 (pg.
16), personal income in the service subsector is a
fundamental part of the shift in Illinois from a
goods-dependent economy towards higher levels of
employment and income in services.
Gross state product (GSP) is not expected to
expand significantly in 1996; however, statewide
GSP will grow in 1997 and 1998. The increase in
Illinois gross state product will be driven, in large
part, by robust expansions in services-producing
industries (see Chart 3, pg. 1 6). The services subsector
is expected to increase by more than 5 percent over
the forecast period.
Retail sales are expected to grow 2.6 percent in
1996. Strong sales of nondurable goods will drive
the expansion in total retail sales. The anticipated
higher levels of personal income may be expected to
encourage increased sales of nondurable goods.
Over time, the Illinois economy has been experi-
encing a fundamental shift away from a goods-
producing economy towards one more dependent
on services. The Illinois Econometric Model fore-
casts a continuation of this trend, with an emphasis
on higher levels of employment and personal in-
come in the service industries. Manufacturing will
experience a strong increase in personal income;
however, employment in the manufacturing indus-
tries will lag behind the higher levels in the services
subsector of the state economy.
Harvey B. Westbrook, Jr., is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department ofEconomics and a research assistant in
the Commerce Research Office, at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
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Chart 1. Growth in Illinois
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Chart 3. Growth in Illinois Gross
State Product
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After a peak in 1994-1995, Illinois employment growth has slowed but will continue modest increases. Illinois personal income and gross state
product are expected to increase steadily through 1998.
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Illinois State Revenue Update
By J. Fred Giertz and Robert W. Resek
A $562 million increase in state revenues is
predicted for FY1997.
Fred Giertz
Revenue receipts for the State of Illinois
have been considerably higher through the
first three quarters of the fiscal year (July 1
,
1995_June 30, 1996) than predicted at the begin-
ning of the period last July. For the first nine months,
total state-source revenues exceeded the level pre-
dicted by $135 million (as established by the Illinois
Bureau of the Budget (BOB), an agency of the
executive branch of the state government) (Table 1).
The corporate income tax and the public utility tax
have been especially strong. The corporate tax rev-
enues reflect the strong growth of corporate profits
nationally, and the utility tax receipts are the result
of an unusually cold winter.
The predictions for state revenues for FYl 996 by
the Institute of Government and Public Affairs
(IGPA) of the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign and those of the Bureau of the Budget
are consistent with one another, differing by only
$23 million (Table 2). The state legislature's Illinois
Economic and Fiscal Commission forecast is less
optimistic, approximately $100 million below the
IGPA estimate.
For the upcoming fiscal year (FY1997), the IGPA
forecast is the most optimistic of the three forecast-
ing organizations. The IGPA predicts an increase in
revenues of$562 million, 3.9 percent over the March
BOB FYl 996 forecast. (Note that the BOB num-
bers presented here do not include the effect of the
$65 million tax increase for riverboat casinos pro-
posed by Governor Jim Edgar.) Analysts will be
closely watching the performance of corporate prof-
its next year to see if they continue the strong growth
of the last 1 8 months. While the extraordinary growth
rate of the corporate income tax is unlikely to be
sustained, the Illinois economy is still expected to
continue its expansion through fiscal 1997. This
means the state can expect at least one more year of
healthy revenue growth.
Table 1. FY1996 Illinois State Revenue
Performance
(July r, r995-March 7996, millions of current dollars)
Receipts
Table 2. Comparison of Forecasts of State Revenue (millions of current dollars)
FY96 FY97 FY98
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From the Editor
Richard J. Arnould
Al'l'RO\lMAIi:i,V ON1-. VKAR ACX) CHANCI-LIOR
Michael Aiken revealed an exciting plan to
take the University of Illinois at Urbana-
(^hampaign into the 21st century. One of the seven
major initiatives outlined in the 1995 plan is "Part-
nership Illinois."
Partnership Illinois is intended to raise the aware-
ness of all Illinoisans about outreach programs and
services delivered by hundreds of University faculty
and staff to hundreds of thousands of Illinoisans
each year, to respond to developing needs efficiently
with coordinated efforts, and to reinforce the
University's central roll in the state's economic well-
being and the qualiu' of life of each Illinoisan.
We in the College of Commerce and Business
Administration (CCBA) strongly endorse Chancel-
lor Aiken's efforts to "take the University to every
Illinoisan." The Illinois
Business Rei'iew(\RR) has
taken on new lite as a
result of this initiative.
The CCBA is made
up of a faculty expert in areas literally too numerous
to list here. UIUC is a major research university, and
the expertise of its faculty benefits Illinoisans in
teaching, research, and service activities and pro-
grams. Members of the faculty engage in a wide
range of research, much of it directed toward eco-
nomic, industry, finance, and management issues of
great interest to many Illinoisans.
All too often, we fail to do a good job informing
you of our research accomplishments. The IBR is
PARTNERSHIP
dedicated to making our faculty expertise available
to you by providing short articles that can be read
without specialized background. While many ar-
ticles may contain political ramifications, it is not
our intent or purpose to promote a particular politi-
cal point of view.
In this issue. Professor Emeritus John Due ap-
praises passenger rail service in the wake of the
proposed reduction in subsidies necessary to main-
tain passenger rail service between certain commu-
nities in Illinois. Professor Fred Giertz provides a
discussion of the virtues and problems associated
with a flat tax that has been a subject ofdebate in the
presidential election campaign. The Commerce Re-
search Office has been following the economic de-
velopments in Rantoul, IL since the announcement
of the closure of Chanute Air Force Base. David
Gerard reports on the re-
markably rapid economic
recovery in Rantoul and
surrounding area.
We will try to keep
you informed of other faculty research by providing
a selected list of faculty papers (see below) or sum-
maries of published research in each issue and a
number to call to obtain a copy.
Finally, please let us know your interests. We
hope to contribute to Chancellor Aiken's Partner-
ship Illinois by bringing the activities of CCBA
closer to you through this publication.
Richard I. Arnould
ILLINOIS
1 KHANA-CIIAMI'AKJN
Commerce Research Papers
To obtain a copy of any of these faculty research
papers, contact the Illinois Research and Reference
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uct and Process of Thought; Towards a Pragmatic
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Research, and Practice. " 96-0118
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Amtrak and State-Supported
Passenger Trains
By John F. Due
In the 1990s, Amtrak has had to cut service
and increase charges to the states for state-
supported trains. The author looks at the
advantages of public rail transportation, the
experience of Illinois and other states, and
the challenges of determining the best rail
policy for the future.
IN
1971, Congress established Amtrak—the
National Railroad Passenger Corporation—to op-
erate a nationwide passenger train system. The
railroads were rapidly ending their passenger service,
which operated at a deficit estimated to be $1.7 bil-
lion in 1970, yet there was strong support for the
retention of a basic network of trains. Amtrak was a
semi-governmental enterprise, designed to be for-
profit, technically not a governmental agency, but
subject to direct government control. Railroads had
the choice ofjoining the system and providing funds
for the privilege of discontinuing their passenger
trains; if they did not join they could not discon-
tinue trains for four years. Amtrak was not initially
authorized to provide commuter service, but power
to manage such services was subsequently granted.
When Amtrak began, it faced substantial diffi-
culties: the equipment acquired from the railroads
was worn and obsolete; some railroads, which
regarded Amtrak as a nuisance, were not highly
cooperative; and Congress failed to provide adequate
funds to carry out the assigned task. Nevertheless,
Amtrak had considerable success in improving pas-
senger service. Annual ridership increased from
16.9 million in 1973 to 22.1 million in 1993. The
deficit fell: revenues were covering only 54 percent
of avoidable cost—the cost that would be avoided if
the trains were not operated—in 1973 but 80 per-
cent in 1993.
After the early 1990s, the trend toward overall
improvement was reversed; ridership fell, though
only slightly, and the deficits increased. Given the
reluctance of Congress to provide more funds, re-
ductions in service resulted—causing further losses
in traffic.
As this is written, the long-range future of Amtrak
is in serious doubt. Continued cutbacks and service
deterioration would bring a return to the unhappy
situation before Amtrak was founded. Yet Congress
is unlikely to raise funding. One general approach to
John F. Due is an emeritus professor of economics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
The author wishes to thank Qiumei Yang for research assistance with this project. This article is a part of a
larger study, "Railroad Passenger Service: Amtrak and State Supported Trains," available from the author on
request. He is also greatly indebted to officials of the Illinois Department of Transportation and to those of
other states for information.
John F. Due
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a solution is to reduce materially the service on the
longer-distance, essentially vacation, trains, raise the
fares, and provide better service for the corridor and
similar services for which daih' (or at least flve-dav a
week) service is imperative.
State Supported Trains in
Illinois
The original act that created Amtrak provided, in
Section 403(B), for additional trains beyond the
national network if states would sponsor them and
cover 65 percent of any operating deficit. Illinois
was one of the first states to take advantage of this
provision and has continued to do so on much the
same pattern down to the present. But current
changes in federal policy are now creating major
problems for financing state-supported trains.
In Illinois there are four state-supported routes:
Chicago-SpringfieUi-St. Louis
The State House, operated since 1972, has an earl)-
morning departure from St. Louis and evening de-
parture from Chicago. This train ser\'es Springfield,
Bloomington-Normal, Lincoln, and other cities. The
train carried 83,829 passengers in calendar 1995.
Until June 28, 1996, the state also supported the
Loop, which carried 37,607 passengers in the last
\ear; it departed Chicago in the morning and Spring-
field in the afternoon. It was discontinued in order
to reduce costs. On this line two daily Amtrak trains
not supported bv the state operate as well.
Chicago-Cbmnpaigii-Carbondale
The lllini has been operating since 1971, though
with some changes. The train carried 108,000 pas-
sengers in 1994, many of them universir\' students.
Carbondale and Champaign provide a large portion
of total passengers. The train operates both north
and southbound in the afternoon. Since 1986, the
only northbound morning service is the City ofNew
Orleans, not subsidized b\' the state.
^ Chicago-Galesburg-Qitiiicy
The Illinois Zephyr serves cities to the west of Chi-
cago; of these, the most traffic is provided by
Galesburg, Macomb, and Quincy. The train carried
84,579 passengers in 1995, about the same as in
1994. The train operates inbound to Chicago in the
morning, outbound in the evening. Galesburg is
also served by Amtrak's long-distance trains, which
are not state supported.
Milwaukee
The last of the supported routes is that of the
Hiawathas, from Chicago to Milwaukee, which cur-
rently runs six round trips a day. The trains carried
577,405 riders in 1995.
The subsidy requirements of the four sen'ices as
reported by the State Department of 1 ransportation
r^e long-range future
ofAmtrak is in serious
doubt.
are shown in the table.
The appropriation for
1996-97 is S6.5 million;
thus a deficit will result.
The total overall deficit
as determined by Amtrak
for the Illinois trains is ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
$ 1 8 million, ofwhich the
share for Illinois is currently 45 percent. But as of
1999 the state must cover all of an estimated $18
million deficit.
There are rwo principal reasons for the increase
in the required subsidy: the shift ofAmtrak charges
from short-term avoidable cost in determining the
charge to the state, to long-run avoidable cost, thus
including capital costs, and then to fully allocated
cost (1997) and the requirement that the state now
cover the entire deficit.
Alternatives That Could Be
Followed
1 here are several alternatives to meet the require-
ments for higher subsidv:
Discontinue support of the trains. This would
save the state several million dollars a year—but
would cause the loss ofexternalities, that is, the gains
to persons other than the users and to societ)' as a
whole, of the present service and the consumer
benefits provided users by the present trains. The
prime externalit\' is the lessening of highwav and
street congestion, with consequent lessened demand
for highway improvements. The use of rail likewise
provides some net gain with regard to pollution,
energ)' use, and lowered accident rates. A basic con-
sideration is that the use by some persons of rail
instead of automobile transport conveys benefits to
persons not using the trains—those who continue to
drive but encounter less congestion—and the tax-
payers who face less demand for highway construc-
tion and improvements.
Much of Amtraks ridership
base consists of people who ^^^^^^^^^^^^™
do not own cars, are ph\'si-
cally unable to drive, or fear
driving in large cities.
Reduce costs and,
thus, the needed subsidy.
There are several possible av-
enues to be explored. One is Champaign-Carbondale
labor cost. If the state is to Quincy
1 ., St. Louis: S(a(e House
continue to subsidize rail ser-
vice, it has a good position
directly or through Amtrak
to bargain with the unions
for further adjustments.
Subsidy Required for Slate-Supported
Trains in Illinois (in millions of dollars)
Subsidy requirements are increasing due to
Increased charges from Amtrak.
1996 1997
1.947
The Illinois legislature's plan
involved some fare increases and
some reduction in service— but this
was rejected by Amtrak,
A second is to consider another operator particu-
larly the railroads. Some states, on commuter opera-
tions, negotiate directly with the railroads involved.
Maryland, for example, has done so on two routes.
Reduce service. One alternative is, of course,
to reduce service—by curtailing the frequency of
trains. For the most part, however, for state-aided
trains, service at least each work day is imperative to
follow the preferences of the users and maintain
ridership.
The plan that the administration and the legisla-
ture developed involved reduction in service on each
route by one train a week, and an increase in fares.
But Amtrak rejected these changes, on the grounds
that there would be little cost reduction and the fare
increases would reduce ridership significantly.
The result of the rejection of these proposals has
been a deficit in the state support for the current
year, estimated at between $500,000 and $800,000.
One alternative now being considered is to end
support for the Milwaukee trains; it is not known
whether Wisconsin would take over full support of
these trains, which are among the least unprofitable
in the Amtrak system.
Other Possible Options
First, there is some possibility of rescheduling
trains to increase traffic. On the Illinois Central line
the lack of a dependable morning train to Chicago
seriously deters use of the service. Rescheduling re-
quires the railroads be willing to approve the changes.
Some of the trains, such as the one to Quincy, have
a relatively late scheduled arrival in Chicago and at
their outer destinations.
Secondly, a 1994 IDOT survey of riders on the
state-supported trains suggests possible readjustments
in the fare structure. One significant set of responses
is the relatively high percentage of riders (37 per-
cent) who list professional occupations, have college
degrees (41 percent), and/or have incomes in excess
of $70,000 a year (27 percent). All of these figures
suggest that there is considerable potential for charg-
ing higher fares to passengers in these groups, if a
means can be devised to do so. This is done now by
providing "custom class" reserved seat service, with
13 seats, on all except the Milwaukee trains.
Even more significant is the surprising data of
frequency of travel. In the survey, about one-fourth
of respondents indicated that this was their first trip,
and one-half indicated that they took less than six
trips a year. Only 1 percent indicated two or more
trips a week. These are, in no sense, commuters. A
major objective is to encourage riders to make more
trips, perhaps by selling multiple-use tickets at re-
duced fares and giving discounts for two, three, or
four persons travelling together.
The Overall Experience of
Other States
In 1995-1996 nine other states had state-
supported trains under Section 403 and are cur-
rently continuing to support these trains. Their ex-
periences are as follows:
California
The state supports three sets of trains: t\\eSan Diegans,
eight trains, are operated each day during the week
from Los Angeles to San Diego, 129 miles, and four
trains a day north from Los Angeles to Ventura and
Santa Barbara, 103 miles; the San Joaquins,
Emeryville (Oakland) to Fresno and Bakersfield,
3 1 2 miles, four trains each way a day; the Capitols,
In 1995 the State House avned 83,829 passengers. It
serves Springfield, Bloomington-Normal, and other
cities between Chicago and St. Louis.
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Sacramento-Oakland-San Jose, 134 miles, three
trains a day.
The volume of traffic is heav)': 1.5 million annu-
ally on the Siw Diegans, 525,000 on the San Joaquins,
350,000 on the Capitols. The state has borne the
entire cost of the deficit, $41.7 million in 1995-
1996, $47.2 million budgeted for 1996-1997 and
an estimated figure of $52 million by 1997-1998.
Missouri
The State of Missouri supports two trains, both
between St. Louis and Kansas City. In 1996 the
state is paying $2.9 million; the legislature has ap-
proved $3.6 million for FY1997.
Michigan
The state supports the Michigan portion of the
International, a Chicago-Toronto train \ia Port Hu-
ron, and the Chicago-Grand Rapids train, now
both daily trains. The state provided about
$1,897,5000, on a long-term avoidable cost basis;
the number of annual riders in 1995 was 1 14,000
on the Port Huron train and 44,887 on the Grand
Rapids train.
New York
The state supports the portion between Albany and
Montreal of Amtrak's New York-Montreal train.
North Carolina
The state supports two trains: the North Carolina
portion of the Carolinian, Charlotte to New York,
and the Piedtnont. between Charlotte and Raleigh.
The riders are covering about 75 percent of the cost
of the ser\'ice.
Oregon
The state supports one train daily between Portland
and Eugene, plus throughway bus service. The state
was paying Amtrak $75,000 a month in 1995; it is
now paying $100,000 per month.
Vermont
The state supports one north-south train, Essex Jet.
(Burlington)-Brattleboro. In 1995 66,846 riders
were carried; the FY1996 subsidy is $750,000.
Washington
The State of Washington supports two trains, one
Seattle-Portland, the other Seattle-Vancouver, B.C.
The former carries about 79,000 passengers a year,
the latter about 90,000. The annual cost to the state
is $2.5 million for each train.
Wisconsin
The state shares the cost of the Chicago-Milwaukee
service paying 75 percent of the deficit.
In addition to these intercity trains, Amtrak man-
ages under contract extensive rail commuter service
in California, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, and Virginia.
The great merit of retaining the
trains is the lessening of highway
congestion and pressure for
additional highway improvements.
Conclusion
Policies relating to the state-supported trains
should be determined by the Illinois administration
and the legislature by weighing the relative gains
from retaining service and the cost to the state of
doing so. The great merit of retaining the trains is
the externalin' benefits
—
primarily the lessening of
highway congestion and pressure lor additional high-
way improvements, particularly in the Chicago met-
ropolitan area, plus gains to the users who are
receiving benefits from the service in excess of what
they are willing to pay. There are also benefits to the
communities ser\'ed, both to their residents as indi-
viduals, especially those who do not have cars or do
not wish to drive, and in terms of location ofhomes
and businesses. Many communities served by
Amtrak have little or no bus service. Relatively
cheap, comfortable, convenient transport to Chi-
cago is a factor in luring new businesses to the area.
These benefits are impossible to measure, but they
are certainly real.
These gains must be balanced against the cost to
the state—which will be greater than in the past. But
even $18 million a year, the maximum foreseen, is
less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the total state
expenditure. In contrast, according to IDOT the
cost to build one mile of urban expressway is typi-
cally $140 million, of rural expressway, $7 million.
Currendy there appears to be strong sentiment in
Springfield that the cost of the trains must be re-
duced and the deficit therefore lowered, ifsupport is
to be continued. Hopefully this can be accomplished.
But the support of the trains could justifiably be-
come a regular state budget item.
Illinois Business Review Summer 1996 7
The Flat Tax and the 1996
Presidential Campaign
By J. Fred Ciertz and Timothy R. Watts
It could be argued that a relatively low^ flat-
rate^ broadly based federal income and
business tax proposal could offer
advantages to candidate Robert Dole and
even to taxpayers.
TAX ISSUES ARE LIKELY TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLEin the upcoming presidential campaign. Inaddition to the usual debate about whether
taxes are too high and a burden tor citizens or too
low leading to large continuing deficits, more basic
issues about taxation may also be raised in the cam-
paign. In fact, they already have played a major role
in the primaries. Republican candidate Steve Forbes
based his whole candidacy on the issue of changing
the existing federal individual and corporate income
taxes to a so-called flat tax.
The demise of" the Forbes candidacy, however,
may not spell the end of the flat-tax idea. With
former Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole trailing
President Bill Clinton in the polls, many Republi-
cans, including Forbes, are urging Dole to propose
dramatic tax reform to energize his candidacy. From
the debate surrounding the Forbes campaign, it is
apparent that there is considerable misunderstand-
ing about the concept of the flat tax and how it
relates to our present system. The flat-tax idea repre-
sents a fundamental change. It would not only change
the income tax rates but would also dramatically
change the base on which the tax is levied.
Older Flat-Tax Proposals
Suggestions for a flat-rate income tax have been
around for many years. They have come from such
diverse points on the political compass as conserva-
tive economist Milton Friedman in the 1960s,
Democratic Congressman Richard Gephardt and
Senator Bill Bradley in the early 1980s, and even
former California Governor Jerry Brown in the 1992
Democratic presidential primary. These plans called
for the modification of the existing individual in-
come tax in two ways. First, they would replace the
existing structure with its graduated tax rates with a
single, low "flat" rate. A rate of around 20 percent
has often been suggested. Note that in the 1950s the
highest marginal income tax rate was as high as 91
percent and was 70 percent as late as 1981. In order
to maintain federal revenues, the new lower rate
would be applied to a number of sources of income
not presently taxed—and many deductions and other
exclusions would be eliminated.
Such proposals have a number of attractive fea-
tures. The broader base would lead to a fairer treat-
ment of individuals with the same ability to pay (the
fundamental equity principle upon which the
J. Fred Giertz
J. Fred Giertz is a professor of economics and a member of the Institute of Government and Public Aflairs
at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Timothy Watts graduated from the University of Illinois
in May 1996. He worked on this topic as part of an independent study project during his senior year.
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income tax is based) since all sources of income
would be treated similarly. In addition, the broader
base would discourage tax avoidance (the use of legal
loopholes to reduce tax liability) in which individu-
als and businesses base their decisions for work and
investment on tax considerations rather than on the
underlying economic factors. Tax loopholes not only
cost the government revenues, they also result in
inefficiency by channeling resources to less produc-
tive areas in the search of tax savings. The low rate
would discourage tax evasion (the reduction of taxes
by illegal means) and avoidance but would encour-
age greater work effort and more investment. It
should be noted, however, that the size of this
supply-side response is the subject of considerable
debate among both politicians and economists.
Flat-tax proposals would deal with equity among
taxpayers of different income levels by providing a
very large combined exemption and standard de-
duction, in the range of $25,000 to $40,000 for a
family of four, on which no income tax would be
paid. This compares with $16,550 for a family of
four in 1995. The tax would be progressive because
of this large exclusion rather than because of gradu-
ated tax rates.
While the "old " flat-tax ideas were never fully
embraced in federal tax law, they did have an impor-
tant impact on tax policy in the 1980s—culminat-
ing in the tax reform of 1986 spearheaded by
President Ronald Reagan.' The 1986 law reduced
the number ot marginal tax rates to two: 15 percent
and 28 percent. The 28 percent top rate was down
from the 50 percent in effect from 1981 to 1986 and
much below the 70 percent highest rate that pre-
vailed before 1981. The 1986 reform also broad-
ened the tax base by eliminating many tax shelters,
especially in the area of real estate, taxing long-term
capital gains as ordinary income, and eliminating
the deductions for state and local sales taxes.
Changes that have come about since 1986 have
led to the erosion of the 1 986 reforms. Tax increases
in 1990 (when President George Bush violated his
1988 campaign pledge, "read my lips—no new
taxes") and in 1993 under President Clinton have
resulted in a top marginal rate of nearly 40 percent.
These increases were designed to raise more revenue
to deal with the persistent federal deficit, but they
did so by creating more brackets as well as higher
marginal tax rates.
New Flat-Tax Proposals
Newer proposals go substantially beyond the goals
of the older plans. Not only do they call for a broad-
based, low, flat-rate tax system, they also call for
integrating the corporate income tax with the
Tax loopholes cost the government
revenues and result In Inefficiency
by channeling resources to less
productive areas in search of tax
savings.
system ot flat individual income taxation. Even more
important, the plans call tor a move to taxing con-
sumption rather than income by making investment
fully deductible at the time the costs are incurred
(expensing rather than depreciating investment costs).
These ideas trace their origin to Robert Hall and
Alvin Rabushka, economists at the Hoover Institu-
tion at Stanford University, who introduced the
notion in 1981. Their ideas are closely linked to the
Steve Forbes flat-tax plan and another proposed by
House Majority Leader Dick Armey (R-Texas) and
Senator Richard Shelby (R-Alabama).- Surprisingly,
a similar plan was introduced by current Clinton
Chiet of Staff Leon Panneta when he was a Demo-
cratic congressman trom Calitornia.
The new proposals call for the existing individual
and corporate income taxes to be eliminated and
The tax base would be broadened
by eliminating almost all current
deductions — charitable contribu-
tions, mortgage interest, and state
and local taxes.
replaced by an individual wage tax and a business
(both corporate and unincorporated firms) tax, both
of which would employ a common, flat tax rate in
the range ot 20 percent.
The individual wage tax would, in a sense, be
narrower that the current individual income tax in
that it would not directly include income from
interest, dividends, rents, or capital gains. Many of
these items, however, would be taxed under the
broadened business tax. Pension benefits, but not
contributions, would be also be taxed. The large
combined exemption and standard deduction men-
tioned earlier would make the system somewhat
progressive. Most individual taxpayers could file a
'Illinois readers will nolc lh.ll ihc siaic's
individual income lax is basically .1 Hal-
rale tax wiih a 3 percent tax rate applied
to a base that is generally broader than
tba[ used by the federal govefnment-
-Interested readers may wish 10 access
Congressman Armey's Flat Tax
Homepage at bltp://»'w^s-.housc,gov/
atmcvtlattax/
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Under a Hat-tax scheme most individuals may be able to file a "post-card"
sized return vastly simpler than current forms.
so-called "postcard" sized tax return that would be
vastl)' simpler than current filing requirements. Be-
cause ot the high combined exemption and deduc-
tions (over $40,000 for a family of four), low-income
taxpayers would owe no tax—and might not even be
required to file a return. The individual tax base
would also be considerably broadened by eliminat-
ing almost all current tieductions such as those tor
charitable contributions, mortgage interest, and state
and local taxes.
Much of interest, dividends, rents, or capital
gains now taxed as individual income would be
taxed imder the flat-rate business tax. Unlike the
current corporate tax, which t;ixes net income or
profit, the business tax would tax all corporate re-
ceipts less wage payments and pension contribu-
tions, the purchase of intermediate goods and services,
and purchases of investment equipment. Interest
would not be a deductible business expense. The
logic of the integrated flat-rate tax is to tax income
once and only once (either at the business level or
the individual level) at the same rate. For example,
while interest is not included on the individual
return, it is not deductible at the business level so it
would be taxed at that level. The costs of benefits
Since all income (business or indi-
vidual) would be taxed at the same
rate, and since no income would
escape taxation, most tax avoidance
schemes would be useless.
such as he.ilih insinance would not be deductible lor
business as thc\- are uiKicr currciu law . I he plan
wotild ettectively eliminate the current double taxa-
tion of corporate profits b\' taxing all corporate
income .u ihc business le\el, but excluding it at the
itulividual level. Under current law, corporate prof-
its are taxed under the corporation income tax. The
profits are taxed again under the iiulixidii.il incotiie
tax when thev are distributed to shareholders as
di\idends. Many individuals (such as landlords, farm-
ers, and the self-employed) would have to file a
simple business return in addition to their indi-
\idual form.
The full dedttction of investment expenses at the
btisiness level is a key feature of most flat-tax plans.
In effect, it shifts the tax base from income to
consumption. Because of the clo.se relationship be-
tween savings and investment, exempting invest-
ment is roughly equivalent to exempting savings
and, thus, taxing only the consumption component
of income. The fact that the firm deducts pension
contributions when they are paid and individuals
pay taxes on their pension benefits when they
receive them is also consumption-based. Unlike other
consumption-based taxes such as the sales tax and
value added tax, the flat tax would be somewhat
progressive and would take into account variations
in ability to pa)' based on family size.
Proponents of the flat tax cite several important
advantages including increased simplicity and effi-
ciency. A fully implemented flat tax would be much
simpler for both individuals and businesses. It would
also be fairer in the sense that all sources of income
would be treated the same, although it might be
criticized for reducing overall progressivit)'. Most
important, it would reduce tax avoidance, with its
losses in revenue and efficiency, by eliminating in-
centives to make economic decisions based on tax
reasons. Since all income (business or individual)
would be taxed at the same rate, and since no in-
come would escape taxation, most tax avoidance
schemes would be useless. The low tax rate would
also reduce incentives for tax evasion. In addition,
supporters of a consumption-based tax argue that
the change would encourage savings and invest-
ment, which would lead to increased economic
growth for the country.
The Politics of the Flat-Rate
Tax
Could Senator Dole benefit politicalh' by .tdopt-
ing the flat-tax plan as a key part of his campaign?
Such a plan has political advantages, but carries
some baggage as well. In a recent poll, respondents
rated the existing federal income tax as the "worst"
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In a recent poll,
respondents rated the
existing federal income
tax as the '^Ieast fair^^
of all other major
taxes, including the
local property tax,
or "least fair of all other major federal, state, or local
taxes, including the local propert)' tax. In another
poll, 49 percent of respondents favored a flat-rate
federal tax, while 39 percent opposed the concept.
In order for the idea to succeed, support would have
to come from a broad-based coalition that would be
willing to trade the existing patchwork of prefer-
ences for a simpler and more efficient, broad-based,
low rate system.
In fact, such a plan would likely be opposed by a
disparate set of interest groups who benefit from the
current system—including state and local govern-
ments (whose income and propert)' taxes would no
longer be deductible), charities (who depend on the
deduction for contributions to stimulate donations),
and real estate interests (who fear the loss of the
mortgage interest deduction). There would also be
numerous transitional issues in moving from the
current system to the a reformed one. For example,
should the depreciation deduction still be allowed
on plant and equipment purchased before the new
rules (which expense investment costs) come into
effect? Should home owners who purchased homes
under past tax rules be allowed to continue to de-
duct mortgage interest? The problem confronting
policymakers is that more generous transition rules
would require a higher new tax rate to maintain
revenues. Many politicians might also oppose the
change in the tax system since the stock and trade of
politicians is providing benefits to narrow, focused
interest groups in exchange for support. The tax
laws have proven to be a fertile ground for this type
of exchange.
From candidate Dole's perspective, a flat-rate tax
might appear to be a high-risk, but potentially high-
return, strategy. He might prefer to call for an across-
the-board tax reduction within the current system
or targeted tax reductions for special interest groups.
To the extent that taxes have been an issue in early
stages of the presidential campaign. President Clinton
and Mr. Dole have engaged more in a traditional
bidding war to attract taxpayers (for example, tax
credits for families and for college students and
special treatment of capital gains) rather than focus-
ing on fimdamental reform. Given Dole's support
of the balanced budget amendment and his reputa-
tion for prudence in the area of taxes, however, a
major tax cut in the presence of continuing deficits
is unlikely. A complete shift to a new system that
would maintain revenues while reforming the cur-
rent unwieldy system might appear to be an attrac-
tive alternative.
It would be a risky strategy in that it would open
the door for the Democrats to appeal to groups who
appear to lose from the change. For example, under
most flat-tax plans, low-income and high-income
citizens might well receive a reduction in their tax
burdens while many middle-income citizens would
end up with a slightly higher rate. Even though it
could be argued that in the long run almost everyone
would benefit from a stronger economy, the scheme
would present some difficult political problems in
the short run. The plan would also have to be
defended against charges that taxpayers could no
longer deduct their and health insurance or that
homeowners could no longer deduct mortgage in-
terest payments. To give in to these interests groups
by exempting certain types of income would both
weaken the basic advantages of the proposal and
require a higher overall rate for all remaining income
sources.
Defending the flat-tax plan against these charges
would require a level of advocacy and commitment
that so far has been lacking in the Dole campaign. It
Mr. Dole were able to rise to the challenge, the plan
might counter arguments that he has no new ideas
or vision and that he would merely be a "caretaker"
as president. On the other hand, if he puts a major
tax reform forward and does not support and defend
it vigorously, it might well prove to be a disaster.
Given his current prospects, however, it is a risk that
is well worth taking if he really believes in the
reforms.
Under most flat-tax plans, both
low-income and high-income
citizens might have a reduced tax
burden while many middle-income
citizens would end up with a
slightly higher rate.
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Base Closings Don^t Have to
Spell Disaster
By David Gerard
Although there were great differences in the
impact of the closing of Chanute Air Force
Base on various types of businesses, many
of the expected ill effects have been
mitigated by planning and careful
exploitation of the community's strengths.
This is the final
article of a series
reporting the
results of surveys of
Rantoul, Illinois,
businesses on the
consequences of
the closing of
Chanute Air Force
Base in 1993.
W^
%.
IN
1989 THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED
the closure of Rantoul's Chanute Air Force
Base and formally decommissioned the base in
September of 1993. Although many small firms
went out of business and others suffered adverse
effects, Rantoul has had fairly robust economic
growth since the base closure. The unemployment
rate in Rantoul has consistently been at or below the
national average, and dozens of new businesses have
located in the community. Since 1990 the Com-
merce Research Office at the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign has been reporting on the im-
pact of the base closure on the Rantoul economy.
This final report looks at events during and after the
decommissioning phase to see why the base closure
had different effects on various sectors of the Rantoul
economy and to discuss the determinants ofRantoul's
economic growth since the base closure.
The primary conclusion drawn from the study is
that the effects of the base closure for each sector
were determined by principal market for its goods
and services. For instance, many local retailers and
professional services lost an established market for
their products and consistently reported negative
effects from the base closure. In contrast, Rantoul's
light industrial firms have a more regional and na-
tional market. Firms in this sector did not report any
deleterious effect of closure. The evidence shows
that most of the negative local economic conse-
quences occurred between the time of the announce-
ment and the actual closure of the base.
Following the closure, the federal government
ceded control of the base property and facilities to
the "Village of Rantoul through grants from the
Federal Aviation Administration, the Department
of Education, and the Department of Interior. The
village government has successfully built on many of
Rantoul's location-based economic strengths by leas-
ing and selling most of these acquired properties.
The effect has been a transfer of land and capital
assets between the public and private sectors. As a
result, some Rantoul businesses expanded onto the
base, new businesses have located in Rantoul, and
there has been an addition of more than 1,400 new
jobs on the former base properties.
The Decommissioning Phase
rhc Commerce Research Office collected data
through biannual surveys of private and public
David Gerard is a Ph. D. candidate in economics and a research assistant in the Commerce Research Office
at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
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sectors of the village from 1990 to 1994, a period
that overlapped the decommissioning phase. Re-
spondents provided information about employment
and revenue levels, changes in these levels from the
previous six-month period, and projections tor the
coming six months. To account for differences across
different types of firms, businesses were divided into
six categories: retail, industrial, financial, artisan/
contractor, financial, and professional.
Not surprisinglv, the results of the study show
that the impact of the base closure is correlated with
the market for a firm's product or service. Sectors
that rely on the local population—and, in particu-
lar, base residents—were more vulnerable to changes
caused by the base closure. For instance, in the two
years following the announcement ot the closure,
approximately 30 firms went out ot business or
moved out of Rantoul. These firms were mostly
small retailers and professional firms—one example
was a locally owned pizza restaurant. In contrast,
some firms providing private dental and medical
services reported that the base closure would have no
impact on their operations. The likely explanation
for this is that those services were provided to mili-
tan' personnel on the base.
The survevs questioned firms about how much
the base closure would adversely affect their opera-
tions and how much the expansion of the Rantoul
economy would aid operations. The chart plots the
expectations of the retail, industrial, and profes-
sional sectors about the negative impact of the base
closure over the period (1989-1993) when closure
had been announced but not yet completed.
On one extreme, the retail sector consistently
reported expectations of negative effects of the base
closure. Because retail establishments cater to local
demand, changes in the level of demand or the n'pes
of goods and services in demand may be especially
bad for businesses within this sector. Retailers con-
sistently reported that the effects of the base closing
were more than incidental. They also reported skep-
ticism about the benefits from expanding business
in the community. The projections for the Rantoul
retail climate improved only incrementally as the
survey period ended in 1994. It is possible, however,
that some retailers could have been affected by com-
petition from a massive retail development in north-
ern Champaign (about 10 miles away) as much as by
the base closure.
On the other extreme were firms in the Rantoul
industrial park. These firms never sold a large per-
centage of their output to the base or local residents,
nor did they rely on the base for ser\'ices or produc-
tion inputs. This sector consistently reported that
the base closure had little impact on their businesses.
Firms in the industrial park are more vulnerable to
Rantoul businesses expanded onto
the base, new businesses have
located in Rantoul, and 1,400 new
jobs have been added on the
former base properties.
changes in regional and national economic trends
than local economic conditions. Two firms reported
expansion during the period immediately following
the closure announcement, and overall the indus-
trial park has added more than 1,500 jobs since the
announcement of the base closure.
An interesting intermediate case is the profes-
sional sector, which includes firms that provide in-
surance, legal, financial, medical, and dental services.
When the sur\'eys began in 1 989 this sector reported
expectations about the same as the retail sector. That
is, on average these firms expected the base closure
to have an adverse effect on their revenues and
employment levels. Throughout the sur\'ey period
the expectations of this sector were between re-
sponse averages reported by retail sales and indus-
trial park members. By the time of the actual closure,
however, the professional sector was reporting the
same expectations as the industrial sector. The infer-
ence may be that the anticipated drop in demand
may not have materialized, perhaps, or the expan-
sion of the local economy offset the loss of consum-
ers from the base.
Expected Negative Impact of Air Force
Base Closure Reported by Retail,
Professional, and Industrial Sectors
Significant
Moderate
Slight
None
Retail ^ '
Professional
Industrial^
1990 1991 1992 1993
Data from Bi-annual Surveys
Though no sector reported significant negative impact,
the retail sector, more dependent on base residents
for sales, suffered most.
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Rantoul Products Textron has leased a hanger on the former air base for its light
manuafacturing operations.
The survey results indicate that by the second
half of 1993 most respondents reported that there
was not much of a relationship between the base
closing and future economic fortunes, even though
the base had not yet closed.
Economic Activity since the
Base Closure
The primar)- conclusion from the sun'ev data is
that a community solely reliant on base residents as a
source of demand for goods and services will be
more adversely atlected by a base closure than a
communit)' with a more diverse economic base. The
closure of the base is only part of the stor)'. Despite
any negative effects, the community may benefit
from an infusion ofland and capital from the federal
government. The Rantoul village government has
redeveloped the base bv leasing and selling the prop-
erties to firms already located in the area, as well as
by attracting new businesses.
Several of the communirv's characteristics allowed
local ofFicials to capitalize on the acquired endow-
ment of base land and infrastructure. The village is
located near major north-south and east-west
By the second half of 1993 most respondents
reported that there was not much of a
relationship between the base closing and
future economic fortunes.
interstate highways, which makes it accessible for
distributing its products. In addition, it has an in-
dustrial park with seven manufacturing companies.
It is also only a few miles north of the Universit)' ot
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The local govern-
ment took advantage ol a grant from the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce to help it identif\' and exploit
these strengths.
The air base provided a fairly stable level of
government expenditure into the community. In
effect, the base closure transferred this public invest-
ment from the federal to the local level, and local
officials have been ven' successful attracting private
nvestment in the former base properties. Certainly
ihe Rantoul expansion has benefited from stable
regional and national economic conditions. While
private investment has been robust, the local economy
will be more susceptible to changes in regional and
national economic trends than when the federal
government supplied a stable source of income.
Two firms from the industrial park, Caradco, a
manufacturer of wood-frame windows and patio
doors, and Rantoul Products Textron, a division of
Chrysler that produces such automotive compo-
nents as instrument panels and door trim panels,
were among the first lessees of the former base
properties. Certainly, an existing industrial base was
one component that eased the economic transition.
The expansion from the industrial park accounts for
roughly one-third of the over Si million in annual
lease revenue, and less than 20 percent of the more
than 1 ,400 jobs that have been created on the former
base properties. The village also has leased properties
to dozens of other private and public entities. These
include business germane to air transportation such
as Reliant Air Carrier Maintenance, medium-size
operations such as Ameritech, as well as many small
retail and professional services leasing office space.
In addition, the possible location of the federal
Defense Finance and Accounting Services on the
former base would provide an additional 750 jobs to
Rantoul.
The village has sold portions of the base proper-
ties and has several sales pending. For instance, local
officials have sold the base housing units to a private
developer. Revenue from these sales will amount to
several million dollars.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Portions of the lease and
sale revenue will go to-
ward upgrading and
maintaining base facili-
ties and other local in-
frastructure.
The village is also
working with depart-
^^ ments at the University
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of Illinois. For instance, faculty and students are
currenth' using the facilities for pavement research
supported by the Federal Aviation Administration
for runways, and the Department ofTransportation
for highways. As a result, faculr\' are able to market
consulting services to airports around the world.
While there has been much economic develop-
ment on the former base properties, there have also
been several additions for the public benefit. The
FAA disposed of several tracts of land for an avia-
tion histoty museum, and the Interior Department
ceded several parcels of land for parks and recre-
ational uses.
An established industrial sector is clearly a valu-
able component of demand for use of the base
properties, but it does not appear to be a necessar\'
condition for attracting private investment. Ironi-
cally, the base staying open as long as it did may have
gotten in the way of the economic transition.
A Final Word
Unquestionably, anv base closure will substan-
tially alter local social and economic institutions bv
decreasing the population and changing the charac-
teristics of the remaining population. The evidence
from the Commerce Research Office study indicates
that there is, indeed, a correlation between the local
markets and the likely impact of a base closure. In
which cases the base residents comprise a significant
portion of the market for goods or services, the
business will likelv be more severely affected.
Since the announcement of the
closure of Chanute Air Force Base^
there appears to be fairly robust
economic activity on and off the
base properties.
After the base is closed, the local government
receives a large endowment of land and capital from
the federal government. The eventual effects of the
base closure on the local economy will depend largely
on the ability of a community to integrate its exist-
ing assets with the newly acquired base resources.
Attracting investment to fill the void left bv the base
closure is a critical dimension of the transition pro-
cess. Rantoul officials have successfully attracted
both pri\ate and public investment to the former
base properties. Vl'hile an existing industrial base
may be one source of demand for base properties, it
does not appear to be a necessaty condition for
leasing and selling them. Since the announcement of
the closure of Chanute .Air Force Base, there appears
to be fairK' robust economic activity- on and off the
base properties. Certainly the economic transition
in Rantoul was aided by an aggressive marketing
campaign and fairly positive regional and national
economic conditions.
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Illinois Economic Growth to
Continue
By Harvey B. Westbrook, Jr.
The Illinois economy will experience strong
personal income growth through 1998.
C^^ TRONG GROWTH IN RKAL PERSONAL INCOME IS
"^ expected in Illinois through 1998 (Chart).'
^ i-^ Real total personal income should grow 2.
1
percent in 1996, 3.5 percent in 1997, and 2.9 per-
cent in 1998. Much of the increase comes from
service-producing industries, which are projected to
grow 4.7 percent in 1996 and 3.8 percent in 1997,
compared with 2.5 percent and 1.5 percent in 1993
and 1994. A large portion of this growth reflects a
continuing shift of Illi-
nois towards a service
economy. High personal
income growth in most
sectors indicates a healthy
economy through 1998.
Illinois employment
will grow moderately
through 1998, reflecting
a national demographic
trend. Major national
forecasting organizations,
the WEFA Group and
DRI/ McGraw Hill, pre-
dict relatively low em-
ployment growth for the
nation due to slower
growth in the adult popu-
lation. An increase of
Growth in Illinois Personal Income
only 1 percent in the adult population is expected
through the next decade. Expansion of the labor
force will not be much higher. Illinois employment
levels are expected to follow the trend. Employment,
in service-producing industries will be more robust
than in goods-producing industries. However, within
the good-producing industries, much of the growth
will come in construction and trade. Employment
in goods-producing industries is expected to in-
crease 2.2 percent in
1996 and 1.2 percent in
1 997. Expanded employ-
ment in goods-producing
industries is driven by aTotal Nonfarm Personal Income
Goods-Producing Industries
.Services-Producing Industries - - - -
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Much of the growth of personal income in services
reflects a continuing shift of Illinois towards a service
economy.
2 percent growth in em-
ployment in manufactur-
ing in 1996. The Illinois
Econometric Model
(lEM) projects steady
employment growth in
durable manufacturing
through 1998.
Employment in the
services-producing indus-
tries is expected to grow
2.7 percent in 1996 and
0.8 percent in 1997. The
expansion is the result of
Note tlut real personal income, total retail sales, and total gross state product arc
reported in terms of 1992 dollars following the convention ol the economic data used
to generate the forecasts.
Harney B. Westbrook, Jr., is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Economics and a research assistant in
the Commerce Research Otflce, at the University ot Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Hant) 11 \\ csibrook, Jr.
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significant increases in employment in the services
subsector. A portion ot the growth can be explained
by increased employment in services-producing in-
dustries, projected to grow 3.8 percent in 1996 and
2 percent in 1997.
Strong growth in real gross state product is ex-
pected in 1997. Total real gross state product is
expected to grow 0.6 percent in 1996 and then to
expand 5.5 percent in 1997. This jump will be driven
by very high growth in the ser\'ices-producing subsector.
Retail sales is expected to grow moderately over
the period. Total retail sales are expected to grow 3
percent in 1997 and 2.3 percent in 1998, signifi-
cantly higher than the 0.9 percent expansion in
1996. The rates for retail sales ot durable and non-
durable goods will follow similar trends.
The Illinois economy will experience healthy
growth in gross state product and personal income.
While projections of" employment growth are less
optimistic than in the past, statewide emplo\-ment
growth will keep pace with national trends.
Illinois Forecast Statistics
Employment (thousands)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total Nonfarm Employment
Illinois Forecast Statistics
Real Personal Income (millions of 1987 dollars)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total Personal Income
Illinois State Revenue Update
By J. Fred Giertz and Robert W. Resek
State revenues for the year will exceed the
official beginning-of-the year predictions by
about $100 million.
LUNOIS STATE REVENUES REMAIN STRONG THROUGH
the first 1 1 months of fiscal 1996 (Table 1). The
forecasts ol the Universit)' of Illinois Institute of
Government and Public Affairs (IGPA) suggest that
state revenues for the year will exceed the official
beginning-of-the-year predictions by about $100
million. IGPA forecasts also predict that revenues
will grow in the next fiscal year at a 2.7 percent rate,
somewhat slower than the 3.6 percent pace recorded
in FY1996. The IGPA forecast remains somewhat
higher than that of the governor's Bureau of the
Budget (BOB) and considerably above that of the
General Assembly's Illinois Economic and Fiscal
Commission (lEFC) (Table 2, following page).
The Illinois General Assembly passed the budget
for the next fiscal year ahead of the constitutionally
mandated May 3 1 deadline for the second straight
year. The 1996 legislative session was uneventful on
the tax front. No new major taxes were approved,
and few spending initiatives were undertaken. Be-
cause of the favorable revenue picture, the General
Assembly was able to increase spending above Gov-
ernor Jim Edgar's budget recommendations while
rejecting his request for an increase in the tax on
riverboat casinos. Over the past several years, the
state was burdened not only with paying current
Medicaid expenses, but also with paying bills de-
ferred from previous years. Therefore, in addition to
new tax revenues in FY1997, increased funding for
education and other state programs will also come
from a seeming windfall, money used in previous
years to reduce the Medicaid payment backlog.
In FY1998 (beginning July 1, 1997) the money
that was used to pay deferred Medicaid payments
will be part of the regular budget, no longer "found
money" to be used for special purposes.
Table 1. FY1996 Illinois State Revenue
Performance
(July 1, 1995-May 1996, millions of current dollars)
Receipts
Table 2. Comparison
x^x
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From the Editor
Richard J. Arnould
WHEN I WROTE IN THIS COLUMN FOR THE
first time last spring, I had no idea
that my tenure with the Illinois
Business Ret>ie!v wou\d be so short—but Hfe is full of
surprises. Recently I was tapped to take over the
leadership of the Department of Economics here at
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
And so this will be my next to last column in this
space— I will serve as guest editor of the 1997
Illinois Economic Outlook Issue. I have enjoyed
the challenge of developing new ways for this pub-
lication to bring to our readers the expertise ofsome
of the talented researchers in the College of Com-
merce and working with the staff, fellow faculty
members, and our research assistants in publishing
the Illinois Business Review.
Next, I want to share with you the results of the
reader survey conducted in the spring issue. Those
who responded mostly found the Illinois Business
Review interesting, easy to understand, useful, and
reliable. A large proportion of respondents reported
that they use the information gained from reading
the IBRin their business. Fewer, but a majority, use
the forecast articles and statistics; revenue statistics
were less widely used. Almost everyone liked the
addition of summaries at the beginning of the ar-
ticles. Less than half of those responding said that
they would use a World Wide Web version of the
publication.
The upcoming Illinois Economic Outlook issue
of the IBR{ January 1 997) will be even more broadly
based than past Outlooks. In addition to articles on
agriculture (done by a panel of University agricul-
tural economists), the state of the state, income
trends, and others, we also will have short pieces by
active practitioners in banking, financial services,
and manufacturing who will share their views of
their industries and their perceptions of the direc-
tions their industries may be heading.
In the current issue, our lead article deals with
the proposed construction of a new domed stadium
for the Chicago Bears. Carole Amidon investigates
the experiences of some other cities who have built
domed stadiums and tries to assess the current Chi-
cago plans in terms of financing issues and the
project's potential as an economic development tool.
Finance Professor Jan K. Brueckner discusses
the use of urban "impact fees" to help local govern-
ment bodies deal with the increased need for ser-
vices produced by urban growth. He examines the
spread of such fees and at who benefits when they
are introduced.
Another article takes a new look at venture capi-
tal, noting that the investors often contribute much
more than money to the companies they fund. The
author, A. Gledson Carvalho, discovered that
through syndication of investments, venture capi-
talists have formed informal networks for exchange
of information about management and manage-
ment teams.
We continue to thank you for your input and
comments about how we can make the IBR more
useful to you.
Thank you,
Richard J. Arnould
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A Chicago Dome: Economic
Development or Empty Promise?
By Carole M. Amidon
Mayor Daley, Governor Edgar, the Bears
management, and the public have been
arguing for months over various plans for a
new or renovated facility for the Chicago
Bears football franchise. What are the
relative benefits and disadvantages of the
plans and the experiences of other cities?
WHETHER OR NOT TO BUILD A NEW DOMED
Stadium for the Chicago Bears foot-
ball franchise has been one of many
contentious issues for the state and the city of Chi-
cago over the past year. Pohtical leaders were unable
to agree on a plan to build a new facility for the
Bears earlier this year even though the project would
create new tourism opportunities, construction jobs,
and, it is hoped, be a spark to the Bears fans and
team. Opposing interests could never agree on how
and by whom the funding would be arranged. Team
owner Mike McCaskey contends that Soldier Field,
at 72 years old, is in need of renovations or replace-
ment because of aesthetic, structural, and revenue
problems. McCaskey has intimated that he will not
renew his lease after it expires in 1999, and he has
courted offers to relocate the Chicago Bears' fran-
chise, most notably from Gary, Indiana.
Building multi-million dollar domes and stadi-
ums is a recent trend in large U. S. cities with 24 of
the 60 largest cities having built or made plans to
build such a complex. Often, the reasons cited for
such massive undertakings are economic development
and the prestige that accompanies the acquisition of a
professional sports team. Chicago is slightly differ-
ent in that it does not need to develop its prestige as
a great American city; but in order to maintain its
position, it cannot risk losing a large, well-followed
franchise such as the Bears to a smaller city less
encumbered with political wrangling. The issues
involved in putting together a stadium deal include
whether to rehabilitate Soldier Field or to build a
multipurpose dome, who is to finance the construc-
tion, and how to divide the profits from the venture.
When Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley pro-
posed spending $171 million to improve and up-
date Soldier Field, the Bears' McCaskey quickly
dismissed the idea. Generally, the stadium is consid-
ered too old and out of date to even consider reha-
bilitation since the addition of luxury boxes and
such facilities as in-house restaurants and bars would
be extremely difficult. Thus, McCaskey would rather
have a large new facility to accommodate all the
modern luxuries common to newer stadiums.
Many cities have favored the multipurpose dome
to spread the cost of the facilities over many
Carole M. Amidon
Carole M. Amidon is a research assistant in the Office of Research, and a Ph. D. candidate in economics at
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
4 Illinois Business Review Fall 1996
sporting and other events and as a way of establish-
ing facilities for football, baseball, and soccer as well
as other such large-crowd events such as concerts,
conferences, and trade shows. Illinois Governor
Jim Edgar has proposed a multipurpose facility as a
solution to McCaskey's requests. A multipurpose
dome would not benefit any major league sports at
the moment since Chicago already has facilities for
all other major league sports in the new Comiskey
Park, historic Wrigley Field, and the new United
Center. The United Center was also built as a
multipurpose facility and has been used for such
large events as the Democratic National Conven-
tion. Therefore, a facility similar to the one pro-
posed by the governor already exists. Analysis ot the
demand for two such facilities would answer the
question of actual need to build another large dome
but Edgar seems to hope this is a case of ifyou build
it, they will come.
The Edgar Proposal
"McDome, " as it has been dubbed by the Chi-
cago media, would be attached to McCormick Place.
The governor's latest financing plan, rejected by
Mayor Daley, called for a $465 million project
Rmded by $175 million from the Bears organiza-
tion, $185 million from tourism taxes, $25 million
each from the state and city coffers for road im-
provements, $5 million from McCormick Place and
Navy Pier, and at least $50 million for a parking
garage to be financed by some sort of debt instru-
ment. The proposed dome would have 72,000 seats,
an increase of 5,050 seats over Soldier Field, with
skyboxes and executive club seating to increase the
revenue garnered from ticket sales. Some seats would
also require the purchase of a seat license, which
allows the purchasers the right to buy season tickets
for the seats. Thus, the Edgar plan is asking the
people of Chicago and Illinois to fund $290 million
of the total dome project, much more than half the
cost. Then the revenues would accrue, not to the
taxpayers or general citizenry, but to the Bears orga-
nization. This is truly a case of double dipping by
the Bears when the taxpayers are first asked to fi-
nance the construction and then must pay for the
privilege of seeing the Bears in the dome.
The perceived necessity for expensive luxury boxes
and services for the Bears fans follows the trend of
recent stadium projects, such as the Georgia Dome,
where the revenue of a franchise no longer depends
on Joe Six-Pack fan but instead on large corporate
sponsors willing to rent costly, but well-appointed
seating for a season, and on a government willing to
guarantee a certain level of income to the franchise.
As a result, the price of a night at the ball park has
skyrocketed in recent
years. Without the sup-
port of the average fan,
though, it may be diffi-
cult to finance a team
through ticket sales and
television revenues. The
demand for television
broadcasts may well de-
crease ifBears policy alien-
ates the general public.
Twenty-four of the
sixty largest U,S, cities
have built or made
plans to build a super
sports complex.
The Daley Proposal
Mayor Daley made a surprise proposal on Sep-
tember 13, 1996, when he announced a compro-
mise plan to build a plastic retractable dome over
Soldier Field. The $395 million proposal would
allow the facility to be used for multiple purposes
but retains the grass field for football. The proposal
would add 6,000 seats, including new skyboxes, by
building nine rows up from the upper deck. Con-
struction would take place over the next three off-
seasons and not disrupt any Bears games.
Daley contends that the plan will help guarantee
$30 million in unshared revenue for the Bears fran-
chise from restaurant and billboard advertising sales.
Currently, the Bears are estimated to receive $15 to
$20 million overall with only $6 million from
unshared revenue, far below the NFL's highest earn-
ings, $60 million by the Dallas Cowboys. Neither
McCaskey nor Edgar were impressd by the offer and
neither sent any representatives immediately to dis-
cuss the plans with Daley's stadium planners and
architects.
Soldier Field, the Bears' present home, was built in 1924.
The Atlanta Experience
McCaskev is not the only owner to have asked
taxpayers to finance a private sports corporation. A
situation similar to the Bears has already been played
out in Atlanta, Georgia. The Georgia Dome project
began when Rankin W. Smith, Jr., owner of the
Atlanta Falcons, threatened to move the team to
Jacksonville, Florida, unless a deal to guarantee in-
come and a new stadium was worked out with the
Georgia and Atlanta governments. The original plan
called for a $158 million dome with 70 percent
financed by private sources and 30 percent from the
public coffers. Banks were unwilling to make a $1 10
million loan to be serviced by ten home football
games per year with a demonstrated weak demand
Construction Trends in the Greater Chicago Area
More construction jobs and increased demand for materials would benefit people
directly related to the project and should filter down to the surrounding area.
Earnings ($ millions)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
4,000
Employees (Thousands)
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Cook County Chicago PMSA Chicago-Gary-Kenosha
Chicago PMSA includes Cook, DeKalb, DuPage, Grundy, Kane, Kendall, Lake, McHenry, and
Will Counties, IL.
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha CMSA includes the Chicago PMSA, plus Kankakee County, IL; Lake and
Porter Counties, IN; and Kenosha County, Wl.
tor presold skyboxes. Since the private market was
unwilling to take the risk on the investment, Geor-
gia Governor Joe Frank Harris intervened and pro-
posed an equal sharing of the costs, with additional
financing from a tourism tax on Fulton County
hotels and motels. Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young
and the Georgia World Congress Center Authority,
overseers of the attached conference facilities, were
unwilling to give up the financing they received
from the tourism tax in order to pay off bonds issued
to finance the dome. Eventually, the tourism tax was
increased in order to accommodate the financing of
both entities.
Financing Issues
In the cases of both the Atlanta and Chicago
domes, the taxpayers are being asked to pay for a
project benefiting a single corporation. The Atlanta
Falcons were unable to presell their seats, demon-
strating that they were not a safe investment, and the
government agreed to guarantee the income of a
large corporation that had already shown its inabil-
ity to compete in the market place. In the end, tax'
free bonds were issued to cover the costs, and the
taxpayers were hit again since any interest income
made by the bond investors will not be taxed.
Such financing plans are very common across the
country where loopholes in the tax codes allow sport
franchise owners to spread the cost of facilities over a
very wide taxpayer base. Prior to 1 986, financing for
many stadiums was done through low-interest pri-
vate revenue bonds, until legislation sponsored by
Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, D-New York was
passed disallowing the use of these bonds for sta-
dium financing. Owners then discovered another
financing path through general purpose tax-free
bonds, issued by a ciry or state, that spread the cost
over many taxpayers. Moynihan also recently pro-
posed that the use of general purpose bonds be
disallowed, retroactive to June 14, 1996; but he
quickly retreated as officials from Nashville, Ten-
nessee, complained that it would threaten their issu-
ance of $60 million in bonds to attract the Houston
Oilers football franchise. House Speaker Newt
Gingrich, R-GA, promised that the bill would not
make it through the House of Representatives and
assured the Nashville officials that their economic
development plan would not be jeopardized.
A private legal challenge also confronted the fund-
ing proposal of the Georgia Dome. The use of the
tourism tax on Fulton County hotels and motels to
pay off construction bonds for the Georgia Dome,
general government services, and fostering of tour-
ism in Atlanta was challenged by a group of Fulton
County hotel and motel owners, represented by
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Nickolas P. Chivilis. Chivilis contended the tax
unfairly singled out Fulton County hotel and motel
guests to pay for development in Atlanta. The suit
was struck down since Fulton County should ben-
efit fi-om increased tourism in downtown Atlanta
even though the site of the stadium is actually out-
side the Fulton County lines. This same issue could
arise in Chicago if the Collar counties are assessed a
similar tourism tax to pay for a stadium in Cook
County, as suggested by Mayor Daley. Daley put
forward the idea of taxing the collar counties be-
cause many Bears fans live in the surrounding coun-
ties outside of Cook County and the Chicago city
limits and, therefore, may be avoiding some of the
payment for a stadium that they use and enjoy. A
way of avoiding city/suburbs conflict would be to
tax the entire state rather than using tourism taxes in
specific places to fiind the stadium. While this would
spread the cost of the new dome over a very large
group of people, no doubt a whole new set of
conflicts would arise.
Development Issues
New stadiums as economic development projects
within a city is a common theme in justifying the
use of taxpayer money and tax-free bond financing.
In their May 1996 report, the Congressional Re-
search Service compiled an example of this eco-
nomic development in Baltimore, Maryland.
Attracting the Cleveland Browns football team to
Baltimore cost $127,000 per job created, vastly ex-
ceeding the $6,250 price of a job created by
Maryland's economic development fund. Further-
more, the Congressional Research Service concludes
that "Almost all stadium spending is spending that
would have been made on other activities within the
United States "; so there is no real development in
such projects.
Bond financing by cities and states has another
negative effect by potentially crowding out other
borrowing the government might need to do. In
fiscal year 1992, Illinois began using short-term
borrowing as a means of raising revenue, with an
initial borrowing of$685 million. Thus, even before
the notion of using $240 million in taxpayer rev-
enue and $50 million in borrowed fiinds to finance
the stadium, the state was already borrowing to
cover revenue shortfalls. Issuing bonds for the sta-
dium could raise interest rates on subsequent state
borrowing or even push the state toward its debt
limit. Both instances could increase tax burdens and
decrease government services in the future.
Building a new stadium could create some posi-
tive effects. An injection of cash into the Chicago
economy in more construction jobs and increased
demand for materials would benefit people directly
related to the project and
should filter down to the
surrounding area. Con-
struction employment
and earnings fell in the
early 1990s in Chicago
and Cook, DeKalb, Du
Page, Grundy, Kane,
Kendall, Lake, McHenry,
Will, and Kankakee
Counties, Illinois; Lake
and Porter Counties in
Indiana; and Kenosha County, Wisconsin. (See
Charts) By 1994 construction earnings had exceeded
the 1990 figure and construction employment has
nearly returned to prerecession levels. Cook County
has been the slowest area to recover in both con-
struction earnings and employment and may ben-
efit the most from increased governmental spending
in construction. Both the earnings and employment
figures show that the general Chicago area could
also profit from an injection of new money into the
construction industry through the dome project.
At the completion of the dome project, more
tourists could be attracted and create more demand
for the city's service industries such as restaurants
and hotels. Some of this
positive effect of tourism
could be lessened, how-
ever, by building the sta-
dium with in-house
restaurants and bars, di-
verting tourists from sur-
rounding businesses and
making more competi-
tion rather than develop- ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
ing the surrounding
economy. The Georgia Dome did have a positive
effect on the greater Atlanta area when the city won
the right to host the 1 996 Summer Olympic with its
corresponding influx of tourists to increase eco-
nomic activity. However, there is as yet no solid
evidence that the money spent to finance the Geor-
gia Dome project actually produced benefits in ex-
cess of its cost.
The Chicago dome proposal appears to have as
many potential problems as benefits for the area.
The Congressional Research Services has determined
that increasing spending on sports domes simply
decreases spending in other areas and results in little
or no net gain for the economy. The major short-
run beneficiaries in Chicago would be the construc-
tion industry and materials suppliers, while in the
long run, the surrounding area might experience
some increase in revenues from tourism.
Attracting the
Cleveland Browns
football team to
Baltimore cost $127,000
perjob created.
The Chicago dome
proposal has as many
potential problems as
benefits.
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A New Way to Finance Urban
Infrastructure
By Jan K. Brueckner
Impact fees that require developers and,
ultimately, new homeowners to pay for the
costs of the infrastructure required by new
neighborhoods offer tax relief for
established homeowners and more rational
urban growth.
OVERNMENTAL UNITS THAT PROVIDE SERVICES
to their residents need both infrastructure
^^^^ and current services such as labor. For
example, educating a city's children requires con-
structing school buildings and playing fields as well
as hiring teachers and purchasing books and other
supplies. When the population is growing and the
citizens wish to maintain the level of public services,
both infrastructure and current services must grow
as well. The city must decide who should pay the
increasing costs of both. In the case of current ser-
vices, the answer is clear: the new urban residents
can pay the additional expenses. Since the older resi-
dents make similar payments, everyone pays a share.
Because most infrastructure costs are one-time
expenses, it is more difficult to devise a fair way to
finance them. One method shares the cost of the
increased infrastructure among all the city's resi-
dents, old and new. In this case, the original resi-
dents help pay for the costs of schools in the new
neighborhoods, which their children do not attend.
This burden is offset by a previous benefit, however,
since the original residents' schools were also par-
tially financed by their predecessors. And the new-
comers benefit from the help of older residents in
paying for their new schools but will be obligated to
share the cost of future construction.
As an alternative, each group of new residents
can be charged for the cost of the additional infra-
structure required by their presence in the city. For
example, the residents of a new neighborhood can
pay for the cost of constructing their school. This
involves a large one-time outlay for the new resi-
dents while exempting the original residents. How-
ever, the original residents would have already made
a similar payment for construction of their own
neighborhood schools.
Historically, U. S. cities have relied on the cost-
sharing approach to finance infrastructure. But rather
than paying up front for its cost, cities typically
raised the required funds through the sale of bonds.
Then all existing residents shared the burden of inter-
est payments on the previously built infrastructure.
In the last several decades cities have increasingly
asked new residents to pay for the cost of new
infrastructure. Such payments come from the real
estate developers who build the new neighborhoods.
The developer often builds the needed new infra-
structure, such as streets, water mains, sewers, parks,
and even schools, as a condition of opening a new
Jan K. Brueckner
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development. While this
"in-kind " provision can
work when the infra-
structure is within the
development itself, there
may be a need for ex-
pansion somewhere else in the city, such as con-
struction ot a larger police headquarters. In this
case, a cash payment, known as an "impact fee," is
charged to the developer as a condition of under-
taking the project.
The 1993 book Regulation for Revenue, by Alan
Altshuler and Jose Gomez-Ibanez, provides a help-
fill summary of trends in infrastructure charges.
Only 10 percent of localities levied these charges
before 1960, but by the mid 1980s, 90 percent did
so. Prior to 1960, most cities required in-kind pay-
ments. By the mid 1 980s, however, impact fees were
used along with in-kind levies in around 60 percent
of localities. Although impact fees are sometimes
levied according to formula, in many cases negotia-
tions between developers and local government de-
termine the levy. However they are determined, the
size of the levies has increased with their use. In
Southern California the level of impact fees rose by
over 500 percent between 1975 and 1983, while
Florida experienced a tripling of impact fees be-
tween 1985 and 1991. Altshuler and Gomez-Ibanez
believe that infrastructure charges account for 5 to
10 percent of construction costs in fast-growing
communities. They cite a figure of trom $5-$7 per
square foot for both residential and commercial
development. This translates into a cost of around
$12,000 for a typical 2,000 square loot house.
The Effects of Impact Fees
Many commentators claim that impact fees are a
response to excessive urban growth. They argue that
when developers are forced to pay the full cost of
infrastructure, development is less attractive, and
urban growth is slowed. Others argue that impact
fees are adopted because they benefit established
homeowners, who enjoy a reduction in property
taxes. Another claim is that the fees raise social
welfare because they lead to better decisions about
development.
Unfortunately, the economic analysis underlying
such claims is incomplete. In recent research I have
attempted to provide a better analysis, addressing
the following questions:
What is the effect of impact tees on urban
growth?
Who gains when impact fees are adopted?
Is the use of such fees socially desirable?
Infrastructure charges account for 5 to 10% of
construction costs in fast-growing communities.
Impact Fees and Urban Growth
A key element in determining the effect of im-
pact fees on urban growth is the notion ofoptimum
city size, viewed from the perspective of infrastruc-
ture costs. To determine the optimum size of a city,
one first computes the cost of the infrastructure
needed to provide a fixed level of services to cities of
various populations. It is possible, for example, to
determine the cost of a road network capable of
providing an acceptable traffic speed, and this calcu-
lation can be repeated for different population lev-
els. The network must grow (and costs increase) as
population rises in order to prevent unacceptable
road congestion. Dividing the total cost of the infra-
structure by the population of the area gives a per
capita cost at each population size. The optimum
size for a city is where per capita infrastructure costs
are as small as possible.
The effect ofchanging to an impact-fee system of
infrastructure finance depends on whether the popu-
lation of the city is above or below the optimum at
the time. If the fees are imposed when the city is
above the optimum size, growth stops. The reason is
that the annual payment for infrastructure now ex-
ceeds the level under the cost-sharing method, so
that housing development becomes more expensive,
and developers have less incentive to build. After a
period of no new construction, growth resumes, but
the population is lower at each future date than it
would have been without impact fees. Therefore,
cities experiencing excessive growth can deal with
the problem by introducing impact fees.
Who Gains?
How does the change
in the funding of new
infrastructure affect the
property values ofhome-
If the city
grown beyond the opti-
mum population, then
the switch to impact fees
raises the value of all ex-
isting houses. So all
homeowners gain. The
reason is that when the
city exceeds the optimum
population, per capita
infrastructure costs rise
Communities are seeking new ways to pay the costs
of providing services to new residents.
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Because the tax burden on home-
owners falls, property values rise.
over tinic when they arc rinaiiccd by the cost-sharing
nietliod. 1 lie shilt to impact tees stops the increase
by transferring the costs to new development, so
that infrastructure payments tor established
homeowners are lower than they would have been.
Because the t;u burden on homeowners tails, prop-
erty values rise.
Therefore, after a ciry has undergone substantial
growth, established homeowners have a strong fi-
nancial incentive to lobby tor the adoption ot im-
pact fees. This political force may account tor the
spread of the impact tee method. Several studies
confirm the financial gains ofhomeowners by show-
ing that the values of existing houses increased in
several cities (one in Florida and another in Colo-
rado) after the adoption of impact fees.
Social Benefits
The impact-tee and cost-sharing methods pro-
mote different patterns of population growth tor a
city. Impact-fee financing of new infrastructure is
socially desirable if the resulting pattern ofgrowth is
"superior " to the one produced by the cost-sharing
method.
Superiority can be judged according to the aggre-
gate value of property in the region, and the aggre-
gate value is greatest when the impact-fee method is
used. The reason is that when a developer is forced
to pay the full cost of infrastructure generated by his
development, he makes a development decision that
correctly balances social costs and benefits. As a
result, development of each piece of land occurs at
the "right ' moment from society's point of view,
leading to the optimum pattern ofpopulation growth
for the city. By contrast, if the developer pays only a
share of the infrastructure costs (as under the cost-
sharing method), then the full social cost ofdevelop-
ment is not taken into account. As a result, land can
be developed at the "wrong" time, and population
growth is not optimum. This suggests that the spread
of impact fees is in society's interest. It will lead to a
more rational pattern of population growth in our
urban areas.
a niiiiiber ot jurisdictions in the Chicago suburbs. If
a developer proposes a new subdivision, the jurisdic-
tion must compute an impact fee per house to be
spent to offset the subdivision's impact on the county
road network.
The traffic impact is computed by first predict-
ing the increases in traffic levels on the jurisdiction's
roads due to the presence of the subdivision, and
then computing the cost of the required capacity
expansion tor each road. The costs for all affected
roads are added up and the sum is divided by the
number ot new houses in the subdivision to produce
the transportation impact fee per house.
While a similar method could be used to calcu-
late the impact on some other kinds of infrastruc-
ture, the actual calculations carried out by local
governments often involve a large subjective ele-
ment (guesswork and imprecision). As a result, there
Implementation ofan
impact fee system is
quite complex.
has been much litigation over the years, with devel-
opers contesting the fees they were charged. The
courts have repeatedly stressed the need for a ratio-
nal link between fees and probable impact, and
several standards have emerged in different states. A
recent Supreme Court decision has superseded all
these with a new standard of "rough proportional-
ity" between fees and impact.
The complexity of the impact fee issue is likely to
continue to generate legal challenges. Given the
political popularity of such fees, however, they are
destined to be used even more widely in the future,
and analysis seems to suggest that this will be good
for society.
This article is revised from an earlier one. "Impact Fees: A New Method of Financing
Urban Infrastructure," in Policy Forum, vol. 9, no. 3-
Administrative Issues
Although it is easy enough to talk about impact
fees in the abstract, the implementation of such a
system is quite complex. Consider the case of trans-
portation impact tees, which are currently levied by
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Venture Capital^ More Than
Money
By A. Gledson Carvalho
Venture capitalists who provide financing to
develop new^ high-risk companies can also
provide nonfinancial benefits such as putting
together effective management teams and
developing the organizational structure of
the firm.
ALITTLE-KNO>XTM AND NOT FULLY UNDERSTOOD
by-product of venture capital financing
of new businesses is the transfer of infor-
mation among coinvestors about the abilities and
experience of corporate managers.
Venture capital (also known as private equity) is
one of the business sectors where the cooperation
among competitors makes the whole sector more
efficient and each competitor individually stronger.
In the course of their activities, venture capitalists
acquire valuable information. But sometimes giving
that information to a rival is the best use that can be
made of it.
Private equity has been the source of funding for
many successful companies, among them Apple
Computer, Microsoft, Intel, Federal Express,
Hybritech, and Teledyne. Nonetheless, the big suc-
cesses constitute a small fraction of the investments
made. A considerable number of cases result in
moderate success and some losses. A not insignifi-
cant number of cases result in the loss of the whole
sum invested (see sidebar, pg. 13). This is because
venture capital funds high risk firms, most ofwhich
are not candidates for other sources of funding. This
raises the question of whether private equity is sim-
ply a form of financial contract designed to remu-
nerate investors tor the high risk they assume or a
superior form of finance that really adds value to the
firms it funds. I have been exploring the idea that
venture capital adds value because it allows inves-
tors to transfer valuable
information acquired in
previous investments to
the new projects.
Part of the value of a
firm includes assets that
are not transferable.
They include the insti-
tutional arrangements
made within the firm, its ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
organizational culture,
knowledge of the abilities and experience that some
employees can bring to the job, and so on—what,
for lack of a better term, I call organizational capital.
I argue that a mature private equity industry pro-
vides venture capitalists with the opportunity to
transfer organizational capital among firms. One of
the mechanisms by which this occurs is an informal
network of venture capitalists that involves locating
and relocating managers. This is a unique feature of
venture-capital financing and constitutes a source of
value-added to the firms involved.
Venture capitalists receive money from investors,
and with it they buy shares of private companies
Big successes consti-
tute a small fraction of
the investments made
by venture capitalists.
A. Gledson Carvalho is a Ph.D. candidate in economics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
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Software giant Microsoft is one of venture capital's success stories.
with the potential for fast growth (they look for
firms that might eventually be traded publicly).
Usually, the investment is made in a way that gives
venture capitalists control over important decisions
such as replacing managers and liquidating the firm.
The ultimate goal of such investors is to make large
profits by taking the firm public through an initial
public offering. Nonetheless, more often than not,
their investment ends when the firm merges with a
larger corporation or is simply liquidated.
In either case, senior managers such as CEOs and
CFOs find themselves in vulnerable situations. Ei-
ther they are unemployed or have lost their au-
tonomy. Therefore, in most cases, they have limited
viability in the firm. They take the risk because they
receive stock options, which can be a big prize in the
event that the enterprise is successful.
Since firms funded with venture capital are very
risky, their success depends largely on having a man-
agement team able to lead the firm through an
ocean of turbulence and
uncertainties. This gives ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
thing for the investor would be to
liquidate the firm. Managers would
rather withhold such information and
keep the investor injecting money into
the firm. This problem makes project
governance extremely important.
One of the mechanisms developed
to deal with this problem is intense
monitoring combined with the stag-
ing of the investment. The project is
divided into stages, and the venture
capitalists invest only the capital nec-
essary to take the firm from one stage
to the next. They monitor the firm
closely, and at every round of financ-
ing they decide whether or not to
continue funding the firm.
Besides monitoring, venture capi-
talists frequently become involved in
the operation of the firm. They help
to develop business strategies, struc-
ture deals with suppliers and custom-
ers, act as the confidants of managers,
recruit key employees, replace manag-
ers when necessary, and so on. Such close involve-
ment provides venture capitalists with privileged
information about the quality of the managers of
the companies they fund.
Venture capitalists frequently syndicate invest-
ments so that an investment is split among a group
of investors (coinvestment). By syndicating, venture
capitalists improve the screening of an investment
(they feel more confident in funding a firm if they
can convince others to invest in it as well), achieve
better monitoring, guarantee sources of funds to a
specific project, and diversify their portfolio (instead
of wholly funding a few enterprises, they partially
finance many). Syndication is also important because
it creates strong bonds among venture capitalists and
allows reliable information to flow among them.
The characteristics of private equity give venture
capitalists the necessary conditions to transfer orga-
nizational capital from one firm to another. First,
they take advantage of the knowledge they acquire
the managers an infor-
mational advantage over
the providers of capital.
In some cases, this dif-
ference in information
can be harmful to the in-
vestors. Consider, for in-
stance, the situation in
which the chance of suc-
cess is small and the best
Since firms funded with venture
capital are very risl<y, success de-
pends largely on management's
ablity to lead through an ocean of
turbulence and uncertainties.
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Venture capitalists who fund high-
risk firms take suggestions and
recommend managers more
intensively.
about the management team of the companies they
fund, trying to keep the good managers by rehiring
them to manage other firms in their portfoHo when
they leave an investment. Second, because venture
capitalists develop skills in forming management
teams and timing the development of the companies
as organizations (for example, when is the right time
to hire a professional CEO or CFO). This consti-
tutes a source of value added, since a firm funded
with venture capital on average will have a manage-
ment team more suitable to its needs than it other-
wise would.
Knowing of a skillful manager looking for a
position can be useful if the venture capitalist's
portfolio includes a firm that needs such a manager.
If that is not the case, the best thing to do is to refer
the manager to someone in need of the ^^^^_
manager. In this case, the venture capital-
ist has a role in certifying the qualifica-
tions of a manager (something that would
be impossible in other types of financ-
ing). This creates an intense exchange of
information among venture capitalists, a
real network involved in locating and
relocating managers.
To study this network, I conducted a
survey answered by more than 150 ven-
ture capitalists all over the United States.
Some of the preliminary results confirm
the existence of the network: 77 percent
of the venture capitalists believe they op-
erate in informal networks involved in
locating and relocating managers. When
asked if it is common for them to suggest
likely managers to other venture capital-
ists, 56 percent agree; and 62 percent say
it is common for them to act on such
suggestions when hiring top managers.
As mentioned earlier, investment syn-
dication plays an important role in broad-
ening the network. In field interviews,
most of the venture capitalists affirm they
would suggest managers only to
coinvestors. This seems to be a conse-
quence of how much they value the in-
formation they obtain about managers.
Some of them even say
that they would suggest
managers to another ven-
ture capitalist o«/yif they
had a stake in the firm
that needs the manager.
They say they would
rather keep the good
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H managers working in
their own portfolio. This
attitude is not very widespread because few venture
capitalists make enough deals to be able to match
the availability of managers with openings.
Another preliminary finding suggests that net-
working is one of the ways venture capitalists use to
control risk in their investments. Venture capitalists
who fund high-risk firms take suggestions and rec-
ommend mangers to other venture capitalists more
intensively than do others.
So far, very litde is known about the charaaerisrics of
the network. Nonetheless, it seems to be an important
element in explaining how venture capital adds value and,
consequendy, in understandingwhy it has been successful
in such an extremely risky environment.
Investment and Ownership of Some Venture
Capital-Backed Firms
In the following listing you can see how several now large corporations benefited from a
series of infusions of venture capital until they were ready to go public. Notice that the
hugely successful Federal Express was not a particularly profitable investment for venture
capitalists, with the price per share at the initial public offering far less than that at the time
of their first round of investment.
Illinois Economic Forecast
By M.uvfy K. Wtslbrook, Jr.
Illinois personal income will remain strong
through 1998^ indicating the health of the
state's economy as a whole.
THE Illinois Econometric Model (IEM)
projects strong growth in real personal in-
come lor Illinois through 1998.' Personal in-
come will increase by 2.6 percent in 1996, 3.3
percent in 1997, and 2.5 percent in 1998. The 1998
growth will be slightly lower than was projected in
the second quarter of 1996 due to lower national
forecasts for the goods-producing sector of the
economy. Real personal income in the Illinois goods-
producing sector is expected to expand by 2.4 per-
cent in 1996, 1.4 percent in 1997, and 0.8 percent
in 1998. Much of the reduced growth in Illinois real
personal income in this sector is offset by robust
expansion in services-producing industries, which
are expected to increase by 4.3 percent in 1996, 3.8
percent in 1997, and 2.8 percent in 1998. Much of
the growth in this sector is driven by the services
subsector (including such services as consulting and
healthcare), which is expected to grow by 5.4 per-
cent in 1996, 5.2 percent in 1997, and 4.1 percent
in 1998. While strong growth is anticipated in the
services-producing subsector, the expected increases
in total real personal income indicates the health of
the state's economy as a whole.
Total nonfarm employment is expected to ex-
pand 2.4 percent in 1996, 0.7 percent in 1997, and
0.9 percent in 1998. This projection is similar to
those made last quarter. A significant portion of
statewide employment growth will be in services. In
particular, the services subsector can expect increases
of 4.2 percent in 1 996, 2.0 percent in 1 997, and 2.
1
percent in 1998, continuing to be the fastest grow-
ing subsector of the Illinois economy. Government
employment is expected to expand by a modest 1.5
percent in 1996 and to decrease by 2 percent in
1997 and 1 percent in 1998. The decrease is similar
to the projections for government employment in
the past few quarters.
Retail sales are anticipated to follow the same
trends as the other measures of the economy. Strong
growth is expected in retail sales in both 1997 and
1998, after relatively slow growth in 1996. Total
retail sales are expected to increase by 2.7 percent in
1997 and 2.8 percent in 1998, significantly more
than the 0.8 percent growth expected in 1996. The
strength in total retail sales can be attributed to the
robust projected expansion in the sales of nondu-
rable goods (see table, pg. 16), expected to grow 0.8
percent in 1996 followed by 3.4 percent in 1997
and 2.5 percent in 1998. The slower rate of expan-
sion for 1998 will follow the expected moderation
ofgrowth in retail sales nationwide. DRl/McGraw-
Hill (a national econometric forecasting service)
suggests that increased consumer spending will come
at the expense of the continued low national
savings rate.
'Note [hat tea] personal income, [otal retail sales, and total gros5 state product are
tepofted in terms of 1992 dollat^ following the convention of the economic data used
to generate [he forecasts.
Harvey B. Westbrook, Jr.
Harvey B. Westbrook, Jr., is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Economics and a research assistant
in the Commerce Research Office, at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
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Total gross state product is expected to grow by
1.1 percent in 1996, 4.3 percent in 1997, and 1.9
percent in 1998. Growth in the goods-producing
sector of the economy will be modest; however,
nondurable manufacturing is expected to increase
by fairly robust amounts—at a projected 2.5 per-
cent in 1 997 and 1 .9 percent in 1 998; but since this
is a relatively small sector of the state economy, its
impact on total gross state product will be moderate.
Much of the expansion of gross state product is the
result of growth in the services-producing sector,
which is expected to expand 4.6 percent in 1996
followed by 3.8 percent in 1997 and 3.2 percent in
1998. As was the case with other economic mea-
sures, the services subsector will experience the high-
est increase in gross state product, expanding by 6.0
percent in 1996, 5.7 percent in 1997, and 5 percent
in 1998. The strong growth in the subsector will be
instrumental in the growth in total gross state product.
Even though lEM
projections for this quar-
ter are not as optimistic
as previous projections
have been, the Illinois
economy will experience
healthy growth in per-
sonal income and gross
state product. Expansion
ofstatewide employment
is projected to be more
modest than was previ-
ously expected, but
growth in employment in
Illinois should keep pace
with national trends.
Growth Rate in Illinois Retail Sales
strong growth is expected in retail sales in both
1997 and 1998, after relatively low growth in 1996.
To
Illinois Forecast Statistics
Employment (thousands)
Strong growth
is expected in
retail sales in
both 1997and
1998.
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total Nonfarm Employment
7996 Illinois Statistical Abstract
Available in November
How MAm' BABIES ARE BORN TO ILLINOISwomen under 17 years old? How many
years, on average, do convicted murderers
spend in prison in Illinois? Have divorces and an-
nulments increased or decreased in the state during
the last five years?*
The answers to these questions and thousands of
others can be found in the 1996 Illinois Statistical
Abstract, to be released in November by the Bureau
of Economic and Business Research.
"This immense volume is also immensely fasci-
nating—especially for those who enjoy numbers,
charts and tables along with a wide assortment of
miscellaneous information," said Anna Merritt, as-
sociate director of the Institute of Goverment and
Public Affairs, in a 1995 book review.
The Illinois Statistical Abstract is a convenient,
informative resource book used in libraries, busi-
nesses, schools, government offices, and homes. The
1 996 edition has almost 900 pages of tables, graphs,
and maps with data on the state, its cities, and all
102 counties.
Compiled from more than 50 different sources,
the book includes 28 chapters exploring topics as
varied as agriculture, business activity, energy use,
crime, education, housing, population, recreation,
and retail sales.
fascinating/^
Recently, managing
editor Carole Amidon in-
dicated, "The 1996 Ab-
.sfrarf includes new tables
on tax rates in Illinois
counties and a break-
down of tax and non-tax
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^_
payments to state and lo-
cal governments by tax type."
The Abstract is available on diskettes or CD-
ROM in spreadsheet files for use on either PC or
Macintosh computers. The computer package fa-
cilitates analysis by eliminating data entry costs and
making the data instantly available. This format
may be used to expand the level of analysis and
combine categories for special research needs.
A softbound copy of the 1996 Illinois Statis-
ticalAbstract is $50. A computer package, which
contains both the book and diskettes, is $90.
The CD-Rom package, new this year, is $100.
The form below may be used to order copies.
'In 1994, 10,230 babies were born to Illinois
women under 17 years old. Convicted murderers
released from Illinois prisons in 1995 spent an aver-
age of 12.5 years in jail. Divorces and annulments
have declined in Illinois, from 45,977 in 1990 to
41,856 in 1995.
'TAiis immense volume
is aiso immensely
1996 Illinois Statistical Abstract - Order Form
Books @ $50.00 each
Computer Packages @ $90.00 per pkg.
(book and disks)
" For Disk Packages, please circle: ^^^^
PC Excel PC Lotus Macintosh Excel
CD-ROM Packages*® $100.00 per pkg.
(book and CD-ROM)
Payment enclosed. (Shipping and handling charges
are waived for those enclosing payment with order.)
Libraries, schools, and bookstores, please attach your P.O.
Prepayment required. Make checks payable to the Bureau of
Economic and Business Research.
For more information call Maria Osterbur at (217) 333-2331.
Na
Company
Address
City/State/Zip
_
Phone
Fax or send your order to:
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Bureau of Economic & Business Research
428 Commerce West, 1206 South Sixth Street
Champaign, Illinois 61820
Fax: (217)333-7410
Illinois State Revenue Update
By J. Fred Civriz and Rtiberl W. Resek
J. Fred Giertz
Revenue growth in fiscal 1997 promises to
continue, but at a slower pace than last year.
STATE REVENUES IN ILLINOIS REGISTERED A
Strong performance in fiscal 1996 (ending
June 30, 1996). State-source general ftind
revenues were up 5 percent over fiscal 1995 and
overall general fund revenues increased by 5-5 per-
cent for the year. The ending general funds balance
of S426 million was the highest in many years.
Furthermore, the state made substantial headway in
reducing its backlog of unpaid bills, especially to
Medicaid providers.
Revenue growth in fiscal 1997 promises to con-
tinue, but at a slower pace than last year. After the
first two months of the new fiscal year, state rev-
enues were nearly on target. Among the major taxes,
sales tax receipts fell short of expectations while the
public utility tax receipts were stronger than ex-
pected. The two gambling-related revenue sources
(the lottery and riverboat casino gambling taxes and
fees) were weaker than expected. Although this may
be a transitory phenomenon, the opening of a new
riverboat casino in the Chicago metropolitan area in
Hammond, Indiana, may have reduced the Illinois
riverboat take.
For fiscal 1997, the Institute ofGovernment and
Public Affairs (IGPA) forecasts total revenue growth
of 3.1 percent with the state executive branch's
Bureau of the Budget (BOB) expecting 2.6 percent
growth. The legislature's Illinois Economic and Fis-
cal Commission (lEFC) predicts a very pessimistic 1
percent growth rate. Even with the lower growth
rate, the state should not experience any unusual
Table 1. FY1996 Illinois State Revenue
Forecasts for FY7998
are problematic be-
cause of the uncer-
tainty ofmany revenue
sources, especially
those associated with
federalgovernment aid.
fiscal difficulties this year. The substantial reduction
of the backlog of unpaid bills has lessened demands
on the state budgetary resources.
Forecasts for the next fiscal vear (1 998) are prob-
lematic because of the uncertaintv* of many revenue
sources, especially those associated with federal gov-
ernment aid. The IGPA forecast for the growth of
basic state source revenues is 3.5 percent. However,
the fiscal 1 998 state budget will be more constrained
than this year because there will no longer be the
cushion of fiinds freed up in 1997 by the elimina-
tion of the Medicaid backlog.
Table 2. Comparison of Forecasts of State Revenue
(millions of current dollars)
FY96 FY97 FY98
y—
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From the Dean
ONCE AGAIN THE COLLEGE
of Commerce and Busi-
ness Administration,
University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign is pleased to offer this
special Outlook issue to readers of the
Illinois Business Review. As empha-
sized by Chancellor Aiken's Partner-
ship Illinois initiative, it is the duty
and pleasure of the university to serve
the citizens of the state by disseminat-
ing knowledge and research results to
the people of the state. This publica-
tion, under the direction of editor
Richard J. Arnould, represents one of these efforts.
The forecast for both the state and nation for
1997 is for continuing moderate growth. This view
is apparent in the evaluations by University faculty
and staff of the prospects for employment, personal
income, retail sales, the state fiscal situation, and the
economies of selected regions of the state. Several
members of the faculty of the College of Agricul-
tural, Consumer, and Environmental Studies have
prepared an overview of agricultural developments
and issues that will be important to the state in the
future. A special feature of this year's Outlook is the
series of articles that editor, Dick Arnould solicited
from outside academe. The director
of the International Division of the
state Department of Development
and Communit}' Affairs gives the
outlook for Illinois exports.
Among other real world evaluators
are investment banker, Willard
Bunn III who offers his view of the
economy from La Salle Street, two
commercial bankers who discuss
credit and bankruptcy, and a real
estate developer and financier who
covers the status and future of alter-
Howard Thomas native finance.
We are grateful to all of those who contributed
their time and expertise to making this Outlook
issue the best yet, particularly those from outside the
academic community. Your comments and sugges-
tions are always welcome. Please address them to
Janet Fitch, associate editor, Illinois Business Review,
428 Commerce West, 1206 South Sixth Street,
Champaign, IL 61820.
Howard Thomas, Dean and
James F. Towey Professor of Strategic Management
College ofCommerce and Business Administration,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
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7997 Illinois Economic Outlook
By Anil Bera and Harvey B. Weslbrook, Jr.
Favorable projections combined with low
inflation and low unemployment ensure a
postive outlook for the state for 1997.
Anil Bera
EVEN THOUGH GROWTH IN THE NATIONAL ECON-
omy is not expected to be as high as it
has been in the recent past, the Illinois
economy will expand steadily as growth in real per-
sonal income remains strong. The service sector is
expected to experience particularly robust growth in
personal income as the services-producing industries
continue their long-term expansion. The Illinois
Econometric Model (lEM) projects promising times
for Illinois even as the growth of the national
economy moderates. The favorable projections of
the IBM, combined with the current low levels of
inflation and unemployment ensure a positive out-
look for the Illinois economy for the next year, and
beyond. Economists are concerned about inflation-
ary pressure caused by the economic growth experi-
enced in the national economy in the recent years.
High employment and stable prices have made
Illinois's economic picture quite good; however, the
concern of economists is rooted in the effects of
possible increases in wages. Increased wages would
put inflationary pressure on an economy made par-
ticularly sensitive to price increases by very low
unemployment. These concerns will continue to be
on the minds of economists and government offi-
cials; however, evidence of impending inflation has
been scarce. A useful measure of the general eco-
nomic health ofan economy is the "misery index," a
measure popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
which is calculated as the sum of the inflation rate
Misery Indexes for the U.S. and Illinois
The Illinois "Misery Index" Is even slightly lower than
the national level.
2U
with a national unemployment rate of 5.5 percent.
Both the national and state inflation rates currently
stand at about 3.0 percent. While the misery index is
a very rough measure of economic prosperity, it is
clear that the national economy is very healthy and
that Illinois should enjoy robust economic health.
Employment
Economic forecasters at the WEFA group expect
national employment growth to be modest in the
next year. Sluggish growth in the service sector na-
tionally is expected to reduce the expansion of na-
tional employment. Much of the decrease in growth
is rooted to the decelerated growth of real Gross
Domestic Product (GDP). The lEM projects a simi-
lar moderation in the Illinois economy. The Illinois
services-producing sector is expected to expand by
less than 1.0 percent in 1997 and 1998, followed by
a moderate 1.2 percent growth in 1999. Growth in
the services sub-sector of the economy—which in-
cludes services related to business, health, legal, en-
gineering, and management— is expected to be
slightly higher than 2.0 percent through 1999.
Recent robust growth
in Illinois employment
has come from strong
foreign demand for
manufactured goods
and a broad economic
base.
The Illinois economy is looking fairly strong.
Personal Income
Growth in real total personal income in the
Illinois economy is projected to moderate from 3.6
percent in 1997 and 2.9 percent in 1998 (see the
chart below). The expected expansion in Illinois
real personal income is partially the result of the
strength ot the financial sector as well as the expan-
sion of the services sub-sector. Finance, insurance,
and real estate industries are expected to grow at 3.4
percent in 1997 and 3.7 percent in 1998 followed
by a very large expansion of 4.3 percent in 1999.
Increased personal income in this sector could sug-
gest significant expansion in the financial sector in
the next few years.
Even though the financial sector experienced
relatively large expansion in personal income, the
major source ot income growth for the state will
continue to be the services sub-sector. The whole
services-producing sector ot the economy will expe-
rience robust expansion through 1999.
Growth in the services sub-sector will drive the
expansion in employment for the state. The other
major sectors of the state economy are expected to
experience relatively low levels of employment
growth. With the low unemployment, low employ-
ment growth could indicate a low risk ot inflation.
According to the WEFA group, much ot the
recent robust growth in employment in Illinois has
been the result of two factors, strong foreign de-
mand for manufactured goods and the broad base of
the economy. Foreign demand for manufactured
goods is expected to slow in the future, and de-
creased foreign demand combined with a stronger
dollar overseas is expected to moderate increases in
Illinois manufacturing employment.
Growth in Illinois Personal Income
The major source of income growth for the stale will
continue to be the services sub-sector.
Consumer Spending
Given the sluggish growth in projcLtcd retail
sales in Illinois, it is unclear that the expansion in
personal income will translate directly into higher
consumption expenditures. Low growth in Illinois
retail sales mirror the expected trends in the national
economy. Retail sales are expected to increase by .3.0
percent in 1997, 2.8 percent in 1998, and 2.1 per-
cent in 1999. Retail sales of durable goods are pro-
jected to expand 2. 1 percent in 1 997 and 3. 1 percent
in 1998. Retail sales of nondurable goods will grow
3.6 percent in 1997. Nondurable goods will be the
source of much of the growth in retail sales in the
state economy. National trends in personal income
and savings indicate that the savings rate could in-
crease in the near future. The WEFA group project
that reductions in consumer spending should be
important sources of the anticipated slowdown in
the national economy. lEM projections indicate a
similar pattern lor Illinois. However, the modera-
tion ot the Illinois economy is expected to be milder
than that of the national economy.
Gross State Product
Illinois gross state product is expected to expand
substantially during 1997. The lEM projects a 4.8
percent expansion in 1997. The sub-sector with the
highest growth in 1997 will be the services sub-
sector, which is anticipated to grow 5.9 percent in
1997, 5.3 percent in 1998, and 4.8 percent in 1999.
The shift of the Illinois economy toward the services-
producing industries is expected to continue. This
fundamental change in the economy will help offset
the effects of expected decreases in foreign demand
Strong expansions ofgross state
product in the financial sector and
in wholesale trade will boost
production in the state economy.
Perhaps surprisingly, the government sector is
expected to experience only very moderate growth,
with expansion of 2.7 percent in 1997 followed by a
drop to about 2.0 percent in 1998 and 1999. The
IEM has been projecting modest growth in the
government sector for the past three quarters, and it
appears that the trend will continue through 1999.
Conclusion
We have been experiencing modest to high growth
for almost six years at both the state and national
levels. One could ask how long the expansion will
last. A reasonable conjecture would be that since
there has been no boom in recent years, chances for
a bust any time soon are very slim. Also with the
economy now more dependent on the services sec-
tor rather than manufacturing, many of the uncer-
tainties associated with dependence on foreign
demand have been reduced, and the economy is
more stable.
The Illinois economy is expected to outperform
the national economy through 1999. Moderation in
national employment growth will have modest ef-
fects on employment in the state. In the past, foreign
demand for manufactured goods was a primary source
of growth in the Illinois economy, but this is ex-
pected to change as a stronger dollar flattens over-
seas demand for U.S. goods. However, the shift to a
services-oriented economy will insulate the Illinois
gross state product and employment and enable the
state economy to outperform the national economy.
The lEM projects a slight moderation in the overall
growth of the Illinois economy. However, in con-
text of the decrease in the growth of the national
economy, the Illinois economy is expected to re-
main one of the strongest in the country.
for manufactured products. Strong expansions of
gross state product in the financial sector and in
wholesale trade will boost production in the state
economy. Wholesale trade is expected to grow by
5.0 percent in 1997, 4.4 percent in 1998, and 4.3
percent in 1999. The financial sector will expand
2.6 percent in 1997, 2.5 percent in 1998, and 2.8
percent in 1 999. Robust growth in these sectors will
drive the increase in the Illinois gross state product
for the next two years.
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Regional Forecasts for Illinois
By Robert W. Resek and Clecio Dias
General economic conditions^ regional
dynamics^ and local events together
determine a regional economy. We present
capsule forecasts for Chicago, Rockford,
Bloomington-Normal, and Decatur.
THE United States and the state of
Illinois continue to enjoy good economic
growth recognized throughout this special
issue of the Illinois Business Review. In this article, we
present specific forecasts for selected urban regions
of the state. The cities discussed vary greatly in the
makeup of their economies and the growth they
have experienced in the last half decade. Not surpris-
ingly, we have also found significant differences in
the nature and extent ofgrowth in the various areas.
Regional Econometric
Forecasting
The wide use of econometric forecasts to under-
stand the national and world economic situations,
regions, and specific industries testifies to their value.
However, users should understand that such tore-
casts need to be interpreted in light ol an under-
standing of the economy under study. The value of
these forecasts increases greatly when considered in
combination with other information.
Forecasting is an inexact science since unexpected
shocks or changes in directions, such as a war or oil
embargo can radically affect an economy. A region
of a state can be affected by a strike, work stoppage,
or a plant opening unforeseen by econometric mod-
eling. A specific strike or new plant opening will not
have a material impact on the national economy. In
fact, there will be always be some strikes and some
new plant openings each year, and the model can
include the effects of these changes. For any given
region, however, such changes can create a greater
range of possible outcomes.
The ability of a model to forecast well is severely
limited by the data available and the nature of the
economy. A national economy is self-contained with
limited imports and exports that are carefully mea-
sured. Therefore, with this model a forecaster im-
proves estimates by using the relations between total
production and total use of the goods produced. In
contrast, a regional model cannot use these relations
since the economy is open, with many goods mov-
ing from one region of the state to another and
beyond and no measurements of those exports and
imports.
Economic Forces Affecting a
Region
Forecasting for any region must take into ac-
count that at least three types of specific forces shape
the future: general economic conditions, regional
dynamics, and specific regional events.
Robert W. Resek is a professor of economics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and a
member of the University's Institute of Government and Public Affairs. Clecio Dias is a research associate
with the Institute of Government and Public Affairs.
Robert W. Resek
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General Economic
Conditions
Naturally, the general economic
changes affecting the nation as a
whole will have an impact on
all of the regions making up
the nation. Therefore, tore-
casters apply statistics
about national directions
of an industry to each re-
gion. -Since each region
has a specific and unique
combination of indus-
tries, the different indus-
trial structure of the
region plays a critical role
in the process of making a
regional forecast.
For example, in the last de-
cade, manufacturing employment
has fallen in the nation because work-
ers and firms are much more efficient
in producing products. We anticipate
that the national trend to reduced em-
Events such as strikes^
work stoppages, or the
introduction of a new
plant strongly affect a
region 's economy.
ployment
manufacturing
will continue and
will affect all regions.
Moreover, regions with
a large concentration of
manufacturing will be
much more affected than
those that have less. If all
the other factors are the
same {and they rarely
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ are), we will forecast
lower growth rates in ar-
eas that have heavy concentrations ofmanufacturing
relative to other industries.
Regional Dynamics
Each region has its own specific energy and char-
acter. A good deal of that character is seen in the
recent history of the region. Past history provides a
great deal of insight into the future. In particular,
areas that have had relatively good employment
growth in the past are more likely to have high
employment growth in the future than other areas.
Specific Regional Events
As we have noted, the specific events, such as
strikes, work stoppages, or the introduction of a new
manufacturing plant or service industry, in a given
region strongly affect its economy. While individu-
als close to the community may be able to foresee
some of these events, out-
side forecasters usually
cannot; and so regional
forecasts are more vulner-
able to inaccuracies
caused by unexpected
events. However, when
combined with the in-
sights from people who
know the local economy,
they should provide sig-
nificant insight into the
future.
In this Outlook issue,
we offer our predictions
for the economies of four
specific regions: Chicago,
Rockford, Bloomington,
and Decatur, concentrat-
ing on employment as a
reliable indicator of the
economies of each area. Over
the forthcoming year, we plan
to make forecasts for the other
metropolitan statistical areas in
the state, as well as for specific
rural regions.
Chicago
The Chicago metropolitan area is the state's domi-
nant economic force and provides 70 percent of
state employment. For this analysis we define Chi-
cago as the U. S.—government defined Primary Met-
ropolitan Statistical Area that includes nine counties
(Cook, DeKalb, DuPage, Grundy, Kane, Kendall,
Lake, McHenry, and Will) stretching from the Wis-
consin border to Indiana (see the map above).
Since Chicago encompasses such a large eco-
nomic area, we anticipate that it will be less affected
by events in single industries than is likely for the
state's smaller areas. Nevertheless, there are two
specific industries of noticeably greater importance
In Chicago, the service
industry, including
hotels, restaurants,
and business services
is expected to grow the
most of all industries.
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Chicago Area' Employment (thousands)
The financial services industry is of greater importance
for Chicago employment than for the remainder of the
state.
Total Nonfarm
Employment Breakdown by Industry for Selected Illinois
Regions (Thousands)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Chicago'
last four years—starting at 14,000 employees, drop-
ping to 1 1,400, and now returning to 13,000. De-
spite the comeback ot employment, the community
has suffered a severe loss of jobs that is not likely to
be recovered. We forecast a small decline in manu-
facturing jobs in the coming year. In contrast, the
public utility employment of the metropolitan area
has grown at an average annual rate of just under 4
percent.
Wholesale and retail trade represents a relatively
smaller portion of area employment than it does in
other areas of the state and has grown at relative slow
rates. Overall, we anticipate that Decatur employ-
ment will grow at a rate considerably slower than
other areas of the state. Nevertheless, employment
will continue modest increases for the next year.
Conclusion
The four areas discussed here represent diverse
economic regions of the state and show how the
economic diversity of Illinois makes up a whole that
is a microcosm ofthe entire nation. Each area should
continue to grow in the year to come, and the
growth should cut across all industries. Our projec-
tions differ from expectations about the U. S.
economy since national forecasters see shrinkage in
manufacturing—a phenomenon that we do antici-
pate in three of the communities examined here.
A positive note in the Decatur economy is the growth of
employment in the public utility sector.
Decatur Area' Employment (thousands)
The Decatur metropolitan area has a high level of
employment in public utilities.
Transportation &
Total Nonfarm Public Utilities'
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Illinois Fiscal Outlook
By |. Fred Cierlz
After several years when spending
significantly exceeded revenues, the state's
financial status is fairly healthy. The next few
years will offer new challenges in funding
education and welfare services.
STATE FINANCES IN ILLINOIS REMAIN STRONG
midway through fiscal 1997. Illinois contin-
ues a remarkable recovery from the early
years of the 1990s when the state budget seemed to
be awash in red ink. One indication of this is the
strong growth in state revenues over the last five
years. (See chart at right.) Real (inflation-adjusted)
revenues were virtually constant from fiscal 1985
until the end of the recession in fiscal 1991. Since
that time, an expanding economy has generated
consistent real increases in state revenues with no
major increases in state tax rates. Including the ef-
fects of inflation, total state revenues have grown at a
6.5 percent rate over the last five years. Adjusted for
inflation, growth has been a healthy 3.3 percent.
(For an overview of the state revenue mix, see the
chart on page 15.)
This favorable revenue picture is a consequence
of the state s strong economy. The national reces-
sion in 1990 was much milder in Illinois than in
many other states, and the state grew more rapidly
than the nation as a whole during the recovery
period. After more than a decade with state unem-
ployment rates above the national average, Illinois
unemployment has been consistently below that of
the nation for the last several years.
Another measure of the state's fiscal health is the
deficits and surpluses that we have experienced in
recent years. (See the chart, page 15.) Early in the
1 990s the state endured several years when spending
significantly exceeded revenues. The basic surplus/
State Revenues, 1985-J995
state revenues have grown strongly in the past five
years.
$ Billions
The state's current position is similar to that of
many other states and even the federal government.
Most states have done well fiscally in recent years.
For example, all states are expected to report a
combined surplus of $48 billion for the year ending
December 31, 1996, up by one-third over the pre-
ceding two years. Similarly, the federal government
is expected to register its lowest deficit in over 1
5
years because of the strong economy.
The strong fiscal position of the state, along with
the control of both houses of the General Assembly
and the governor's office by Republicans, resulted in
a relatively uneventful legislative session in 1996.
There were substantial increases in appropriations
for education, but no fundamental reform of the
state's system ot educational finance. The backlog of
Medicaid bills, amounting to well over a billion
dollars in the early part of the decade, was finally
reduced to a normal level. The elimination of the
need to use current revenues to fund old bills in
fiscal 1997 actually freed up additional, one-time
funds for appropriations this fiscal year.
One-third of the way into the fiscal 1997, the
state is close to meeting its targeted revenue levels.
(See the table, page 17) However, unlike the last few
years, revenues are not running ahead of projections.
During the current expansion, the state experienced
a series of welcome surprises when actual revenues
exceeded levels forecast, often by $100 million or
more. While the Illinois economy is still expanding,
the rate of growth seems to be slowing, making
another unanticipated revenue surge is unlikely for
fiscal 1997.
Future Prospects
This leads to the conclusion that the state's fiscal
position is likely to be somewhat tighter in future
years beginning in fiscal 1998 (beginning July 1,
1997). Even though most observers do not see an
economic downturn in the next 18 months, it is
unlikely that the Illinois economy and the tax rev-
enues will continue the unusually high rates ofgrowth
of the last several years. Furthermore, there will be
no repeat of the one-time windfall in fiscal 1997.
On a more positive note, Medicaid costs (and
medical care costs in general) seem to be increasing
at a rate near that of the general rate of inflation as
opposed to the double-digit rates experienced in the
late 1 980s and early 1 990s. While the recent changes
in the federal welfare system promise to have major
effects in the long run, these will not be felt by the
state for at least a year or more. The federal changes
limiting welfare eligibility while giving states consid-
erably more flexibility in structuring welfare pro-
grams (both cash benefits and medical aid) will
The expanding economy^ and in-
creased discipline in expenditures
in the early 1990s allowed the state
to control deficits and, eventually,
reach a surplus without major tax
increases.
Corporate Income Tax
5.4»/„
Public Utility
4.4»a
provide the state with as
much or more federal aid
for the first year or two
as would the old pro-
gram. In the longer run,
however, the rate of
growth of federal aid will
be considerably slowed.
This will require the state
either to reduce benefits
to welfare recipients or
to raise additional state-
level revenues to offset
the federal changes. The
increased flexibility from
relaxed federal mandates
may make this task more
manageable, but the state
will still be faced with sig-
nificant challenges in the
welfare area over the next
five to ten years.
Even though the
short-run fiscal picture is
bright, Illinois still faces
a number of long-term
problems. While the state
has recovered more or less
fully from the problems
of the early 1990s, it is
not prepared to meet the
problems of a future re-
cession without some
major and painful adjust-
ments. Furthermore, Il-
linois still faces an
underlying structural
deficit. Projections of the costs to maintain current
levels of state programs in the face of changing
economic and demographic factors (such as an aging
population and increased numbers of prison in-
mates) suggest that costs will grow at a faster rate
State Revenues Sources, FY 7996
The sources of Illinois revenues are quite mixed.
ndividual Income Tax
32.0",.
Alternative Deficit Measures
A more accurate deficit measure would include the
basic surplus/deficit minus the unpaid bills.
$ Millions
The James R. Thompson Center in Chicago.
tlian projected revenues
under our current (;ix sys-
tem. This means that the
state will eventually face
the choice of either re-
ducing services or in-
creasing tax rates.
Current Issues
Property tax caps
(more formally Property
Tax Exemption Limita-
tions) continue to be an
important issue in Illi-
nois. After several years
of debate, the Illinois
General Assembly in
1996 approved legisla-
tion allowing downstate
counties to implement
property tax caps. Tax
caps were applied by the
state to the Collar Coun-
ties (DuPage, Kane,
Lake, McHenry, and
Will) around Chicago in
1991. They were extended to Cook County in 1 995.
The caps were initially a response to rapidly rising
assessed values and, thus, property tax extensions in
the Collar Counties and suburban Cook County.
Local jurisdictions found that they were able to
increase revenues substantially without raising tax
rates because of the increased base.
The caps generally limit property tax increases
for a jurisdiction to the lesser of 5 percent or the rate
of inflation. The caps do not apply to home-rule
jurisdictions
—
generally
municipalities over ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
25,000 population and
to the Cook County gov-
ernment. They also do
not apply to newly an-
nexed areas or to new
construction or for levies
to pay off previously is-
sued bonds. They can be
exceeded by voter ap-
proval of a referendum.
Proponents view
property tax caps as a ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
low-cost way of restrain-
ing the growth of local jurisdictions that somehow
has not been accomplished by the normal process of
electing representatives (such as school and county
board members) who make tax and expenditure
decisions. Opponents see tax caps as a "blunt instru-
ment" that reduces the flexibility of local govern-
ments to meet changing needs. Both sides view caps
as a makeshift remedy for dealing with a more
fundamental problem in Illinois of over reliance on
the property tax, especially for the financing of
schools. Harly studies have found that the tax cap
legislation enacted in 1991 for the Collar Counties
has had a significant restraining effect on many local
districts, particularly school districts.
The new legislation passed in 1 996 differs from
the previous caps in that they are allowed, but not
mandated by the state for downstate counties. To
implement property tax caps, a county board in a
downstate county must vote to have a binding refer-
endum on the issue. If approved by the voters, the
caps would become effective on January 1 of the
following year. Caps would only apply to multi-
county jurisdictions if all the counties containing
the jurisdiction vote on them, and if the caps are
approved by voters in counties containing a major-
ity of the jurisdiction's assessed value.
In the November 5, 1996 general election, prop-
erty tax extension limitation referenda passed in 18
of the 19 Illinois counties where the issue appeared
on the ballot. The measure was approved in Boone,
Champaign, Christian, Franklin, Jackson, Kankakee,
Lee, Logan, Macoupin, Menard, Monroe, Morgan,
Randolph, Schuyler, Sangamon, Union, Williamson,
and Winnebago Counties. These caps will become
effective in 1997, which means that they will apply
to the 1997 levies for taxes payable in 1998. Massac
County voters were the only ones in the state to
reject caps. Several other counties are expected to
vote on the issue in 1997.
A more fundamental issue facing the state is
educationalfinance reform. There appears to be gen-
eral agreement that the
The tax cap legislation
enacted in 1991 for the
Collar Counties has
significantly restrained
many Illinois school
districts.
current system of educa-
tional finance, which re-
lies heavily on the local
property tax, needs to be
modified. Critics suggest
that the current system
results in inappropriate
disparities in expendi-
tures among rich and
poor districts, inadequate
levels of spending in
many districts, and over-
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
reliance on the property
tax as a source of financ-
ing. While there is consensus about the failings of
the current system, there is no general agreement
about what precise reforms will be needed to ad-
dress these problems.
lb* Illinois Business Review Winter 1996
One-third of the way into fiscal
1997, the state is close to meeting
its targeted revenue levels.
Illinois State Revenue Performance,
FY1997
(July 1, 1996-October31, 1996, millions of current dollars)
Receipts
In the spring of 1996, the Governor's Commis-
sion on Education Funding, chaired by Stanley O.
Ikenberry, president emeritus of the University ot
lUinois, recommended major changes in the method
of financing elementary and secondary education in
the state of Ilhnois. The report called for a major
increase in state funding for education, which would
be used to increase overall spending for education
while reducing the current heavy reliance on the
local property tax as a funding source. Further rec-
ommended was the establishment of a basic level of
per pupil spending (estimated at $4,225 for 1995—
1996) for all districts in the state. It is estimated that
this would require $500 million in additional state
aid. This proposal would guarantee a minimum
level of per pupil spending, while reducing the dis-
parities among school districts in the state.
In addition, the plan called lor a reduction of
local property taxes used for elementary and second-
ary education by $1.5 billion or 25 percent, which
would be replaced by increased state aid. The Com-
mission suggested that the estimated $2 billion in
additional state revenue come, at least in part, from
an increase in the state's income tax. A 1 percentage
point increase in the
state's current 3 percent ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
current system, with its
heavy reliance on the lo-
cal property tax, needs to
be changed. Yet, it has
proven impossible to de-
vise a politically accept-
able plan to replace the
current system. In par-
ticular, the size of the
state-level tax increase
necessary to accomplish
the dual objective of in-
creased funding and
property tax relief is a
major hurdle. (See chart
next page) Note that
property taxes currently
going to fund schools ex-
ceed both the individual
income tax and the state
sales tax, and they dwarf the corporate income tax
and state gambling revenues.
There are also extremely divisive issues concern-
ing the distribution of increased state tax revenues.
Local Property Tax and State Revenue
Sources, FY1996
Property taxes now going to fund schools exceed the
individual income tax and state sales tax and dwarf the
corporate income tax and gambling revenues.
•Lottery and Riverboal Gambling
••Calendar Year 1995
A Final Evaluation
1 )i.s[ii(c the problems discussed here, the Illinois
fiscal system, while imperfect, is basically sound.
Nevertheless, Illinois' state tax system gets little re-
spect. Recently, two studies—one by the conserva-
tive Cato Institute and the other by the liberal
Citizens for Tax Justice—have blasted the Illinois
revenue system.
The Cato study gave Governor Edgar a grade of
D in their "Fiscal Policy Report Card." Only four
governors received a lower grade. Edgar was criti-
cized for allowing the 1989 income tax increase
(from 2.5 percent to 3.0 percent for the state's
individual income tax) to
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
become permanent. He
was also taken to task for
suggesting that the state's
voters should be allowed
to consider the educa-
tional finance plan sug-
gested by the Ikenberry
Commission. Mean-
while, the Citizens for
Tax Justice put the Illi-
nois state and local tax
system in the "Terrible
10" category for its lack
of progressivity and its
relatively heavy burden
on the poor. Their find-
ings were based on the
state's heavy reliance on
property taxes and a flat
rate income tax.
Despite these criti-
cisms, Illinois has a mod-
erate tax climate with
many good features. Illi-
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ nois' combined state and
local tax burden in per
capita terms in 1993 was slightly above the national
average, but about 5 percent below the average for
the other (10) large industrial states. When com-
pared with state income (that is, when considering
taxes as a percentage of state personal income),
Illinois taxes were below the national average and
substantially below the industrial states' average. In
addition, the percentage of lUinois's personal in-
come going to state and local taxes in 1993 was
considerably lower than ten years ago. Illinois clearly
is not a high tax state. During this same period,
Illinois' economy performed very well. The state
now is the ninth highest in terms of per capita
income and its income growth has exceeded the
national average—no small accomplishment for a
high income, highly industrialized state with slow
population growth.
In addition to its moderate tax rates, the Illinois
fiscal system has a number of other desirable at-
tributes: (1) a low, flat rate income tax for both
individuals and corporations that is simple, efi"i-
cient, and productive; (2) a high level of conformity
with federal tax rules which reduces compliance
costs; and (3) a relatively good mix among the major
tax sources (the income, sales and property taxes),
despite a somewhat heavy reliance on local property
taxes.
As noted, the state has managed to overcome the
fiscal problems created by the 1990 recession and
the large increases in the cost of medical care for the
poor without a general tax increase. Stability of this
sort is an important virtue of the state's fiscal system.
The state has also moved away from the "let's make
a deal" era of providing fiscal concessions to new
business to a more evenhanded policy for attractii^
and retaining companies.
If Illinois is doing so many things right, what is
the basis of the low evaluations? The Cato study
gives a high rating to governors of states in which
taxes have been cut, not to states that have main-
tained low rates. They grade on improvement (low-
ered taxes), not achievement (low taxes).
The Citizens for Tax Justice concern is almost
exclusively with issues of equity or fairness (relating
to the state's flat-rate income tax), not with effi-
ciency or competitiveness. They seem not to realize
that there are limits to the progressivity that can be
achieved in state and local taxes without affecting a
state's competitive position. The efficiency gains
from a flat rat tax are likely to outweigh the distribu-
tive drawbacks.
In summary, while Illinois faces a number of
challenges in the upcoming years, the state has a
basically sound revenue system—one that can serve
as the foundation for various reforms that can make
it even better in the future.
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Illinois Export Outlook for 1997
By Margaret Maclean
The staters position as a leading supplier of
the technology required to build the world's
emerging economies should provide a solid
base for future expansion in exports.
ILLINOIS CONTINUES TO OUTPACE THE NATION AS A
whole in export growth. In 1995, lUinois exports
increased to $32.6 bilHon, a 23.6 percent increase
over the previous year, and well ahead of the na-
tionaJ growth rate of 1 3.8 percent. This trend should
continue for a variety of reasons, most important
being the ability of Illinois to supply the world's
most active and growing economies with core mate-
rials—industrial and capital goods that are essential
to building the infrastructure of the world's devel-
oping nations.
The type of products and services that Illinois is
sending abroad provides the key to the state's future
export growth. More than 70 percent of lUinois's
exports are in high-technology sectors such as elec-
tronics, computers, and transportation equipment.
More than 70 percent of
lllinois^s exports are in
high-technology sectors
such as electronics,
computers, and trans-
portation equipment.
Illinois's export growth in 1995 in electronics (41.7
percent) and industrial equipment (15 percent)
remained strong and is expected to continue to
increase throughout 1996. In fact, Illinois's growth
in the export of electronics and other high-tech
products nearly doubled the national average in
1995. As the global market continues to modernize,
the competitive advantage of Illinois in these and
other high-tech industries will continue to be tapped,
increasing the number of value-added jobs in the
state. Simply defined: Illinois's success in exporting
comes from producing high-quality products, mainly
capital goods, for the highly competitive world mar-
ketplace. (See sidebar on page 20.)
Illinois's Global Future
Some ol the factors that contribute to a positive
global outlook for Illinois and suggest that the state
will continue as an export-driven economy are
Illinois exports less of its gross product than
the United States as a whole and as compared with
other states, indicating that there are opportunities
for increased exports over the long haul.
The world market is four times larger than the
U.S. market and is predicted to grow as much as 40
percent faster than the U.S. market through the year
2000. The industrial centers and targeted industries
within Big Emerging Markets (markets that will
account tor the overwhelming incremental growth
in world imports over the next decade) are predicted
to grow even faster. Illinois already has a strong track
record in many of the world's most expansive mar-
kets, indicating even greater economies of scale are
expected from Illinois firms exporting to these rap-
idly growing economies.
Margaret MacLean is the managing director of the International Business Division tor the Illinois Depart-
ment of Commerce and Community Affairs and trade director tor the State of Illinois.
Margaret MacLean
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Illinois produces what the world's most rap-
idly growing economics need—industrial inachin-
erv, telecommunications equipment, electronics,
financial services, and products related to the needs
ot basic economic development. In other words, the
products and services needed to build a strong infra-
structure and economv.
Some market trends to watch are the Big Emerg-
ing Markets, growth in major trading blocks such as
ASEAN and NAFTA, steady growth of trade with
Exports: A Vital Component of the State's
Economy
Companies that make the leap into export are growing faster than those
who do not.
One in eight jobs in Illinois is dependent on exporting—one in tour in
the manufacturing sector. As of 1995, it is estimated that more than
625,300 Illinois residents were employed by jobs sustained by direct and
indirect exports.
Every dollar of Illinois exports generates $.04 of state tax revenue.
Export-related jobs are globally competitive and proving to be the key to
the creation and retention of higher paying and permanent jobs in Illinois.
Wages tor workers in the manufacturing and service exporting sectors, where
Illinois products are the most competitive, exceed the U.S. average by 24
percent.
Illinois ranked fifth in the nation among the top ten exporting states in
1995; this is the second consecutive year that Illinois has improved its
ranking. Illinois exports have grown by double digits in 1993, 1994, and
1995—24.6 percent, 20.2 percent, and 23.6 percent, respectively.
Illinois exports reached an all-time high of $32.6 billion in 1995, an
increase of 23.6 percent over 1994 and nearly double the 13.8 percent
increase of all U.S. exports for the same period.
Exporting companies pay employees more than plants that produce only
for domestic consumption.
Worker productivity at exporting companies is 30 to 50 percent higher
than that of nonexporters.
Innovation is stronger at exporting companies. Exporters adopt new
technologies far more frequently than nonexporters and report more signifi-
cant benefits from doing so. This tendency is especially strong in fabricated
metal products, machinery, computers, and transportation equipment—key
industrial sectors in Illinois.
Exporting companies tend to be larger than others, on average four times
as large in employment and six times as large in sales.
Sales per employee tend to be 50 percent greater in exporting companies
than in nonexporting companies.
Value added per employee is up to 33 percent greater in exporting plants
than in nonexporters.
Figures derived from the Washington-based Institute for International Economics, the
National Association of Manufacturers, and the Massachusetts Institute for Social and
Economic Research.
traditional trade partners, the increasing importance
of the Mexican market, the explosive growth of
trade in the Chinese economic area, and the new
possibilities for trade with South Africa.
The Big Emerging Markets
Big Emerging Markets or BEMs are the markets
that will double their share of world imports (and
imports of Illinois products), rising 38 percent by
2010. No other market category shows such dra-
matic growth potential.
The BEMs offer tremendous opportunities for
Illinois exports. While Europe and Japan continue
to be among the top ten trading partners for Illinois
firms, current trends show slower growth in these
traditional markets than in the BEMs. Most of the
BEMs now rank among lUinois's top ten trading
partners and are all among the top 25 world markets
for Illinois products.
There are big differences between BEMs and
Illinois's more traditional trading partners, such as
Japan, Britain, or Germany. There are still trade
barriers to entering these markets, and full respect
for commercial systems are often still developing, or
lacking altogether. The nature of competition we
face in these markets is dramatically different from
prior experience, and they have economies that are
growing twice as fast as the rest of the world. Still,
our economic stakes in BEMs are enormous. The 10
BEMs as a group are importing about as much
merchandise from the United States as Japan and
the European Union combined. In fact, during the
period 1990-2010, the BEMs could account for at
least $1 trillion in incremental U. S. export growth.
Major Trading Blociis such as
ASEAN
Some BEMs are viewed as regional economic areas
rather than as isolated markets. The Association of
Asian Nations (ASEAN) began as a geo-political
entity in 1967 and has developed into a free trade
area. The resulting ASEAN market is one of the
largest and most dynamic in the world. By some
Growth^ and the prob-
lems it creates^ is gen-
erating extraordinary
opportunities through-
out Southeast Asia.
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The Big Emerging Markets
Japan
Japan i.s second only to Canada in terms o( im-
ports from Illinois. Economists agree that currently
personal consumption, rather than corporate spend-
ing on plant and equipment, serves as a major en-
gine for the world's second largest economy. During
the first half of 1996, sales to Japan from Illinois in
electronics, chemicals, transportation, and primary
metals actually declined. After a number of slow
vears due to an economic downturn in Japan, in-
quiries for new projects as well as expansion of
existing facilities increased during 1996. Overall,
export growth from Illinois to Japan increased 38
percent in 1995. Expect far slower growth in 1996
with exports from Illinois to Japan increasing by
only 5 to 10 percent. Illinois has been fortunate that
the Japanese companies that have invested in the
state have not been greatly affected by their country's
economic downturn, and, therefore, the state did
not lose the number of investments that some other
states experienced.
Europe
Exports from Illinois to markets including Ger-
many, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, and France are expected to continue to increase
by 10-20 percent throughout 1996.
Mexico
The Mexican market, with its recent turbulence,
typifies both the promise and problems of doing
business in emerging markets. In the wake of its
Notwithstanding the problems
experienced by Mexico in the two
years since NAFTA, the pact has
proved beneficial to Illinois.
worst economic crisis since 1932, Mexico experi-
enced a very turbulent year in 1995. Inflation sky-
rocketed from 7 percent in 1994 to 52 percent in
1995. After experiencing growth of 3 percent in
1994, the Mexican economy suffered a 7 percent
decline in growth last year. Foreign investment to-
taled only $4 billion for fiscal year 1995. However,
in the wake of Mexico's financial storm, two key
points must be made. As a result of the peso crisis,
Mexico has enacted an economic program to restore
business and consumer confidence and stabilize the
economy. And despite the crisis, Mexico continues
to liberalize its economy and to meet its NAFTA
commitments. Many analysts are optimistic about
the prospect for significant recovery in 1996. Due to
continued growth in exports, Mexico registered a
trade surplus of $6.78 billion for the first 1 1 months
of 1995.
Notwithstanding the political, economic, and
financial problems experienced by Mexico in the
two years since the implementation ofNAFTA, the
free trade pact has proved beneficial to Illinois. Since
the agreement became effective on January 1, 1994,
Illinois has experienced an increase of33,600 manu-
facturing jobs, with 93 percent of the increase
(3 1 ,400) occurring in lUinois's top ten export indus-
tries. In addition to growth in jobs, Illinois wages
have been improved substantially since NAFTA went
into effect. The average manufacturing wage in the
top ten industries has been consistently higher than
the average for all manufacturing.
With a population of over 90 million, Mexico
stands to be one of the largest, if not the largest,
future trading partner for the United States. As the
NAFTA relationship develops, commercial ties will
strengthen. As Mexico's economy continues to re-
cover, Illinois stands to benefit from increased de-
mands for technology, electronics, capital goods,
and know-how.
The China Triangle
This volatile trading area, the Chinese Economic
Area (CEA), made up of China, Hong Kong, and
Taiwan, is by far the biggest of the Big Emerging
Markets worldwide. The CEA, the seventh largest
economy in the world, with a combined GDP of
$800 billion, offers the largest potential market for
infrastructure spending in the world.
China is Illinois's sixth largest export destination
and stands to further its growth. All three markets
continue to develop as a regional center for trade not
only in manufactured goods, but also in services.
Services currently account for almost 83 percent of
Hong Kong's GDP, and the burgeoning Hong Kong
services sector—design, marketing, advertising, fi-
nancial, legal, telecommunications, and transporta-
tion/distribution—are sandwiched between China's
massive manufacturing capability and the country's
huge market for foreign-sourced goods and services.
The transition on July 1, 1997, from British to
Chinese sovereignty overshadows every other issue
in shaping Hong Kong's current and fiiture political
and economic agenda. Business and investor confi-
dence has stayed strong in the face of increased Sino-
British tensions over proposed electoral reforms.
Hong Kong continues to be a destination for U.S.
and international investment. Chinese investment
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in Hong Kong is also
growing rapidly. With
China's continued mar-
ket-opening policy.
Hong Kong companies
will play an increasingly
important role in pro-
moting China's eco-
nomic development by
providing capital and
technical expertise. Hong Kong will continue to be
China's window to the world—a strategic gateway
to foreign business contracts, modern technology,
and investment. Illinois exports to China, currently
$1.35 billion, and to Hong Kong and Taiwan, $800
million and $632 million, respectively, are predicted
to increase with the region's dramatic growth.
South Africa: Great Expectations
Already the most advanced, broadly based, and
productive economy in Africa, with a GDP that is
45 percent that ofthe whole continent, South Africa's
transformation to a democracy will finally enable it
to harness and unleash all of its potential, thrusting
the nation into true BEM status. South Africa repre-
sents one of the last major markets not yet thor-
oughly explored, particularly by American exporters
and investors who for two decades stayed away in
response to apartheid policies and sanctions. The
country possesses a modern infrastructure support-
ing an efficient distribution ofgoods to major urban
centers throughout the region and well-developed
financial, legal, communications, energy, and trans-
port sectors.
In April 19%, South ^^^^^m^^^^
Africans celebrated the
second anniversary ofthe
first all-race elections,
which resulted in the
election of President
Nelson Mandela and his
African National Con-
gress government. While
there is much to celebrate
as South Africa contin-
ues to take its place in the world community, the
country is facing imposing economic, political, and
social challenges that lead some to suggest that the
prolonged honeymoon period is over. Despite these
challenges, the South African economy continues to
grow. Experts are forecasting 4 percent growth for
1996.
At the same time, because the country's currency,
the rand, is weaker, South African exports are ex-
pected to increase substantially. With a weaker rand,
The Chinese Economic Area, the seventh largest
economy in the world, with a combined GDP of
$800 billion, offers the largest potential market
for infrastructure spending in the world.
prices become more expensive for the South African
importer, and, therefore, less competitive. Sectors
that involve high-value-added products should con-
tinue to do well as industrial development and ef-
forts to improve productivity continue to require
more equipment and machinery.
Despite these issues, Illinois will continue to hold
its own in its trade balance with South Africa. Top
exports from Illinois to South Africa include key
materials for industrial development: industrial ma-
chinery, computers, electronics, and instruments
—
all needed to build a strong physical infrastructure.
As South Africa aims to leap forward and en-
hance its technological capabilities, the realm of
computer hardware, software, peripherals, and in-
formation technology are finding voracious demand
in South Africa. Currently, it is estimated that the
United States holds almost 30 percent ot the mar-
kets in hardware and over 70 percent lor computer
software in South Africa. With the largest number
of Internet subscribers on the continent, South Af-
rica is striving to catch up with the Europe and the
U.S. in this area.
South Africa represents one of the
last major markets not yet thor-
oughly explored, particularly by
Americans,
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Illinois Agriculture Evolves for a
New Century
By Paul N. Ellinger, Bradley D. Lubben, Eric A. DeVuyst, LeeAnn McEdwards
Moss, and David A. Lins
The 1996 farm bill^ new technology,
structural changes in the number, size and
type of farms, as well as continuing concern
for environmental issues in farming will all
affect Illinois agriculture in the coming year
and the future.
Paul N. Ellinger
MANY NKW ISSUES AND CHALLENGES FACE
Illinois agriculture in the transition into
the next century. Livestock production,
environmental issues, agricultural policy, and site-
specific agriculture are four key issues facing the
farming community. These issues have important
implications for all residents and businesses in Illinois.
Agricultural Policy
The passage of the Federal Agricultural Improve-
ment and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 this past April
marked a watershed event in agricultural policy. For
the first time in more than 50 years, federal farm
programs changed direction significantly from pro-
duction controls and income supports to fixed sup-
port payments not tied to production. The effects of
this change will become apparent over the next
seven years and will have a significant influence on
Illinois agriculture.
The language ofthe FAIR Act specified eligibility
for enrollment in a seven-year contract running from
1996 through 2002. Over this period, program par-
ticipants will receive a contract payment based on
their historical crop acreage and production. Con-
gress authorized total contract payments for pro-
gram commodities at $5.57 billion dollars for 1996,
a level that will eventually decline to $4,008 billion
in 2002. These levels represent a continuation of the
decline in overall federal farm program supports
over the last decade, since the record high level of
$26 billion in total government support payments
in 1986.
The change in federal farm programs will bring
significant changes in the way Illinois farmers make
their business decisions. The FAIR Act of 1996
Bradley D. Lubben
This report was prepared by the following members of the College ot Agricultural, Consumer, and
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assistant professor of production and natural resource economics. Department of Agricultural and Con-
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provides a significant increase in planting flexibiiit)',
but also shifts the responsibility for managing risk
from the federal farm program to the farmer. While
the old federal farm program tied support payments
to restricted crop production, the new program al-
lows almost complete planting flexibility. Producers
will be able to consider market conditions when
they make production decisions. They will be able
to respond to growing market demand with in-
creased production and to compete more efficiently
in the world market-place.
Illinois producers will become more responsible
for their own risk management in all their decisions.
Historically, the level of federal farm supports was
based on the difference between the current market
price and an established target price. Thus, pay-
ments helped to counter-balance market price fluc-
tuations. However, government payments under the
FAIR Act are fixed for the duration of the contract
and, thus, will not mitigate any of the potential
fluctuations in market prices. New risk management
tools now developing in response to changing fed-
eral farm policy will offer increased opportunities
and choices. Producers will need to assess their risk
to determine the best combination of marketing
tools, insurance policies, and management decisions
to handle their risk effectively.
With the landmark change in federal farm policy
signaling a reduced government role in farming,
interest will shift to other issues such as environmen-
tal policy, property-rights issues, tax policy, and
international trade. Environmental policies of inter-
est to agriculture go far beyond the implementation
of the conservation title of the FAIR Act. They
include issues such as the Endangered Species Act
and the impact that similar legislation has on
The 1996 FAIR Act shifts respon-
sibility for managing risk from the
federal farm program to the farmer.
property rights and the decisions farmers must make.
Some of these issues even extend bevond the border
of the United States and are part of the broad range
of issues involved in negotiations on international
trade, which will become increasingly important as
the role of the government in farm programs contin-
ues to decline. Agriculture is also strongly affected
by tax policies and changes, especially in the areas of
capital gains taxes and estate taxes. Although the
FAIR Act of 1996 may have signaled the beginning
of the end of government involvement in farm pro-
grams, it certainly does not eliminate the potential
impact that government can have on agriculture
through other policies.
Site-Specific Agriculture
Farming in Illinois is becoming increasingly high-
tech. Since the early 1990s, terms like global posi-
tioning systems (GPS) and variable-rate technolog}'
(VRT) have become common in the language of
Illinois farmers. GPS refers to the satellite link-up
that permits farmers to identifv' and map specific
points on their fields. VRT (also known as site-
specific farming (SSF), precision farming, or pre-
scriptive farming) refers to the ability to vary
application rates for fertilizers or pesticides as the
farmer moves across his fields. Instead of fertilizing
the entire farm at the same rate, farmers can apply
soil treatments that more
precisely match the par-
ticular needs and soil char-
acteristics ofeach point in
the field. The system re-
quires a significant invest-
ment in equipment, soil
mapping, and testing. A
computerized map of soil
t\pes and fertility rates
must bv generated after
testing is done for each
field (often on a 2.5 acre
grid). The individual ap-
plying the fertilizer must
have a computer-con-
trolled applicator linked to
a differential GPS receiver
Precision farming requires a significant investment in equipment, soil mapping,
and testing.
Eric A. DeV'uyst
LeeAnn McEdwards
Moss
David A. Lins
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In the 1950s, livestock accounted
for approximately 50 percent of
total farm income. It now accounts
for only about 20 percent.
and satellites. The GPS receiver continually updates
the applicator's position in the field. The computer
reads the stored soil and fertility map to determine
the desired treatment rate, and the application rate is
adjusted accordingly.
Illinois farmers also use GPS technology at har-
vest. Linked to a yield monitor in the combine,
computerized yield maps can be generated that give
precise yield levels at a given point in a field. This
information can be used not only to fine tune future
fertilizer application rates, but also as a diagnostic
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
tool. If a particular area
of a field is producing
fewer bushels per acre
than the field average, the
farmer will know the pre-
cise location of the prob-
lem and can better
investigate its cause.
At present, site-spe-
cific farming is used pri-
marily for the application
of fertilizer and lime.
However, there are many
other potential uses. For
example, SSF could be used with most chemical
applications to adjust treatment levels to actual needs.
Also, pest infestations can be mapped with hand-
held computers linked to a GPS receiver, allowing
site-specific treatment in the next growing season.
Despite the excitement over SSF, researchers con-
tinue to address questions
Table 1. Number of Illinois Farms with
Livestock
Illinois now also has fewer, but larger livestock
operations.
Cattle Milk Cows Hors Sheep
1950
Another reason for the decHne of the Hvestock
industry is that the business climate in lUinois has
been perceived to be less favorable than that of
neighboring states. For example, a recent study con-
ducted at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign revealed that worker compensation laws
were a perceived impediment to locating new live-
stock facilities in Illinois. As the livestock processing
industry in a geographic area declines, farmers face
increased costs in shipping animals to market, mak-
ing it difficult to remain cost effective.
Livestock farming in Illinois is also tending to-
ward fewer but larger farms. From 1950-1990 the
numbers of farms has declined and average farm size
has increased (see Table 2). The concentration of
livestock farming into larger and larger operations
raises environmental concerns related to odor and
waste.
Pork production is undergoing a dramatic change
with the movement to large-scale integrated produc-
tion units. Public concern has been heightened by
the fear ol odor and potential pollution from such
large-scale units. Some people have called lor a mora-
torium on permits for lagoons and other structures
needed for the large-scale production units. Others
have expressed concern over the potential adverse
economic effects on smaller-scale producers. Orga-
nized farm groups, such as Farm Bureau and the
Illinois Pork Producers Association, have generally
supported large-scale hog production units, arguing
that restrictions will continue to erode the livestock
industry in Illinois. Future efforts to control the
adverse environmental impact of livestock produc-
tion need to be balanced against the economic ben-
efits arising from this value-added industry.
Environmental Issues
Discussion of the effects of production agricul-
ture on environmental quality in Illinois continues.
Illinois farmers are exploring and incorporating safer
and more efficient means of producing agricultural
commodities into their farming operations to the
benefit of the industry and the community at large.
As outlined in the first section of this article,
government policies and industry pressures have
increased the number of acres in Illinois devoted to
the production of row crops. Agricultural land that
is tilled for row crops is more vulnerable to wind and
water erosion. Since row crops require more fertiliz-
ers and pesticides than other crops, increased pro-
duction of row crops can increase the potential tor
surface and ground water contamination.
However, Illinois farmers have responded to these
potential problems by adopting a variety of environ-
mentally friendly practices. The use of reduced
A hog confinement facility in Southern Illinois.
tillage and conservation tillage on many soils is now
common. Many agricultural chemicals are now ap-
plied after the new crop is growing when the treat-
ment is more directly related to the actual rather
than an anticipated weed or pest problem. Grassed
waterways and terraces on farms with rolling topog-
raphy, subsurface drainage tile, and grassed filter
strips between field boundaries and drainage ways
all help in controlling etosion.
In the past, wetlands were often drained for
agricultural use. However, it is now recognized that
wetlands serve important environmental fiinctions,
providing wildlife habitat and water filtration. Pre-
vious farm bills have provided for severe penalties
for draining wetlands and converting them to crop
production. Although the 1996 Farm Bill allows
farmers more flexibility in complying with wetlands
conservation requirements, the goal ofwetland pro-
tection is no less important under FAIR.
There is, as we mentioned earlier, growing con-
cern about the potential impact of large-scale hog
farms on environmental quality in Illinois. Hog
production units of any size must deal with the
effects of manure handling and odor on their com-
munities. The level of concern over potential envi-
ronmental damage increases with the scale ot the
The Conservation and Wetland
Reserve Programs will continue to
provide erosion control, wetlands
and wildlife protection, and water
quality improvements.
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hog Farm. As the number oi hogs at a particular
facility increases, so does the volume of manure
stored and the potential for a failure in the waste
handling system, polluting a larger volume oi water.
Illinois has very stringent laws regulating the
operation and placement ofnew hog operations. For
example, there are strict requirements for distance
from inhabited dwellings, communities, and streams.
The FAIR Act also addresses this issue. Under the
Environmental Quality Incentive Program, livestock
producers can receive cost-sharing and technical as-
sistance to improve and protect the quality of the
environment.
Agricultural policy will continue to influence Illi-
nois environmental quality. The FAIR Act allows
increased planting flexibility, and annual acreage
set-a-side requirements have been eliminated. As a
result, tens of thousands of acres that would have
been idled in the past will now be producing crops,
requiring the application of greater amounts of fer-
tilizers and pesticides. Illinois farmers, however, will
respond by balancing economic incentives for in-
creased production with their ongoing concern over
the stewardship of their farmland assets.
The FAIR Act ot 1996 has many provisions that
are friendly to the environment. Most notably, the
Conservation Reserve Program and Wetland Re-
serve Program have been renewed. Both provide
annual payments to farmers to idle land for a speci-
hed number oi years (10 years and 30 years, respec-
tively). The environmental benefits that these
programs have provided have resulted in public sup-
port for their renewal. These programs will continue
to provide erosion control, wetlands and wildlife
protection, and water quality improvements, under
the new legislation.
For more information on any of the issues in this article, contact
any of the authors at the Department of Agricultural and
Consumer Economics, 305 Mumford Hall, 1301 West Gregory
Drive, Urbana, IL 61801 or consult the web site:
http://w3.aces.uiuc.edu/ACE/Welcome/index.html.
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Income Trends in Illinois
By J. Fred Gicrtz and Shekhar Mehta
Illinois has long enjoyed a per capita income
above the national average^ and the trend
will probably continue.
A LITTLE NOTICED FEATURE OF THE ILLINOISeconomy in recent years has been thestrong growth in per capita personal in-
come. After many years oflagging the national growth
rate, in the last ten years Illinois per capita income
has grown more rapidly than the national rate. It
should be noted that the entire period has been
characterized by consistent growth for both Illinois
and the nation, aside from a period of stagnation in
the late 1970s and early 1980s (see chart below).
Per Capita Income: 7950-7995 (thousands
of constant 7995 dollars)
The entire period has been characterized by consistent
growth for both Illinois and the nation.
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995
From 1950 to 1995, real per capita income in the
United States grew at an annual rate of 2.0 percent
while income in Illinois grew at a 1.7 percent rate.
More recently, from 1985 to 1995, the Illinois growth
rate of 1 .7 percent exceeded the national average ot
1.5 percent. It should be noted that growth in
Ml
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The Illinois economy was much
better prepared to weather the
problems of the 1990 recession
than most areas in the country.
regions (U. S. states or countries in the world)
diminish over time so that high income regions tend
to grow at slower rates than low income areas. There
are a variety of suggestions as to why this happens:
DifRision of Technology. It has been sug-
gested that relatively poor areas can adopt the tech-
nologies of more advanced nations without going
through the slow and costly process of developing
the technologies themselves.
Mobility of Labor and Capital. When wage
rates vary from region to region, labor tends to move
from low-wage to high-wage areas and capital from
high-wage to low-wage areas. Both of these move-
ments lead to a convergence of wages.
Homogenization of Population Characteris-
tics. Incomes among various areas will tend to con-
verge when their populations become more alike—as
they have among regions across the United States.
Government Policies. A number of govern-
ment policies may also contribute. Policies set at the
national level (for example, progressive taxation and
universal welfare benefit levels) may contribute to
the convergence of incomes.
In any event, the forces ofincome convergence in
the United States were relatively strong until the last
10 years. Areas with high income in the beginning
generally grew at slower rates than did poorer areas.
It should be emphasized
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that income convergence
does not usually lead to
reversals of position. For
example, the South
started as the poorest re-
gion at mid-century and
remains so today, al-
though the region now
trails the nation by a
much smaller margin
(chart at left).
There have been some
notable exceptions to the
trend toward income
convergence, for ex-
ample, the resurgence of
the Northeast from the
late 1970s through the
Ratio of Regional and Illinois Per Capita
Income to U.S. Average (1950-1993)
The South started as the poorest region at mid-century
and remains so today, although the region now trails
the nation by a much smaller margin.
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mid-1980s. This region moved from second place
to first by a wide margin. In this period, the high-
income Northeast, which had experienced consis-
tent decline since 1950, suddenly jumped ahead of
the rest of the country. This was the period of the
"Massachusetts miracle" attributed to the expansion
of high-tech businesses, the defense build-up that
benefited the Northeast more than other regions,
and the growth in financial and legal services before
the stock market crash in late 1987. Surprisingly,
the Northeast has been able to maintain, although
not expand, its dominance since 1986.
Illinois has also staged a significant, but less dra-
matic resurgence since the mid-1980s, reversing, at
least temporarily, the forces of convergence. Illinois
and the Midwest in general were especially hard hit
by the recession of the early 1980s. The national
recession coincided with a worldwide restructuring
of industry that had a particularly negative impact
on Illinois, which was heavily dependent on manu-
facturing and capital equipment. The state and
region's problems were compounded by a high-
valued dollar that hurt exports and by the run-up of
energy prices in the 1970s. The defense build-up of
the Reagan years also shifted resources away from
the state, which gets only a small share of defense
procurement spending.
This period ot austerity had a positive side, how-
ever. Illinois firms were forced to make painful
adjustments to deal with the changing world
economy. This laid the foundation for a strong
recovery that has taken place the last 1 years. Note
Illinois' strong performance after 1984. The state's
economy was much better prepared to weather the
problems of the 1990 recession than most other
areas in the country, and, in fact, the recession was
much milder here.
What does the future hold? While there has been
a long tendency toward income convergence, in the
last rwo decades the process has often been halted or
even reversed for periods, probably in response to
unforeseen outside events. Increased interregional
and world trade, along with greater capital and labor
mobility may have led to a situation in which in-
comes react more to individual events rather than
following long-term trends toward convergence. This
means that Illinois need not expect ever-diminish-
ing incomes as compared with the rest of the nation.
However, there is no reason to predict that the
period ofresurgence of the last ten years will continue
at such a brisk rate in the future.
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
SM Illinois Business Review Winter 1996
Views from the Business World:
Outlook from La Salle Street
By WillardBunn III
Steady growth ahead!
THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY' IS SOUND. By ANY
conventional measures—and by some uncon-
ventional ones—the economy shows itself to
be on an even keel and portends steady growth in
the months ahead.
First, let us look at the conventional measures:
The stock market has continued extraordi-
nary growth; the Dow Jones Industrial Average rose
above 6000 for the first time in October, less than a
year after first crossing the 5000 threshold. By the
beginning of December it had reached 6400.
In early December retailers reported that their
Christmas sales were off to a brisk start over the
Thanksgiving weekend.
At the same time the Conference Board an-
nounced that its index of leading indicators had
advanced for the ninth consecutive month.
The unemployment rate declined to 5.1 per-
cent in August from 5.4 percent in July, a seven year
low. The number ot jobs swelled by 250,000. The
Illinois employment rate fell slightly in August, to 5.3
percent, down from 5.4 percent in July.
The National Association of Purchasing
Management's survey rose to 52.6 in August from
50.2 in July, suggesting that manufacturing activit)'
was expanding.
The inflation rate over the last twelve months
has been just 2.9 percent.
In August builders broke ground on new
homes and apartments at the fastest rate in nearly
two years. And in November sales of single-family
homes remained above 700,000 for the tenth straight
month, the longest stretch since a 36-month period
between October 1976 and September 1979. Sales in
1996 are 13.5 percent above those of the first 10
months of last year.
Apparently, the Federal Reserve Board agrees
with the assessment of a benign economic climate
inasmuch as, at the critical post election meeting of
the Open Market Committee in November, it ad-
justed no rates on financial instruments under its
jurisdiction. The December 17 meeting had the same
result. The Fed's role here is not an easy one. A
former chairman once observed, "We have to take
away the punch bowl just when the part}' is getting
going." By that he meant that as the economy heats
up and starts to spark inflation, the Fed must cool
things oft by raising interest rates.
By more unconventional measures, the economy
also appears to be in good working order. For ex-
ample, the market for new equin' issues rose to
record activity levels in early 1 996. The number of
equity offerings in March, April, and June made
them the strongest months since the record levels ot
1993, clearly a reflection of investor confidence in
the economy. The large number of initial public
offerings (IPOs) under $50 million reflects a market
more receptive to small capitalization stocks and less
cautious about liquidity.
At the same time, mergers and acquisitions also
continued a brisk pace from 1995 with a number of
announced "mega-deals," those over $1 billion in
transaction value, particularly in telecommunications,
financial ser\'ices, and health care. In 1 995 mega-deals
represented only 1 percent of the number of transac-
tions, but 5 1 percent ofthe total transaction value. In
contrast, in 1993 mega-deals accounted for just 0.7
percent ofthe number oftransactions and 35 percent
of transaction value.
An interesting aspect is that the preponderance
of the deal-making has been strategic-buyer driven
unlike the deals of the 1980s, which were financial-
buyer driven. In many industries consolidation and
control over distribution channels are viewed as
critical strategies for gaining competitive advantage
and increasing shareholder value. Low inflation and
Willard Bunn III is managing director of the Financial Services-Investment Banking Group of The
Chicago Corporation.
Willard Bunn III
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Low inflation and limited internal
growth have both provided ideal
stimulants for more mergers and
acquisitions.
limited internal growth have both provided ideal
stimulants for more mergers and acquisitions.
The recently announced acquisition of Boatmen's
Bancshares in St. Louis by Nationsbank is a perfect
example of a large premium over book value being
paid by an acquirer to further its strategy, in this case
a nation-wide presence. Nationsbank agreed to pay
$9.5 billion, the third highest price ever paid for a
bank, to acquire Boatmen's. The acquisition will
make Nationsbank the country's fourth largest in
terms of assets and give it a string of 2,600 branches
spread across 16 states and the District of Columbia.
One other interesting aspect of the merger and
acquisition activity is that historically it has been
relatively counter-cyclical with initial public offer-
ings. Current strong performance in both sectors
reflects attractive valuation opportunities in the public
market and premium valuations in the merger and
acquisitions market—not to mention the underpin-
nings of a vibrant economy.
In sum, the strong signals from the economy
suggest to me a case of moderate growth with mod-
erate inflation over the next several quarters. The
bullish stock market also suggests that merger and
acquisition activity is likely to continue to flourish.
Views from the Business World:
Credit, Bankruptcy, & the Information Age
By Gregory B. Lykins and Robert L. Plankenhorn
Even with personal bankruptcies at record
levels, easy consumer credit is here to stay.
Gregory B. Lykins
WITH BANKRUPTCY FILINGS AT AN ALL
time high, it seems paradoxical to say
that credit is readily available. Cer-
tainly, creditors tighten their lending standards in
the face of rising bankruptcies. However, there is, in
fact, brisk competition to make credit available.
Three major trends have contributed to the ease of
borrowing. First, easy credit is required to enable
consumers to buy the goods produced by our
economy. Second, social policy dictates that there
should be no discrimination in the extension of
credit: it should be available to everyone. Third,
lending is a profitable business. These trends will
continue in the Information Age when elegant ap-
plications of knowledge will be used to promote the
extension of credit.
The increased availability of credit to borrowers
other than governments and big business emerged,
along with mass production, the national market,
and mass consumption, in the early decades of this
century. Railroads, with their steel rails, made it
possible for people to travel throughout the country
and tor farmers, miners, and loggers, to get their
products to the market. With efficient transporta-
tion, manufacturers could reach consumers through-
out the nation, and they mass produced goods for
Robert L. Plankenhorn
Gregory B. Lykins is chairman of the board and chief executive officer of Central Illinois Financial Co., Inc.
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32, Illinois Business Review Winter 1996
this national market. With mass production, supply
could exceed demand—unless mass consumption
could be sustained.
Extending credit was a way of sustaining con-
sumer demand. Lending bridges the gap between
the need for cash and available money. When a
young couple buys their first home, the builder
demands the purchase price at closing. The couple
would have to toil for 20 years for the cash required
to meet the purchase price. The act oflending allows
the couple to buy the house now and repay the
lender over the next 20 years. Without the lender,
the couple would have to save until they acquired
the purchase price. Since they would be paying rent
at the same time, they might never save enough. The
couple would never own a home, and the builder
would never sell a house!
By the early 1900s, consumers were able to ob-
tain credit. In 1910 in Norfolk, Virginia, attorney
Arthur J. Morris started Fidelity Savings & Trust
Bank. This was a new type of institution that made
loans on a borrower's character and earning power.
A typical Fidelity Savings and Trust loan re-
quired two additional persons to co-sign (become
obligated to repay) the promissory note. The loan
bore an interest rate of 6 percent, subtracted from
the proceeds at closing. Besides the interest, there
was a 2 percent fee. The consumer would only
receive 92 percent of the loan. Then, the loan was
repaid in 50 weekly installments. The annual per-
centage rate on the loan was more than 1 9 percent.
Another step in the development of consumer
credit was in the late 1920s when Roger Steffan,
manager of National City Bank's consumer credit
business, decided that with the bank's cost of funds
at 3 percent and its earnings on its consumer loans
on average 12 percent, this was profitable business.
With the workers' jobs relatively more plentiful
than the bosses' jobs, Steffan felt, forther, that work-
ers were a better risk than the bosses.
The realization that consumer finance was prof-
itable inevitably drew more financial institutions
into the business of consumer lending. The avail-
ability of credit enabled consumers to buy the goods
produced by American manufacturers.
Financial institutions, working to increase their
shareholders' wealth, viewed consumer finance as a
profitable business. The profits are not greatly dif-
ferent today than in Stefifan's time. The credit card
industry has a cost of funds of approximately 5
percent. It has an average yield of 17 percent. With
the net overhead and bad credit expenses recog-
nized, the credit card industry expects a return of 3.3
percent on investment, before taxes. The growing
number of lenders made consumer credit increas-
ingly available. This easily available credit has
produced an interesting corollary: a high rate of
consumer bankruptcies.
In the second quarter of 1996, 3.6 percent of all
credit card accounts were delinquent. This is the
highest rate on record with the American Bankers'
Association. Personal bankruptcies are up 25 per-
cent over last year, a ten year high. It is projected
that 1 . 1 million households will have filed for bank-
ruptcy in 1996.
It is unlikely that the trend will change. Ameri-
can public policy, embodied in the bankruptcy laws,
has been to give the debtor the opportunity to start
over. Higher bankruptcies are one of the costs asso-
ciated with credit extension. Also, in this country
public policy has been to press for the equal oppor-
tunity for credit.
As we have entered the Information Age, knowl-
edge has surpassed labor and capital as the means to
wealth generation. With employment in the United
States at a level that would have been considered
inflationary in the past, there are no inflationary
pressures. The application of knowledge is required
to make the most of labor. Increased automation
and information management are making current
labor pools more productive. Nor is capital scarce.
Baby boomers are saving fitriously for their retire-
ment. Knowledge applied to the use of capital,
through the extension of credit, will leverage its
productivity.
To continue to reduce the cost of consumer
credit, financial institutions dispense credit on a
"mass production " scale. Credit bureaus supply lists
ot prospects and their credit scores to the financial
institutions. Ctedit underwriting, on this basis, may
skip several important, yet costly steps. Those po-
tential losses are controlled through statistical risk
management.
In the Information Age, financial institutions
will accelerate the use of mathematical techniques,
probability and statistics, to provide credit. The
same characteristics that lend themselves to statisti-
cal analysis will also allow lenders more flexibility in
raising capital to lend.
Financial institutions have used two techniques
for risk management. The first is diversification.
Financial institutions, working to
increase their shareholders^ wealth,
viewed consumer finance as a
profitable business.
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Turning loan pools into securities
will accelerate as the knowledge of
statistical techniques is applied to
more classes of financial assets^
fostering an ever increasing expan-
sion of credit.
Commercial banks, for example, are generally lim-
ited to lending no more than 15 percent of their
capital to any one borrower. In practice, the percent-
age is much lower. Lenders spread the risk over a
large base. The second technique is to shift the risk.
In small business lending, agricultural lending, and
home lending, there are federal guaranty programs.
In addition, lenders have increasingly recognized the
benefits ofapplying statistical techniques to lending.
When the lender considers its diversified client
base as a population sample, it can begin to make
statistical inferences about future events based on
experience. With statistical analysis, the delinquency
rate and loss rate for a portfolio of similar loans can
be predicted. The prediction of delinquency and
loss is then included as a cost of doing business. The
expected return is a function of the interest earned,
less all the expense, and the probability that the
principal and interest will be returned to the lender.
A pool of individual loans, described by its eco-
nomic and statistical characteristics, becomes a com-
modity. When they have the same characteristics,
one pool of loans is no different from another. The
pool of loans is then packaged as a negotiable secu-
rity. Selling the securitized loans through the capital
markets enables the lenders to raise capital more
efficiently. Securitization also allows the lenders to
shift the risk of loss to the buyers of the loans.
In the Information Age, the securitization of
loans will accelerate as the knowledge of statistical
techniques is applied to more classes of financial
assets. This increase in productivity will foster an
ever increasing rate of expansion of credit. Along
with the increase in credit, bankruptcy will increase.
However, since the cost of bankruptcy will be in-
cluded in the cost of credit, the trend of social policy
for easier credit will not change.
Views from the Business World:
Alternative Financing Is Here to Stay
By Peter Fox
Structural economic changes such as bank
consolidation and the proliferation of new
enterprises have made alternative financing
an important part of the funding of new and
expanding businesses.
ALTERNATIVE FINANCING IN THE COMMER-
cial sector can be broadly defined as any
"nontraditional" source of funding. To
understand why alternative financing is becoming a
more common source of funds and why its impor-
tance will continue to grow at an accelerating rate
over the next ten years, one must understand how
traditional financing markets work, as well as the
fundamental changes that are taking place in the
business sector.
Historically, most businesses relied on commer-
cial banks as a source of business loans. Generally
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speaking, small and mid-size companies tradition-
ally borrowed from a local bank with which they
already had a commercial depository relationship.
In some cases, the commercial relationship devel-
oped because a principal of the company had a
personal depository account with the financial insti-
tution. For equity sources (investment fiinds), prin-
cipals utilized their personal resources and money
fi-om close family and friends.
The mid-1990s have seen a mass migration to-
wards nontraditional sources of financing. The rea-
sons for this shift are the same ones that will cause
the trend not only to continue, but accelerate as the
U.S. economy enters the new millennium. Although
many factors contribute to the trend, 1 will focus on
the major reasons that it is likely to continue.
Conservative Commercial
Lenders
Traditional commercial lending institutions have
maintained very conservative lending policies to-
wards small commercial clients. This is, to some
extent, a function of the severe losses recently suf-
fered by banks and savings and loans—even though
the small business sector was not the major cause of
the losses. The disappearance of the "hometown
bank" that prevailed for many years has been one
factor driving conservative business lending. Although
local banking officers frequently continue to staff local
facilities after their institutions have been bought by
regional or national megabanks, the policies and final
lending decisions are usually centrally controlled. Con-
sequently, personal relationships with the local bank-
ers no longer carry the value they once did.
Growth in the Service Sector
Most commercial lenders have traditionally made
loans based on tangible assets of the enterprise in
question. An asset-based lending formula is typically
used to approve a loan based on a certain percentage
ofa company's eligible accounts receivable, inventory,
and machinery. In some cases, term loans are pro-
ded for certain types of machinery with relatively
useful lives. This model has served the U.S.
economy well for a number ofyears. However, most
of the recent growth in our economy has been (and
will continue to be) in the service sector. In particu-
lar, the growth has come in those industries such as
VI
long
consulting, software development, and small retail
concerns that do not have significant tangible assets.
Therefore, the demand for commercial lending in
this sector has greatly outstripped the ability (or
willingness) of the lenders to provide the financing.
Greater Number of Small
Businesses
Due in large part to corporate downsizing and
disenchantment with the large industrial work envi-
ronment, there has been a growing trend for em-
plovees to start their own companies. The days of
lifelong careers with a single Fortune 500 employer are
over. There will continue to be more and more
people able and interested in leaving their employers
to start their own busi-
nesses. The consequences
will be more startup and
early-phase companies,
typically with fewer than
100 employees. Another
factor that contributes to
making people willing to
start their own businesses
is the fact that those now-
entering the workforce
do not have parents that
suffered through the
Great Depression of the
1930s. Therefore, these
new employees are more
likely to have been raised
in a home environment
less concerned about steady, dependable employ-
ment for life. Commercial banks are not particularly
eager to lend to young, unseasoned entrepreneurs,
especially those without years of experience manag-
ing a business similar to the one for which funding is
being sought.
A Shortage of Funding
Sources
A number of factors have left "family and friends
capital" in short supply. The dramatic return on
investments in stocks ol publicly traded companies
over the past few years have made such investments
much more appealing tor people willing to take a
moderate risk with their avail
The dramatic returns on
investments in the stock
market over the past
few years have made
stocks much more ap-
pealing than investing
in your brother ^s busi-
ness venture.
Mc Als(
Peter Fox is a senior managing director in Bear, Stearns & Co.'s Chicago office. The author would like to
acknowledge Jim Schnorf CEO ofCardinal Capital, L.L.C., a Champaign, Illinois-based firm that provides
alternative debt and equity financing and third-party broker financing to small and mid-size companies, for
his contribution towards this article.
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tremendous growth in the number of entrepreneur-
ial ventures has created unparalleled competition tor
such funds. Even though venture capital firms have
been providing imprecedcnted levels ot funding to
companies that nuet their criteria, many venture
groups are highly selective in the type ot business
and geographic location in which they invest or lend.
There is no question that those who provide
nontraditional funding to small and mid-size com-
panies will tind continuing opportunities tor double-
digit growth (in both volume of transactions and
total dollars) over the next ten years. The "alterna-
tive financing" industry is, to some extent,
recession-proof, in that commercial lenders will fur-
ther tighten lending guidelines if and when the
economy weakens. Also, stock market investment
will decrease in a down market, treeing capital for
alternative uses.
Successful Alternative
Financing for the Future
Although a number ofas yet unknown economic,
legislative, and technological factors will largely dic-
tate the determinants of the relative success and
failure of these alternative financing vehicles, certain
key attributes for those that will succeed can be
identified today:
Focus coupled with diversification
A steady flow of quality deals to review
A predictable and competitive "cost ofmoney
"
source
The ability to analyze quickly and respond to
opportunities
Proper risk-taking relative to value
Too many venture firms today have focused their
funding on unduly narrow company profiles or geo-
graphic boundaries. Although a narrow focus does
have advantages, particularly the reduced risk that
comes from a more intimate knowledge of the client
base, such a philosophy
The ^^alternative
financing^' industry is^
to some extent^
recession-proof.
can cause the financier
to dismiss attractive op-
portunities simply be-
cause the transaction falls
outside the restrictive pa-
rameters that have been
established. Successful
financiers of the future
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
will maintain a core fo-
cus yet will diversify so as
to participate in a high percentage of the attractive
business opportunities they encounter.
A continuous flow of quality opportunities will
be vital for success. The successful firms will find
ways to improve the ratio of high quality proposals
they receive. The most cost-effective method of
increasing the percentage of quality proposals re-
ceived is to develop a network of relevant, reliable
referral sources. The successful alternative financing
firm ot the future will develop and maintain a net-
work ot contacts among accountants, attorneys,
banks, and, potentially, venture capital funds
—
groups from whom companies in search of funding
may seek assistance.
It is crucial for an alternative financing firm to
maintain a predictable and low-cost source of fund-
ing tor its transactions. The firm must appropriately
match the cost and maturity of its funding sources
with the needs of its client companies. Predicting
the timing of the maturation of cash flows from
minority equity investments in companies with mini-
mal short-term liquidity can be particularly chal-
lenging. The successful alternative financiers of the
future will have a substantial portion of their own
funding structure suitably tailored to the nature of
their transactions.
Since businesses seeking alternative financing are,
as a rule, talking to a variety of potential financier.s
and since many of the proposals have already been
rejected for traditional financing, it is important to
be able to provide the prospective client with a
prompt "preliminary level of interest" that will serve
to establish the relationship and help to consummate
the transaction. One must assume that firms with
high quality proposals who approach nontraditional
financiers will be able to find alternative sources of
funding.
Finally, successful alternative financing companies
will be able to determine and accept the opportunities
that provide the greatest value relative to risk. Such
companies will likely be seeking to hit singles and
doubles (and avoiding strikeouts) rather than swing-
ing for home runs and encountering the resultant
strikeouts. However, one must design the financier's
loan, equity, and third-party financing services so that
an occasional double can turn into a home run.
Seeking Alternative Financing
Businesses seeking funds from alternative financ-
ing sources should always make sure that sound
business plans, including financial projections, are
part of the proposal. The appearance, thoroughness,
and general professionalism shown can often play a
significant role in the acceptance or rejection of the
proposal.
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Views from the Business World:
The Two-Pronged Solution
By David Hunter
A case study of how the combination of
economic forecasting and a revamped
operating model solved a major problem for
an Illinois manufacturer.
ALTHOUGH THE DOLLAR VALUE OF ROAD WORK
performed and the tonnage ofasphalt con-
crete laid is quite stable from year to year,
the market tor the Blaw-Knox paving equipment
my company makes is strongly cyclical. In indus-
tries such as ours, each competitor's success in re-
sponding to these dramatic cyclical swings has a
significant impact on their market share, profitabil-
ity, and asset efficiency. The difificulry is how to
forecast cycles that seem to make so little sense.
In order to try to get a handle on the problem,
we worked with an outside economic consultant
who ran correlation analyses of data both for our
industry and our own shipments against a variety of
economic data. This process looked for leading,
lagging, and coincident correlations between actual
data series and rate-of-change indexes. Our objec-
tive was to determine whether any of the widely
followed and forecast economic data series have a
consistent enough correlation with our industry to
be useful in anticipating upward and downward
swings in our business.
The results of the study were surprising because
the highest correlations were v/ith two series that
appear to have little direct relationship with our
business—industrial production and housing starts.
Trends in these areas seemed useful in anticipating
an upturn or downturn in our business. However,
they provided only a cautionary signal and not a
clear indicator of the timing or potential magnitude
of an increase or decrease in business.
We concluded that without a reliable forecasting
tool we needed to reduce our need to forecast. Our
search for the underlying factors that contributed to
the cyclical swings in our
business found that, in ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^"
fact, our own slow re-
sponse to dealer orders
was a major factor. Cus-
tomers generally expect
immediate delivery, and
our delayed delivery re-
quired dealers to main-
tain large inventories in
order to have products
available for customers
when demand was
strong. The dealer de- ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
mand for inventory
tended to exaggerate the strength ofa rising market.
During weak markets, dealers reduced inventories
and actually intensified our downturn.
We set to work to shorten dramatically the time
required to produce a unit in our factories in order
to minimize the inventory our dealers needed to
carry to assure prompt deliver)' to their customers.
We also reduced the number ofoptions available on
our products, which permitted further reductions
in dealer inventory. The end result has been a
significant reduction in the need for dealers to hold
a large inventory in order to satisfy customer orders.
This, in turn, has reduced the roller coaster effect of
In fact, our own slow
response to dealer
orders was a major
factor in the sharp
cyclical swings in our
business.
David Hunter is President of Blaw-Knox Construction Equipment Corp., Mattoon, Illinois, one of the
world's largest producers of highway paving equipment and a subsidiary of Ingersoll-Rand Company.
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dealer inventory accumulation and liquidation on
our business over the cycle.
We believe that this combination of a macro
economic forecasting model designed to provide
early warning of a change in activity and an operat-
ing model that is designed to dampen rather than
amplify cyclical swings will provide a better busi-
ness solution than any approach that relies purely
on either forecasting or operating strategies. If the
recent weak growth in industrial production and
spotty performance in housing starts does mean a
weaker 1 997 then we will be ready. Our inventories
arc down, so we will not have to compete with our
own past production and our lead times are short
enough to meet customer needs as they develop.
1996 Illinois Statistical Abstract
FACTS, FACTS, AND MORE FACTS. That's WHAT
the J 996 Illinois StatisticalAhstmcthis. This
convenient, informative resource book con-
tains almost 900 pages of tables, charts, and maps,
with facts about Illinois, Chicago, the state's other
cities and towns, and all 102 of lUinois's counties.
Gary Wisby, a Chi-
''Although [it] isn't bed-
side readings it won'tput
you to sleep, either/'
cago Sun-Times writer,
said, when reviewing an
earlier edition, "Al-
though [it] isn't bedside
reading, it won't put you
to sleep, either." Some
interesting facts from the
1996 edition:
In 1995 there were 34,495 new businesses
incorporated in the state; 42,771 businesses de-
clared bankruptcy in the same year.
The highest infant mortality rate in Illinois in
1994 was in Schuyler county: 54.1.
Calhoun and Henderson counties had the
highest rate of death from cardiovascular diseases
in 1994—61.19; Johnson county had the lowest
rate with 36.1 1.
Illinois Beach had the highest attendance of
any state park in 1 995 with 3,1 22,2 1 1
.
In 1990 the average commuting time in
Illinois was 25.1 minutes; Cook county residents
had a mean commute of 29.4 minutes, while in
Coles county the commute averaged only 14
minutes.
Lake county had the highest operating ex-
pense per student in public schools for the 1993—
94 school year—$6,413. Richland county spent
the least, $3,683.47 per student.
In 1995 9,249 bachelor's degrees and 6,769
master's degrees were awarded in business and
management; 5,465 bachelor's and 5,861
master's degrees awarded in education.
From 1983 to 1993 Illinois energy consump-
tion increased by 176 trillion BTUs.
The book includes 28 chapters exploring topics
as varied as agriculture, business activity, tax rates
energy use, crime, education, housing, population,
recreation, and retail sales.
A softbound copy of the 1996Abstract is $50. A
computer package, containing both the book and
diskettes, is $90, and can be ordered for either PC
or Macintosh systems. The CD-Rom package, new
this year, is $100.
1996 Illinois Statistical Abstract - Order Form
Books @ $50.00 each
Computer Packages @ $90.00 per pkg.
(book and disks)
For Disk Packages, please circle:
PC Excel PC Lotus Macintosh Excel
CD-ROM Packages (» $100.00 per pkg.
(book and CD-ROM)
Payment enclosed. (Shipping and handling charges are
waived for those enclosing payment with order.)
Libraries, schools, and bookstores, please attach your P.O.
Prepayment required. Make checks payable to the Bureau of
Economic and Business Research.
For more information call Maria Osterbur at (217) 333-2331.
Name
Company,
Address
City/State/Zip_
Pho
Fax or send your order to:
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Bureau of Economic & Business Research
428 Commerce West, 1206 South Sixth Street
Champaign. Illinois 61820
Fax: (217) 333-7410
292 10/97 151.M
The 1997 Outlook
By Richard J. Arnould
The Illinois economy will continue steady
growth over the next few years as will the
nation^s economy.
ONE YEAR AGO AT THIS TIME I WROTE MY
first note on forecasting. At that time I
did not anticipate tiiat I would write
only two such articles. Actually, I would not need to
write a second article. The forecasts developed this
year from the Illinois Econometric Model are so
similar to those of last year that the same comments
could be published again!
Let me remind readers again that the Illinois
Econometric Model involves a technical process of
using a large number of equations to tie the Illinois
economy to national forecasting models developed
by others and from those links estimate various
aspects for the Illinois economy. Although some-
times such a model provides very unrealistic fore-
casts, our model has been generating very accurate
predictions. While it will take another year to deter-
mine the accuracy of the forecasts in this issue, the
arm chair forecaster must say that they appear to be
quite realistic.
There seems to be a consensus that the Illinois
economy will continue steady growth over the next
few years as will the U. S. economy. In 1997, robust
growth of nearly 5 percent in the gross state product
will be driven by strong wholesale and retail trade
and the services sub-sector. After 1997, the economy
will continue to grow, but at much slower rates at
least until the end of the century. Employment
growah should be quite modest over the next three
years, but personal income should increase by be-
tween 2.5 and 3.5 percent annually, and retail sales
should grow at much better rates in the next three
years than they have in the past three. The only
negative numbers in the forecast are very small drops
in income in nondurable manufacturing expected in
1998 and 1999.
Although the state revenue picture has improved
considerably over the past two years due to an im-
proved economy, there are challenges to be met in
Retail sales should grow much
better in the next three years than
in the past three.
the form ofquestions ofeducational funding reform
and in the 1996 welfare reform legislation, which is
as yet a mystery card that could provide a significant
challenge to the state in its provision of services to
welfare recipients.
I want to draw your attention to an innovation
we have made in this issue. We have drawn on the
expertise of business and professional men and
women to provide readers with their assessments of
various issues of significance to current and future
economic conditions. We thank each ot them for
their contributions and hope you, our readers, gain
from their insights.
Richard J. Arnould, special editor for this issue, is the tormcr editor and currently the head of the
Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Richard J. Arnould
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